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A b stra c t
This thesis is an examination of Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic I, 
and the Phaedrus. The focus is on Plato's political thought and my aim 
is to examine politics and language within the context of Plato's belief 
in and desire for order. I try to show how he connects the way 
language is used with the political life of a community. I argue that he 
identifies a link between the stability of a political association and the 
uses, and users, of language. Given his fundamental belief in a 
metaphysical order, existing beyond and prior to human existence, I 
argue that Plato seeks to anchor language and politics, to rationalise 
them in accordance with the the universal harmony characterised by 
the Forms. In making this argument I try to show that, for Plato, the 
spread of order logically culminates in a harmonisation of the physical 
and metaphysical. So much is this so, I claim, that the stability of order 
in any sphere of human existence depends on the existence of order in 
all other spheres. Thus, an orderly political association, one organised 
in accordance with Platonic moral principles, simply cannot exist if the 
language its members share does not exhibit the very same order. 
Psychological order is the avenue through which the metaphysical 
order enters human affairs. Given the Greek assumption that life in 
the polis is the natural life for man, examination of the human psyche 
becomes for Plato also an examination of communal, or associative, 
living. The moral as intrinsically part of the political. Plato is 
concerned with both the quality of the association and the quality of its 
mode of interaction. Both politics and language must be harmonised 
to ensure a concordance between human existence and the 
metaphysical order in which Plato believes.
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I n t r o d u c t io n
Sum m ary
This thesis is an examination of Plato’s Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Republic I, and the Phaedrus.
Grube begins his examination of Plato’s thought with an 
analysis of the theory of the Forms, on the grounds that 
everything else in Plato’s philosophy follows from this.1 We 
could add to this view a point that Cooper makes: Plato’s chief 
interest is in the spread of rational order to the greatest extent 
possible.2 The focus of this thesis is Plato’s political thought 
and my aim is to examine politics and language within the 
context of Plato’s belief in and desire for order. I try to show 
how he connects the way language is used with the political life 
of a community. I argue that he identifies a link between the 
stability of a political association and the uses, and users, of 
language. Given his fundamental belief in a metaphysical 
order, existing beyond and prior to human existence, I argue 
that Plato seeks to anchor language and politics, to rationalise 
them in accordance with the universal harmony characterised 
by the Forms. In making this argument I try to show that, for 
Plato, the spread of order logically culminates in a 
harmonisation of the physical and metaphysical. So much is
Grube, Plato's Thought, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1980), ix.
2John M. Cooper, "The Psychology of Justice in Plato", A m erican  
Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 155.
4
this so, I claim, that the stability of order in any sphere of 
human existence depends on the existence of order in all other 
spheres. Thus, an orderly political association, one organised in 
accordance with Platonic moral principles, simply cannot exist 
if the language its members share does not exhibit an 
analogous order. And, as we shall see, psychological order is 
the avenue through which the metaphysical order enters 
human affairs.
Plato’s interest in language and politics is best seen as an 
outgrowth of his interest in contemporary Athenian politics.
The rise of sophistry and the emergence of popular, direct 
democracy changed the nature of Athenian life, giving the 
average citizen an increased opportunity to participate in civic 
life as an equal with traditional political elites. Perhaps from 
the perspective of an aristocrat such as Plato, Athens had gone 
“down market” as the political character of the city became 
increasingly democratic (even though Plato’s mature 
experience of his city was of post-Periclean decline and not of 
some aristocratic golden age). It is tempting, therefore, to see 
his political theory in terms of class bias. But Plato’s ideas 
succeed in transcending the schisms of his time -- divisions 
that separated the Greek world into oligarchies and 
democracies. The dichotomy between oligarchy and democracy 
that dominated Greek political life did not entice Plato into 
taking sides, but into exploring the possibility of political 
stability. This is largely due to the unorthodox education in 
moral thought he acquired from Socrates and his own efforts to 
develop the political dimension of that thought. Plato could
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transcend the schisms because his education transcended the 
typical. We can characterise the Socratic influence on Plato as 
an impetus to question the terms of contemporary debates.
In large measure, then, Plato’s Socrates, like the historical 
figure, redirects interlocutors into examining whether they are 
in fact asking the right questions of themselves and each 
other.3 Socrates’ admonition to the Athenians in the Apology, 
that their foremost concern should be the condition of their 
souls (Apology 29d-30b), sets the tone for the Socratic 
“mission” in Plato’s other dialogues. In the context of my 
thesis, I try to show that this redirection takes the form of 
shifting the interlocutors’ attention away from the particular 
toward an understanding of universal order. Combining this 
with the Socratic admonition to the Athenians, the question for 
Plato, as it was for his teacher, is, how should one live? The 
question can be misleading if we think in terms of individuals 
choosing to conduct themselves in one way or another. The 
Greek assumption that life in the polis is the natural life for 
man translates the question into an examination of communal, 
or associative, living. This is how we should read Plato’s 
thought: the moral as intrinsically part of the political. In the 
political, furthermore, the conduit for interaction is the shiared 
language of the community’s members. Thus, Plato is 
concerned with both the quality of the association and the 
quality of its mode of interaction. Both politics and language
3Throughout this thesis, “Socrates” will refer to the character 
presented in a particular dialogue and not to the historical figure, 
unless otherwise stated.
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must be harmonised to ensure a concordance between human 
existence and the metaphysical order in which Plato believes.
M ethod
For lack of a better label, my method can be called intensive 
textual exegesis. All of the analysis contained in this document 
began as detailed examinations of the Platonic works, paying 
particular attention to settings, dramatis personae, d ram atic 
functions of arguments, and the broad objectives of each text. 
Each section attempts to make sense of one Platonic work as a 
whole and the method chosen best contributes to this objective. 
Plato wrote the works as distinct texts and, therefore, I have 
followed the method of saying something about the text first, 
and then saying something more general about the author’s 
beliefs. At times, I have presented something like a running 
com m entary.
The scholarly literature that has helped me develop my 
arguments has come from philosophers, historians, and 
classicists. All of these fields have helped shape this thesis, but 
the result is primarily a statement about Plato’s political 
beliefs. The distinction between these fields and political 
theory, as I see it, is that the thesis has more to say about 
human community in Plato’s thought than about analytical 
reconstructions of arguments or about specific historical events. 
Nevertheless, neither of these is excluded.
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Scope
This thesis is a critical examination of four Platonic works that 
can loosely be grouped into Plato’s middle period. I say loosely 
because the Protagoras and the Gorgias are not always 
considered middle period works, but are, I think, accepted to 
be from late in Plato’s early period. Since it would be 
impossible to identify a definitive break between Plato’s three 
periods4, I have felt justified in treating these two works as 
broadly contemporaneous with the concerns he pursues in his 
middle period. The other two works examined here are more 
certainly from the middle period, with the Phaedrus alm ost 
certainly being later than the Republic (and definitely later 
than Book I). The interpretation in the thesis, however, does 
not hinge on the dating of any specific work.5 My objective 
was to choose works that contain a decidedly Platonic political 
philosophy in order to say something firm about the author’s 
thought. Without doubt, there is some Socratic influence in all
4Vlastos finds four Platonic “periods”: early, transitional, middle, late. 
Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cam bridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46-47. Vlastos adds the transitional 
period to butters his claim that the philosophies of Plato and Socrates 
can be decisively differentiated by the former’s concern with ethical 
and non-ethical issues (e.g., politics). I am not sympathetic to such a 
reading, but will not have scope here to examine this vexed issue. I 
follow Allen’s dating of the dialogues. R.E. Allen, The Dialogues o f Plato, 
Vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 13-15.
5For a useful discussion of dating techniques and past attempts to date 
Plato’s works see Leonard Branchwood, “Stylometry and Chronology” in 
Richard Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 90-120.
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Plato’s works. Nevertheless, the “Socratic Question” has not 
been my concern here and I have tried to avoid raising the 
issue. To hazard a guess, my suspicion is that at least some of 
my arguments would be applicable to dialogues in Plato’s early 
and late periods. Specifically, we can note the manipulation of 
language in the Euthydemus; the examination of crafts in the 
Ion; the treatment of sophistry in the Hippias Major; the 
ambiguous treatment of knowledge in the Hippias Minor; the 
theory of language espoused in the Cratylus; and the emphasis 
on persuasion in the Laws.
In examining the four chosen works, I attempt to tell a 
complete story about politics, language and order in Plato’s 
thought. Thus, the four sections examine the idea of order in 
Plato’s thought (Protagoras); the use and misuse of language in 
the context of political order, broadly construed (Gorgias); 
language and order specifically in the context of political 
institutions (Republic I); politics, language and order in the 
context of psychic harmony (Phaedrus).
Plato wrote in the fourth century BC, but set his dialogues in 
the fifth century. The latter was a time of significant social 
upheaval. Internally, Athens acquired the cosmopolitan 
atmosphere that brought new ideas into the mainstream 
thought of its elite class. Simultaneously, the city, which had 
democratic institutions for some time, became a more fully 
participatory regime under Pericles’ leadership. Externally, the 
growth of the Athenian empire produced a more conventional 
upheaval in the form of war. Thus, the latter half of the fifth
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century was simultaneously a time of greatness and a time of 
crisis. That which made the ‘golden age* golden also threatened 
its stability.
The dialogues chosen, then, offer a vivid description of Athens 
at the time Plato describes. They also offer vivid descriptions 
of colourful characters in Greek history. Because the 
Peloponnesian War (427-404 BC) dominates the latter half of 
the century, the coming clash of military powers can be heard 
rumbling in the distance beyond each dialogue. The 
significance of the Peloponnesian War cannot be 
underestimated. The social and political changes that occurred 
in Athens, the challenge to the city’s self-perception, and the 
intellectual role of sophistry all contribute to the conclusion 
that this was a watershed in the ancient world. Writing in the 
fourth century, Plato must have been aware that the dramatic 
settings he presents would have symbolic value for a 
generation to whom Athenian military supremacy was a story 
of the past. Plato uses the Athenian “Golden Age” as the model 
of self-defeating social beliefs and practices. In this sense, it is 
important to read Plato as addressing a contemporary audience 
who must be convinced that nostalgia for the supposed golden 
age is misplaced. This is not to say Plato believed in a more 
distant golden age that was undermined in the latter half of the 
fifth century. Nor can we say he believed in a coming golden 
age. Given the nature of Platonic formalism, perfection of any 
kind exists outside of time. True political reform for Plato 
would involve a decisive break with past human experience.
He might say that there had not yet been an attempt to
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produce a golden age because there had not been an attempt to 
harmonise politics with the objective moral order.
The possibility of reform, however, is always present in Plato.
In redirecting the interlocutors in any particular dialogue to 
ask more fundamental questions of themselves, Plato is 
indicating that human society is not incorrigible. Plato’s reform 
objectives are simply outside the political experiences of his 
day. I think we should take him at his word that instituting 
the ideal state is not strictly impossible.
My discussion of each work is somewhat self-contained and 
each could be read on its own. This is inevitable given my 
concentration on a single work in each section. Nevertheless, 
each forms part of a larger picture. Read together, each section 
supports the conclusion that Plato was concerned with the role 
of language in the construction of political stability, and that
this was an aspect of his more general interest in the spread of
rational order.
Section Summaries
• Section One: Protagoras
This section is a discussion of the concept of order in Plato’s 
thought. Looking at the Protagoras I examine the creation of 
order from disorder. In particular, I try to show that language 
can be used as a tool in the construction of order. However, I
try to show that it also has the power to produce a sham order
1 1
— a seemingly coherent arrangement that gives only the 
appearance of order. I look mainly at three parts of the 
dialogue: the opening scene with Socrates and Hippocrates, 
Protagoras’ ‘Great Speech’, and Socrates’ facetious 
interpretation of Simonides poem.
The first part gives us numerous dramatic clues about the 
construction of order and the potentially harmful effects of a 
disorderly life. The second part identifies order in human 
society as something problematic, something that must be 
created. Incorporating mankind into the divinely created 
universe is a problem brought about by the method used to 
construct the cosmological order, as the Great Speech’s myth of 
creation reveals. Mankind's needs are addressed last of all 
creatures. With his survival threatened, man is given 
attributes that will allow him to orchestrate his life and live 
safely, regardless of his physical inability to survive in the 
created universe. Bringing in the craft analogies that Socrates 
introduces early in the dialogue, I try to show that creating 
order is an exercise of man's rational powers. I argue that 
mankind's problematic relation to the rest of the universal plan 
does not mean that an ordered human society is impossible or 
unnatural. My point is that an ordered human society depends 
on the beliefs and actions of the members of that society.
Unlike order amongst the beasts, order in human society is not 
a necessary outgrowth of creation. Whereas Protagoras and 
Socrates may agree on this point, they disagree on how to 
evaluate human ways of life. On the grounds that an orderly 
life is better than a disorderly one, Plato is trying to show that
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it is in mankind's interest to create an organised political 
association that more closely resembles the natural order of the 
cosmos -- and, furthermore, that this order can be known.
Introducing an idea developed further in Section Two, I try to 
show how language can be used to promote either order or 
disorder. To do so, I turn in the third part to Socrates' analysis 
of Simonides poem. I describe how an apparent order can be 
fabricated and used to persuade those who do not grasp the 
fundamental connection between stability and natural 
harmony. For Socrates, the instability arises from the failure of 
the order to be grounded in any sort of knowledge of cosmic 
order. Its apparent orderliness rests on its ability to affect the 
appetites and provide a kind of pleasure. The reaction to 
Socrates' interpretation confirms this by showing that another 
“order”, that offered by Hippias, could be just as “orderly”.
• Section Two: Gorgias
The aim of this section is to examine the idea of political speech 
as an instrument of power. This dialogue contains Plato's most 
famous critique of rhetoric and those who both practice and 
teach it. I present the dialogue as a contest between differing 
conceptions of political power and human interests. The 
section is divided in three parts, each one devoted to a single 
interlocutor. Gorgias, I argue, represents the power of 
persuasion. His understanding of political power presents the 
rhetorician as the one most capable of swaying popular moods 
and opinions. Nevertheless, this power is limited in scope: the
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rhetorician seeks to become a dominant personality amongst 
his fellow citizens. This fellowship is never sacrificed for the 
sake of dominance. The rhetorician strives for fairly 
conventional Greek ideals -- the praise and respect of his peers.
With Polus we begin to see a transition to a less benign interest 
in rhetoric. Gorgias has casually expressed some ideas that, if 
taken literally, show the rhetorician as essentially power- 
hungry. Polus does take these expressions literally. The 
language of tyranny, which Gorgias unreflectively introduces, 
becomes for Polus the expression of a fundamental human 
desire. Plato uses this character to show the progress of the 
rhetorician’s teaching as it travels from teacher to student and, 
with Callicles, on to the practitioner. Polus* literal 
understanding of Gorgias’ position illustrates, from Plato’s 
perspective, an inherent flaw of rhetoric as conventionally 
taught and practiced. The transition Polus represents is from 
an unreflectively ethical use of power, one that presents no 
deliberate threat to an existing order, to a reflectively unethical 
use, one that seeks to destabilise the existing order.
Callicles perfects Polus and advances an argument for an 
extreme form of hedonism. In this section we see power 
praised as the supreme human desire, the thing that must be 
had to achieve all other ends. Callicles' hedonism requires that 
he value the power to fulfill desires above all else.
Running through the dialogue is a sub-theme about the misuse 
of power. Arguing that the misuse of rhetoric reflects the
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individual’s conception of interests as something distinct from 
the interests of the community, I try to show that Socrates 
wants to make individual and communal interests coextensive. 
This section sets the stage for the idea that the individual and 
the community are mutually supporting and that order in each 
is necessary for the spread of order generally. These ideas are 
developed further in Sections Three and Four.
The conclusion I draw in this section of the thesis is that Plato 
sees political language as a tool for gaining power and 
influencing popular belief. As a tool it can be used in a way 
analogous to more blatant forms of political manipulation, such 
as the public works projects that Socrates identifies in his 
discussion with Callicles. The issue is to discover how political 
language should be used, given the Platonic objectives of 
political stability and rational order.
•Section Three: Republic I
In the Republic I look at the idea of a moral vocabulary and its 
relationship to political order. My purpose is to show how 
beliefs are manifest in a moral language and how this 
influences the nature of a political association. I divide Book I 
into four parts: the opening scene on the road to Athens, 
Socrates' encounter with Cephalus, Polemarchus' attempt to 
rescue his father's argument, and Thrasymachus’ intervention 
in the discussion.
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In the first part of this section I talk about what will be called 
the pre-conventional setting that Plato describes. The scene 
contains some important ambiguities. There is a threat of 
force, a rejection of deliberation, but a collection of bonds 
existing between the characters in the scene. Those present 
are related as friends, fellow citizens, or brothers. I argue that 
Plato is saying something fundamental about the nature of all 
political associations that are not based on his moral principles. 
He is saying that beneath a fagade of community, the 
association is wracked by conflict. Only in the ideal city will 
the fagade reflect the underlying reality.
The next part of Book I is the discussion with Cephalus. In this 
part I deal with the operation of moral language in a 
community. Cephalus introduces (and uses) a moral language 
that provides a kind of order to the members of his 
community. However, this order lasts only so long as the 
beliefs supporting it are held unreflectively by the members of 
the community. Socrates' cross-examination demonstrates that 
Cephalus' type of ordered community is already an 
anachronism and prone to instability. The lack of reflection 
necessary to its maintenance has been superseded by a more 
critical method of analysis. Therefore, this supposed order on 
which Cephalus relies cannot be a true order from Plato's 
perspective.
Polemarchus' attempt to rescue his father's argument will also 
fail. In the third part I look at the way Cephalus' beliefs are 
transmitted to the next generation and how each generation
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effectively reproduces itself through its moral language. 
However, what has been transmitted must adapt to changing 
intellectual circumstances, personified by Socrates. Cephalus 
fails because he cannot argue a particular way. Polemarchus 
tries to rescue his argument by maintaining the same beliefs, 
but adopting a more analytical approach in order to counter 
Socrates. Both Socrates and Polemarchus want to ground the 
language that is being used in order to provide a stable basis 
for moral belief. While Polemarchus desires this, he does not 
see how to do it. He tries to ground his views by an appeal to 
an authority, the poet, which is itself ungrounded. There is no 
basis for determining why the authority is better than 
unreflective belief. Socrates will not accept this and tries to 
have Polemarchus see that the stable ground for moral beliefs 
and the language that expresses them is a knowledge of moral 
truths. Polemarchus concludes his section having sacrificed the 
content of his inherited beliefs through an inability to defend 
them in a satisfactory way. With a vacuum created, the way is 
clear for a more serious challenge to Platonic principles.
Thrasymachus presents the real challenge to Socrates in Book I. 
My interpretation concentrates mainly on his first statement 
about justice, specifically, his statement that the strong 
effectively impose a moral framework by declaring what is just 
and unjust (I accept in this part the view that Thrasymachus’ 
second statement is a more inclusive position and probably 
reflects his actual beliefs about justice. I treat the first 
statement as an important corollary to his later more inclusive 
explanation.). By doing so, they create a kind of order through
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a willful act. This, however, jeopardises the value of the craft 
analogy that Socrates has been using. This is made explicit 
when Thrasymachus uses the craft analogy to arrive at 
conclusions opposite to those of Socrates. Socrates claims that 
the craftsman benefits only the object of his craft, not himself. 
Thrasymachus successfully responds with the example of the 
shepherd who, by doing his job well, works to the detriment of
the sheep, the object of his craft.
I connect this to the point raised in Section Two that language 
is double-edged. It can be used for purposes antithetical to 
Plato's ethical views and, therefore, begs the question of what 
grounds moral beliefs. The correct ground for Plato is, again, 
knowledge of moral truths. Thus, the solution is found in the 
craft analogy that has been under threat. As a craft is based on
knowledge, the role of knowledge in the foundation of a
genuinely ordered political association becomes paramount.
But this cannot be defended until Plato makes clear what he 
means by knowledge and how it differs from the 
Thrasymachan position. The aporetic ending, as in Plato’s 
Socratic dialogues, confirms the relation Plato sees between 
knowledge and a virtuous (thus, orderly) life.
•Section Four: Phaedrus
In the final section of my thesis I return to the idea of language 
as an instrument of power introduced in the Gorgias section.
My objective here is to show this power as it is misused and to 
try to describe its proper use according to Plato. I argue that to
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achieve order, the human soul must grasp the fundamentally 
ordered nature of the universe. To do this, the psyche must 
recollect a vision of Beauty. My argument claims that this 
vision, which all souls have experienced to some degree, 
represents human moral intuitions and that Plato saw 
conscious reflection on these intuitions as necessary to creating 
an ordered psyche.
Also in this section, I try to show how language can distort or 
prevent the creation of this psychic order. I divide the 
dialogue into three parts: Phaedrus’ delivery of Lysias’ speech, 
Socrates’ first speech, and Socrates’ recantation. In the first 
section I explore the power of language to conceal truth, 
specifically the genuine beliefs of the speaker. I use Phaedrus’ 
delivery of another person’s speech to show how a person’s 
identity can be concealed behind a persona. This will lead to 
my later claim that, before moral intuitions can be reflected 
upon, the agent must reveal a true identity. In other words, 
the individual must give up all attempts at both self- and 
interpersonal deception. This theme is carried into the second 
part of this section, where I examine Socrates’ speech imitating 
Lysias’ style. The final part of this section develops the claim 
that the order of the human soul depends on grasping the 
ordered nature of the universe. Socrates’ myth of the 
disembodied soul provides most of the textual material I use to 
construct my argument.
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• Conclusion
In my conclusion I summarise my findings from the four 
sections of the thesis. I try to bring the sections together to 
show that, in these middle period dialogues, we can see a 
concern about the possibility of an ordered political association 
and the role of language in its creation. I end with a brief 
afterthought about some implications arising from my analysis 
and how these might inform our reading of other Platonic 
dialogues.
2 0
THE CREATION OF ORDER IN THE 
PROTAGORAS
Sum m ary
In this section I look at the Protagoras in order to explore P la to ’s views 
of the creation of order from disorder. I try to show that political 
language can assist in the creation of order, but that it can also be used 
to produce a sham or false order. This, I argue, represents only an 
apparent order that is ungrounded in the kind of knowledge that 
Socrates indicates is necessary. The explicit argument of the dialogue is 
about order in the individual soul. However, the political theme o f  
communal order is introduced through Protagoras’ claim to teach the 
art of politics (politike techne). I look at three parts o f the dialogue: The 
opening scene with Socrates and Hippocrates, Protagoras’ 4Great 
Speech’, and Socrates’ facetious interpretation of Simonides’ poem.
Introduction
The Protagoras is most notable for Socrates* argument about 
the unity of the virtues and for what has come to be known as 
the “hedonic calculus” that he defends in the dialogue.6 The
6Gregory Vlastos’ analysis of the unity of the virtues is still the best 
available. See “The Unity of the Virtues in the P ro ta g o ra s” in Gregory 
VlastoS, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
Regarding pleasure and the hedonic calculus see J.C.B. Gosling and 
C.C.W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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latter, in particular, makes the dialogue puzzling, since Socrates 
is eager in the Gorgias to reject hedonism of any kind (this is 
discussed in Section Two), but apparently supports a contrary 
position here. Both of these aspects of the dialogue are 
philosophically challenging and invite us to find Plato’s overall 
meaning through the issues they raise. It seems clear that the 
connection between the hedonic calculus and the unity of the 
virtues lies in the dual notion of rational understanding and 
unity. The hedonic calculus is a device that Socrates introduces 
to illustrate the need for some external standard which 
individuals can use to organise their lives. The unity of the 
virtues complements this by illustrating that those things that 
are most necessary to have are achieved through one thing, 
knowledge. The unity of the virtues, then, is the reduction of 
plurality to singularity. Both of these aspects of Socrates’ 
argument are significant for the idea of creating order in the 
political association.
Scholars have not used this dialogue extensively to make overt 
political arguments — and there seems to be negligible 
attention paid to the use of language in the dialogue. The 
philosophical challenges mentioned above have been the most
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frequent points of departure in analysing the Protagoras.1 M y 
analysis, however, sees the political issues as paramount, given 
Protagoras' claims about his own skill and given the historical 
time and place of the dialogue. As Martha Nussbaum notes, 
this dialogue, more than most, has an ominous sense of doom 
about it.8 The Peloponnesian War is looming and the political 
and moral complacency of the Athenians is about to be 
shattered. Moreover, the association of Protagoras with the 
Periclean era connects this work to the political events of the 
time (this is discussed further, below). The destruction of 
Athenian peace of mind brought on by the war only adds to the 
claim that political order can be merely a sham. The Athenians
1982). Also useful are Roslyn Weiss, “The Hedonic Calculus in the 
Protagoras and the Phaedo", Journal of the History o f Philosophy 2 7 
(1989), 511-29; J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, “The Hedonic Calculus in 
the Protagoras and the Phaedo: A Reply”, Journal o f the History of  
Philosophy 28 (1990), 115-6; Roslyn Weiss, “A Rejoinder to Professors 
Gosling and Taylor”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990), 117- 
8; Henry S. Richardson, “Measurement, Pleasure, and Practical Science 
in Plato’s P ro ta g o ra s '’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990), 7- 
32.
7This is true of the dialogue, but certainly not of any scholarly work on
Protagoras himself. Protagoras was a highly politicised figure in
Athens, if for no other reason than his association with Pericles. He is
also mentioned in other Platonic works, most notably the Cratylus and  
the T heaetetus. An interesting examination o f Protagoras' political 
significance can be found in Cynthia Farrar, The Origins o f Democratic 
Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Her chief 
concern is Protagoras' "man-measure" doctrine, which she uses to 
construct a strongly democratic theory which she feels can be
attributed to Protagoras. Peter Nicholson argues that, at least in the 
current dialogue, we must be careful not to attribute a democratic 
theory to Protagoras. He also uses other known aspects of Protagoras' 
thought to support his claim that the Great Speech is not a defence of 
Athenian democracy. Peter P. Nicholson, “Protagoras and the 
Justification of Athenian Democracy”, Polis 3 (1981), 14-24.
8Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 91.
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are about to learn that present stability is no guarantee of the 
fu ture.
In this section I will be exploring specifically the creation of 
political order as presented in the dialogue. My main claim is 
that Plato is trying to show how political language can be used 
to stabilise and order a political association. However, he is 
also careful to show how language can also be used to distort or 
prevent the creation of order. The dramatic action of this 
dialogue is especially significant. Plato clearly devoted a great 
deal of attention to the details of the work and that makes it 
incumbent on the reader to see the action as part of the 
argument. The dialogue form itself invites us to read each 
work as something more complex in its structure than a 
philosophical treatise. However, the Protagoras uses the 
dramatic detail to illustrate Plato’s point. Part of my argument, 
therefore, will be an interpretation of how we should 
understand particular scenes in the dialogue.
A significant part of my analysis has to do with Socrates’ use of 
the craft analogy. I attempt to show that the craft analogies 
raise important issues about the possibility of an ordered 
political association and the relationship between knowledge 
and the creation of that order. It is important to clarify that by 
an ordered political association is meant an arrangement 
organised around a rational principle. An element of the 
conflict between Socrates and Protagoras is the nature of 
rational principles. Protagoras finds the necessary organising 
principle in the existing practices and arrangements of a
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community. Socrates, on the other hand, sees the correct 
principle for guiding a political association as existing outside 
and prior to that association. Because of this, he sees the 
possibility of false order — something that arises from the 
failure to anchor the political association in something more 
stable than itself.
Also included here is an effort to justify the use of the craft 
analogy from Plato’s perspective. I try to show that the 
existence of crafts in general indicates both the possibility and 
superiority of order. Crafts also exemplify an order that is 
grounded in a knowledge that is prior to the order created 
through the practice of the craft.
My analysis is in three parts. I look first at the opening scene 
with Socrates and Hippocrates, where the need for order is 
illustrated through the dramatic action. Secondly, I look at 
Protagoras’ “Great Speech”. Here I argue that the myth of 
creation treats order in human society as something 
problematic -- something that must be created through 
mankind’s own powers. I try to show that Socrates is in 
fundamental agreement with many of the implications of this 
myth and that it can be used to describe what he indicates is 
necessary for an ordered political association. Thirdly, the 
examination turns to Socrates’ interpretation of Simonides’ 
poem. This part of the argument sets out to describe the 
creation of a merely apparent order through the manipulation 
of language. Protagoras believes that the interpretation of 
poetry is a necessary skill. Socrates practices this “skill” by
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showing its groundless claims to truth and, thus, its tendency 
towards instability. Socrates constructs a plausible 
interpretation of the poem that seemingly makes sense of it as 
a whole. But, the interpretation is just one of many that are 
possible because the interpretation arises from the poem itself 
and not from an understanding of truth that is prior to the 
poem. I conclude with a summary of the claims put forth in 
this section and a review of the idea of political language as a 
tool that can be used either to promote or subvert political 
order.
Before turning to the dialogue itself, I first give some 
background to the idea of a craft and the use of analogies in 
argument. This seems to be necessary in order to understand 
the validity, from Plato’s perspective, of using the craft analogy 
at all. It is important to show the complicated way he made 
use of this device for constructing his arguments in the 
dialogue.
Crafts and Analogies
Plato is obviously not the first to use analogical arguments, 
since it is reasonably certain that the analogies found in his 
earlier works reflect the sort of argumentative style Socrates 
employed. Since scholarly opinion accepts Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues as faithful representations of what Socrates was like, 
we an say that the analogies I discuss in this section have roots 
extending at least as far back as Socrates. As I show below, 
they can be traced even farther back. Nevertheless, the
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construction of a political analogy with crafts serves as both a 
powerful tool in arguing against an interlocutor and at the 
same time a suspect philosophical device to the mind of the 
reader. An interlocutor may feel compelled by the logical force 
of the craft analogies to concede that statesmanship is a craft, 
but the reader may feel that something has been slipped in 
that, if stated explicitly, would be questionable. The obvious 
question to ask is, what does politics produce that would allow 
one to see it as a craft? A simple way to answer this question 
is to say that politics does not produce anything tangible, but 
that there is a knowledge-based way of engaging in politics.
My answer will claim this much and add that the political craft 
is knowledge-based and has a result that is analogous to a 
craft’s output, without being identical to it in character. 
However, at this stage we are simply begging the question of 
what constitutes political knowledge and how its results are 
comparable to the product of a craft.
"If statecraft is an art that resembles rhetoric and sophistry in 
its lack of readily specifiable products," Sprague asks, "how is 
Plato able to regard statecraft as a genuine science...but 
rhetoric and sophistry as shams?"9 Is statesmanship directly 
comparable to, say, medicine? Does a shoemaker do with shoes 
essentially the same thing as what the virtuous man does in 
politics? Socrates’ arguments certainly imply that this is what 
he means. When he says at Republic 489b-c that the man
9Rosamond Kent Sprague, Plato's Philosopher King: A Study of the 
Theoretical Background, (Columbia: University of South Carolina), 1976, 
xiv. I will be discussing crafts and products below.
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whose body is sick should wait at the door of the doctor and 
the man whose soul is sick should wait at the door of the 
philosopher, we have little choice but to draw the conclusion 
that there is a direct correlation.
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But the correlation may be more subtle than these direct 
comparisons would indicate. The common understanding of a 
craft is a series of techniques that are practiced to generate 
some given product. The craftsman does w, x, and y in order to 
produce z. And the knowledge requirement for a craft 
indicates that the steps are definitely done with the intention 
of arriving at the end product. The end product is the 
justification for following the steps indicated. Or, as Irwin 
writes, “If the product [of a craft] is an artefact, each step will 
be justified by its contribution to an object separate from any 
exercise of the craft.”10 When the steps are followed, the end 
result is always and inevitably z. A craft on this view is no 
more than the joining of method and objective and is 
analogically suited to the description of rule-based activities. 
No matter how many times the shoemaker performs his set 
tasks, he always ends up with the same sort of end product. I 
will refer to this as the “output oriented” view of crafts. This is 
certainly one way of regarding the craft analogy, but I want to 
claim that it is more misleading than helpful in understanding 
what Plato means by the craft analogy.11
10Terence Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 73.
11 This appears to be the way that Irwin reads the craft analogy. In 
criticising this view I draw on several commentaries on Irwin:
Nussbaum (1986); George Klosko, "The Technical Conception of Virtue", 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981), 95-102; David L.
Roochnik, “Terence Irwin’s Reading of Plato” in Charles L. Griswold, 
ed., Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (London: Routledge, 1988). See 
also Terence Irwin, “Reply to David L. Roochnik” in Griswold, ed. (1988)
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Beside this we can place what I will call the “practice oriented” 
view of crafts. In some cases, we call an activity a craft 
without being able to specify an artefact that is produced. I 
can see two ways of accounting for these activities as crafts. 
First, we can follow Irwin: “Some crafts, however, produce no 
artefact; an expert flute-player or chess-player produces 
nothing but good flute-playing or good play in chess. But he 
still produces a product which can be identified without 
reference to his particular movements.”12 The existence of a 
product is crucial to Irwin’s argument.
Second, we can modify this to exclude the product as external 
to the activity and treat the thing that one is doing as the 
desired end result itself.13 The measurement of output is how 
well the practice is conducted and, thus, specifying the 
existence of a “product” is to miss the point. Irwin’s example of 
flute playing is, therefore, understood quite differently under 
this second interpretation. By its nature, good flute-playing 
requires a different sort of analytical method than the output- 
oriented view of crafts. Other types of crafts that seem to fit 
Irwin’s interpretation can also be seen as more problematic. 
Japanese flower arranging is another good example wherein 
the desired “output” is no more definite than well-arranged 
flowers. There are no associated steps in the doing of the craft 
because the craft cannot be defined or even described by the 
mechanical operations that produce the flower arrangement.
12Irwin (1977), 73.
13Martha Nussbaum offers an argument like this to counter Irwin’s.
My analysis is indebted to her observations. See Nussbaum (1986), 97-99.
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The output of the craft is the quality of the arrangement and 
this is what would have to be specified.
It is a trivial description to say that the arranger places cut 
flowers in a vase, moreover, because there is no associated 
knowledge with this activity (outside of the knowledge of 
"flowers" and "vase" and the purely mechanical activity 
involved). The difference between the output and practice- 
oriented crafts, then, has to do with what the craft does. In a 
way, we can reconcile these two views by accepting that both 
posit the existence of a product. We can then say that the 
difference does not really lie in the existence or non-existence 
of a product, but in the quality of the product to which the 
craft contributes. In an output-oriented craft, the product’s 
relevant quality is its existence. In a practice-oriented craft 
the product’s relevant quality is it impression on a subject who 
perceives it. It is the quality of the music or the aesthetic 
value of the flower arrangement that is being produced. In 
short, one product is susceptible to measurement and one is 
not.
In her analysis of the craft analogy in the Protagoras, 
Nussbaum’s concern is to explain Socrates’ craft of practical 
deliberation as something very much like the output-oriented 
view of crafts. Alternatively, she tries to explain Protagoras’ 
craft as something like the practice-oriented view. Her 
criticism of Irwin is that his view of crafts must reject that 
Protagoras has any craft to offer at all. Her own analysis of 
Socrates, on the other hand, will take the hedonic calculus
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literally and she will, thereby, attribute to Socrates a 
technocratic view of deliberation.14
In the output-oriented crafts, the craftsman seeks merely to 
create something that is new to the world; it becomes one of 
the material artefacts that exists for us. Its quality as a 
particular type of thing, i.e., the degree to which it is a good 
example of that class of things, is not the issue. This is true 
simply because the steps of an output-oriented craft produce a 
product of the required quality by design. As Nussbaum’s 
table above shows, this type of product’s quality is measurable. 
Practice-oriented crafts, however, imply a more complex 
relationship between "consumers" and "product" -- one where 
the product is experienced more as an impression than as a 
practical artefact.
The intellectual background to these views may be illustrated 
with some examples from Aristotle. In the M etaphysics  
Aristotle draws a distinction between experience and 
understanding. Both are related to and necessary for the 
existence of art. He says at 981a that "art arises when from 
many notions gained by experience one universal judgement 
about a class of objects is produced. But understanding 
surpasses experience in the power it gives a person to explain
14Nussbaum (1986), 97. NussbaumV analysis of crafts is insightful, but 
I will later try to develop a different way of understanding Socrates’ 
position in the dialogue. It is not necessary, I feel, to take his “science” 
of practical reasoning literally and, furthermore, to do so prevents us 
from appreciating his argument for the exercise of knowledge in 
human affairs.
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causes.” 15 Understanding allows us to theorise about 
experience.
He also describes two kinds of crafts: utilitarian and, what I 
term, intellectual crafts. The first crafts stemmed from the 
need to maintain our biological existence. And, he says, any 
man who could move beyond common perceptions about the 
world was considered wise. As life became more readily 
sustainable from the proliferation of utilitarian crafts, the 
intellectual crafts were soon developed. The inventors of these 
crafts were seen as the wisest men. They moved beyond the 
lessons of experience to pure theory about causes. Thus, if we 
were to place Aristotle’s categories of men on a scale it would 
look something like this:
men of theoretical knowledge
m aster workers
/
artists
/
men of experience
/
creatures of sense  perception
The arrows indicate a movement to a higher level of 
intellectual development (not an inevitable progression).
15Quotations are from Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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Artists are treated in Aristotle as shop-floor workers who 
mechanically repeat the steps they have been taught. Master 
workers are those who can organise and manage the work of 
artists. The scale moves from experience to understanding.
The wisest person is the one who is least controlled by others, 
but who controls others the most. As Aristotle says, "The wise 
man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not 
obey another, but the less wise must obey him" (982a).
Aristotle’s analysis is applicable here. As in Aristotle, we find 
in Plato a distinction between productive crafts and those that 
use human intellectual potential to a greater extent. When 
looking for wisdom in the ideal city of the R epublic , Socrates 
acknowledges that even the craftsmen are wise with respect to 
their crafts, but that the wisdom of the city resides with those 
who promote the good of the whole (428c-d). Thus, we can see 
an awareness that the techne analogy is more complex than a 
simple input-output model of human rational activity because 
there is an awareness that techne itself is a complex concept. 
Nussbaum writes:
The word techne is translated in several ways: ‘craft’, ‘art’, and 
‘science’ are the most frequent....The Greek word is more 
inclusive than any one of these English terms. It is also very 
closely associated with the word “episteme’, usually translated 
‘knowledge’, ‘understanding’; or ‘science’, ‘body o f knowledge’.... 
In fact...there is, at least through Plato’s time, no systematic or 
general distinction between episteme and techne. Even in some
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of Aristotle’s most important writings on this topic, the terms are 
used interchangeably. This situation obtains in the P r o ta g o r a s . 16
With this in mind, and Aristotle’s distinction between 
experience and understanding, we can see the importance of 
the distinction between output and practice-oriented crafts 
that I have described. While both are kinds of crafts, it is only 
practice-oriented crafts that utilise the highest human 
capabilities — and that will be more applicable to politics.
One could carry on with the argument that, in a logical sense, 
all crafts produce something that is distinguishable from the 
activity itself. Even if techne has a multi-layered meaning, it 
does not alter the fact that a craft produces. A flute player 
does, indeed, produce flute music and, as a logical category, 
that is the player’s objective. This seems to be Irwin’s 
contention: the “doing” always results in a “something”, no 
matter how ephemeral or intangible that something is. It is 
possible to grant this point up to the moment that we identify 
the product with the craftsman’s objective.
I said above that the "product" of practice-oriented crafts is 
fundamentally an experience had by a subject (or many 
subjects). Take for example, the playing of any musical 
instrument. This is a recognised craft and it results in the 
product called music; but the intended purpose of playing the 
instrument is to produce music of a particular kind. When the 
concert ends, there is nothing to take home besides, first, a
16Nussbaum (1986), 94.
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memory of what was heard and, second, a judgement about 
what has been heard. The musician’s objective is to produce a 
particular judgement and that is the reason a practice-oriented 
craft is not reducible to an output-oriented one. Only the latter 
defines its purpose as the production of an artefact that will 
directly alter the material make-up of the world.
Take as a further example Japanese flower arranging again. 
Because the product is tangible in this example it seems to pose 
a special challenge. Nevertheless, the art of arranging the 
flowers aims at an aesthetic experience, not simply the 
relocation of the flowers in the vase. Thus the product is the 
perception in the viewer of the particular arrangement, and 
both perception and arrangement could have been different. 
There is no requirement that this arrangement produce th is  
perception, nor that another arrangement either not p roduce  
the same perception or produce the opposite percep tion . 
Therefore, the product is associated with the viewer’s 
assessment of a particular artefact.
I have developed these outlines as background for the 
following analysis of the craft analogies, but this by itself will 
not be sufficient. The crafts are part of an analogical argument 
and we need to examine this type of argument before moving 
to the dialogue. At its most basic level, analogy depends on the 
recognition of similarities between two things. As Lloyd says, 
analogy is "any mode of reasoning in which one object or 
complex of objects is likened or assimilated to another (of the 
two particular instances between which a resemblance is
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apprehended or suggested, one is generally unknown or 
incompletely known, while the other is, or is assumed to be, 
better known).”17 Analogy is generally intended to make the 
incomprehensible more clear through comparison with 
something familiar and ordinary. As I said, Plato did not 
invent analogy and Lloyd describes the liberal use of analogies 
in Presocratic cosmologies. All the images used in the 
analogies, he says, are derived from normal features of society 
at that time and typical human experiences. "Three ideas,” he 
says, "which are of great importance in the history of Greek 
cosmological theories are (1) the conception of the cosmic order 
as (or as like) a social or political order, (2) the conception of 
the world as (or as like) a living being, and (3) the conception 
of the world as (or as like) the product of intelligent, designing 
agencies."18 What this tells us is that arguments from analogy 
were the traditional tools of the earliest Greek thought and 
Plato was not breaking new ground by using analogies, but 
perhaps by making particular comparisons.19 There is one 
caution to be made. Making a comparison is not the same as 
establishing an identity. The purpose of an analogy (and what 
I take Lloyd to be saying) is to establish a way of
17G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1966), 175.
18Lloyd (1966), 193.
19There is a possible problem with classifying the early cosmological 
theories with analogies. We may, for example, treat a theory of the 
origin of the world as an analogy between an artefact and the universe, 
but the original theorist may very well have seen this as establishing 
an identity. Is the world like an artefact or is it an artefact?
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understanding what is obscure by using a set of relevant 
characteristics of the un-obscure as an analytical tool.
The analogy between politics and crafts, as I said above, can 
hide almost as much as it reveals and at the least may make us 
suspicious of Plato's methods. The reason for this is simply 
that the set of relevant characteristics to use in the comparison 
is never stated. On the one hand he compares the perfect 
politician to a craftsman and on the other he seems to have 
little use for the intellectual capacity of actual technicians. 
"None of the psychological aspects of technology appear to 
[Plato] valuable in human terms. He did not consider the 
concentration demanded by work as a special type of human 
effort, nor technical thought as playing a formative role in 
human reasoning."20 If this is the case, why would he make 
the comparison between politics and crafts? It apparently 
throws us back to the idea that he intended to describe some 
political “product” that the statesman produces.
The answer, I think, lies in how we understand crafts 
themselves and what Plato believed they told us about the 
world. The crafts are more than the technical production of 
goods, as I have argued, but also a general organisation of 
knowledge into a coherent “discipline” or activity. While flute- 
playing is more than the systematic manipulation of the 
instrument, it is still a separate activity with its own relevant 
body of knowledge. So, playing the flute, practicing medicine,
20Jean Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, (L ondon: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 243.
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and shoemaking are all crafts (or arts), but all in different 
ways. Each in its own way reveals, also, that these spheres of 
human action are susceptible to such organisation. I want to 
claim that the set of relevant characteristics that Plato uses in 
comparing politics to a craft contains the craftsman’s ability to 
organise and arrange. Additionally, it contains the craftsman’s 
ability to achieve the sort of objective appropriate to the kind 
of craft (output or practice-oriented) he practices. The 
objective of some craftsmen is a material artefact. The 
objective of other craftsmen is a type of experience.
We can see the crafts are analogues to the divine creation of 
the universe — just as Pre-Socratic cosmogonies saw divine 
creation in terms of human technical skills. Platonism must 
start from the assumption that the universe is ordered in the 
best possible way prior to the existence of human beings. 
Furthermore, we can say that order is always superior to 
disorder for Plato (a point that I will illustrate in my discussion 
of the opening scene, below). The Timaeus, Plato’s own 
contribution to cosmology, makes these views clear. He writes 
at Timaeus 30, “God therefore, wishing that all things should be 
good, and so far as possible nothing be imperfect, and finding 
the visible universe in a state not of rest but of inharmonious 
and disorderly motion, reduced it to order from disorder, as he 
judged that order was in every way better.” Therefore, 
without the imposition of divine reason, the visible world 
would have remained in flux. However, reason did impose 
order and that means that there is now a structure lying 
behind the shifting patterns of the visible world.
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Plato is effectively arguing the following:
(1) the universe has a rational pattern (assumed)
(2) a rational pattern precludes conflict
(3) humanity is a component of the universe
thus,
(4) the natural (or teleological) pattern of human 
relations is orderly and conflict-free.
Anyone wishing to argue that (4) is false must show either that 
the rational order of the universe does not entail orderly 
human relations, i.e., that human relations are an exception to 
the universal rule, or show that the universal order is an 
illusion and that (4) is the logical conclusion of a false 
proposition. The burden of proof is either way on the 
dissenter. The interlocutor who would accept that the universe 
is orderly, but that human relations are an exception, must 
further explain why the god judged that order is better than 
disorder, but did not think this mattered for humanity. The 
interlocutor who would claim that there is no order to the 
universe must further explain why the god would prefer 
disorder to order. This is not to say that such arguments 
cannot be constructed, simply that there is at least prima facie
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support for Plato’s argument, accepting a model of divine 
creation.
The reason that Plato’s argument is important to an analysis of 
the craft analogies is contained in the quotation from the 
Timaeus above. The universal order did not come about by 
itself; it was imposed by god. The universe is a product of a 
rational craftsman and, to varying degrees, human craftsmen 
do essentially the same thing as the god. Men take the 
disorganised material from the world of becoming and 
synthesise it into something organised with respect to human 
needs or desires.
Some of these crafts organise things that directly serve 
utilitarian ends. We can say that a craft’s level of complexity is 
commensurate with the difficulty involved in ordering the 
material used (taking material in a broad sense to 
accommodate the sound-making capacities of a musical 
instrument, and so on). Politics, then, becomes a highly 
complex craft activity because it seeks to organise a type of 
material that, by its nature, is capable of organising in general. 
In other words, the straightforward utilitarian crafts use 
materials that have no say or opinion about their use. To 
organise human beings necessitates taking account of their 
capacity for self-direction that may militate against attempts at 
organisation.
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By the time of the Protagoras Plato has started to distinguish 
firmly between those who are guided by appetitive desires and 
those who are guided by intellectual desires and the more 
sophisticated psychology of the Republic will describe just how 
complex Plato thinks the human mind is. At one level, all 
people are identical in that each has the same characteristics 
combined into its soul. At a higher level, the mixture is 
different for each person, and this is what makes the political 
craftsman’s job difficult. Uniformity is not possible because the 
human soul is not uniform across all people. What may be 
possible is the orderly arrangement of existing souls within a 
stable system.
“Therefore [god] turned [the world] into a rounded spherical 
shape,” Plato writes regarding the creation of the universe,
“with the extremes equidistant in all directions from the centre, 
a figure that has the greatest degree of completeness and 
uniformity, as he judged uniformity to be incalculably superior 
to its opposite” (Timaeus 33). This suits inanimate material 
well, but the same degree of uniformity cannot be achieved 
with men. The statesman must balance the elements of soul in 
men to eliminate disharmony. Unlike inanimate material, these 
elements of soul are vying with each other to gain control of 
the entire soul. By assigning each part a function appropriate 
to its nature, the whole is reduced “to order from disorder” and 
the state comes to resemble the order of the universe.
The point I am trying to argue is that we can understand the 
craft of statesmanship that Plato has in mind as a highly
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complex form of practice-oriented craft. As I argue above, 
such a craft aims to produce a judgement about whatever 
passes for “output” in such a craft. The complexity arises from 
the fact that statesmanship uses as material the very thing that 
forms the judgement, namely human beings. The statesman is 
in the position of having to generate a perception within the 
members of the community that his efforts at creating order 
fo r  them are good or desirable. In other words, the statesman 
persuades his subjects that he is arranging their lives to their 
benefit.
Regarding crafts, my argument thus far is that we can look at 
the craft analogies as Plato’s windows into the rational order of 
the universe. The existence of easily recognised crafts such as 
medicine, shoemaking, and the other examples that he so 
frequently uses, reveals that there is, indeed, a possibility of 
rationally organising human activity in accordance with a 
conception of knowledge. If an interlocutor were to argue that 
human relations are an exception to the universal order, these 
common crafts would prove to be stumbling blocks. Plato could 
reverse the argument by asking why some parts of human 
existence are rationalised, but not the most important part, 
politics? This is precisely what Socrates is made to ask through 
the craft analogies. Understood as something more than 
output-oriented crafts, we can see that Plato has constructed an 
analogy, not an identity, and that we will need a broader view 
of crafts to grasp his meaning.
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Given the scheme of Plato’s argument that I present above, we 
can describe two views of the craft analogies. The view that is 
critical of Plato treats the analogies as comparisons between 
familiar organised bodies of knowledge and politics. The crafts 
here are pockets of rational activity amidst the disorganisation 
that is either the norm in the universe or in human relations. 
The existence of these crafts is neither related to a harmonious 
cosmic order, nor are they in any way related to one another. 
This leaves us with the possibility that all human activity is not 
susceptible to rational ordering, but some activities are — so 
order and disorder exist side by side naturally. Either disorder 
is unnatural or we cannot think in terms of an orderly 
universe.
Another view is that the crafts are aspects of the way the 
world is, i.e., a glimpse into its rational structure. They are not 
so much areas of human life that we have somehow managed 
to conquer and control, but the very principle of universal 
harmony that has been disclosed by means of theoretical 
reasoning. The creation of the crafts is a sign of the human 
mind's ability to contemplate reality and imitate its nature.
The orderliness of a craft becomes, then, quite significant, and 
its precision fundamentally necessary to Plato's task. A craft 
that does not yield orderly, predictable, and precise results is 
not revealing the order of the universe, but further obscuring it 
from our mind's gaze. The interlocutors I examine below offer 
themselves as believers in politics as a craft, but the ideas they 
put forth are shown to be incoherent. The characteristics of
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their crafts would produce arts that are not sustainable 
because they result in self-defeating principles. In other 
words, their crafts are denials of art as such. Plato wants crafts 
that are like the rational structure at the macro level. The 
following sections will attempt to develop these themes 
through analyses of the opening scene with Hippocrates, 
Protagoras’ Great Speech, and Socrates’ poetic interpretation.
Protagoras
Before turning to the text, it is important to introduce the 
people who will come under analysis. The distinction between 
sophist and rhetorician becomes blurred in Plato's depiction of 
P rotagoras.21 He claims that he can teach young men the art of 
managing their own affairs well and those of the city 
(characterised as politike techne 22 and later as politike arete 
and then simply arete), but he also has rhetorical skills that
21 See E. L. Harrison, “Was Gorgias a Sophist?”, Phoenix 18 (1964) 3. 
Harrison contends that we need to examine Plato’s objective to discover 
why Gorgias is not described as a sophist, while Protagoras is. In the 
case of the Gorgias, he says, Plato is anxious to condemn Callicles, which 
requires an analysis of rhetoric more than sophism. Whereas, in the 
Protagoras he is attempting to display the shallow wisdom of those who 
billed themselves as sophists. I think we can add to this the lack of any 
technical distinction between teachers of rhetoric and sophists at the 
time -- and the relative unimportance of such a distinction. The 
distinction is not so much blurred, then, as irrelevant.
22There may be some risk in treating these terms as synonyms. C. J. 
Rowe evaluates the various possible interpretations of "arete99, This is 
part of the larger issue of defining what a sophist is (see above). C. J. 
Rowe, "Plato on the Sophists as Teachers of Virtue", History of Political 
Thought, 4 (1983), 409-27.
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remind us of Gorgias. Hippocrates echoes the popular notion 
that a sophist is the "master of making people clever speakers" 
(312d)23 and Protagoras certainly lends evidence to this view. 
He may have been the first to advertise himself as a sophist, in 
the sense in which we now understand it — a professional, fee- 
charging teacher of virtue.24 Plato attests that this occupation 
was quite lucrative (Meno 91d, Hippias Major 282d-e).25
By the dramatic date of the dialogue, Protagoras is quite old 
(317c) and well-known throughout Greece (the Friend whom 
Socrates meets at the beginning of the dialogue has heard of 
him and, later, Hippocrates repeats the majority view that 
everyone speaks highly of Protagoras, saying that he is a clever 
speaker — 310e). Surely, part of his reputation must be 
attributed to the novelty of sophistry in general and his early 
entrance into the profession.
Of his life and teaching we have several reports, but two ideas 
recur as the most important aspects of his thought. The first is 
the doctrine that "man is the measure of all things: of the
23C. C. W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991). All references will be from this translation.
24See Rosamond Kent Sprague, The Older Sophists (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1990), 4 (translation of Diels-Kranz frag. 80. 
Hereafter frag. 80) See G. B. Kerferd, "The First Greek Sophists”, The 
Classical Review, 64 (1950), 8-10 for a discussion of the meaning and 
uses of “soph is tes” prior to the classical period. See also Hippias Major 
283c: [Socrates to Hippias] "What you're good at surely is improving the 
morals of those who come to you as students, isn't it?" Trans. Robin 
W aterfield.
25 Hippias claims to have earned more than any two sophists combined.
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things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, 
that they are not" (Theaetetus 152a).26 Secondly, we hear that 
he wrote a treatise entitled On the Gods, which opened with the 
statement, "Concerning the gods I cannot know either that they 
exist or that they do not exist, or what form they might have, 
for there is much to prevent one's knowing: the obscurity of 
the subject and the shortness of man's life" (frag. 80, B4).
Protagoras was also part of the political life of Periclean 
Athens, where he became a close advisor of that politician. 
Plutarch reports that when a spectator at the pentathlon was 
accidentally killed with a javelin, Pericles "spent the whole day 
with Protagoras trying to decide whether, according to the most 
correct judgement, one ought to regard as the cause of the 
mishap the javelin or the man who threw it rather than the 
directors of the games" (frag. 80, A10). He also wrote the laws 
for the Athenian colony at Thurii — proof that he had close 
contacts with Athenian political elites and that he was a 
participant as much as an educator. It may also show that he 
was considered a good democrat, or, at least, a safe one. 
However, judging by his own man-measure principle, it may be 
difficult to attribute any particular political leanings to him.27
26Cf. Cratylus 386a.
27It is tempting to say that the Great Speech of the Protagoras  is the 
closest thing to a theory of democracy that we have from the Greeks. 
Unfortunately, we cannot move from that statement to the conclusion 
that Protagoras was a democrat. He could, as a clever speaker who 
adopts a quasi-relativist position, defend any political ideology if  the 
need arose. See Peter P. Nicholson (1981).
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My interest, of course, is in Protagoras as a craftsman and 
Plato's response to his claims to have a special skill or 
knowledge that he imparts to others. Protagoras says he 
knows something and is able to teach it to others. Socrates 
wants to know if the area in which Protagoras is wise is 
teachable. Both are trying to come to terms with the nature of 
the political craft. Protagoras has given us the barest outlines 
of what it must be: the proper management of personal affairs 
and those of the city. The craft resides somewhere in the 
undefined term “proper management”. It implies the desire for 
rational control to replace both random causation and 
unreflective reaction to circumstances.28 Clearly, both Socrates 
and Protagoras accept this as desirable. Thus, the different 
views that they will express reflect different “rationalisms” 
that are fundamentally incompatible. Plato will describe in 
both words and dramatic images the nature and consequences 
of each view. In the process, he will cast doubts on Protagoras 
as a teacher. However, what I want to show is that he will not 
reject the Protagorean objective of knowledge-based politics, 
but leads to a different understanding of how knowledge 
operates.
28See Nussbaum (1986) for a discussion of the techne-tuche antithesis
in Greek thought. She claims (e.g., p. 94) that traces of the antithesis
are already apparent in Homer and that it is commonplace by the time
of Thucydides and the Hippocratic writer.
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The Opening Scene
This work serves well as a reminder that the dialogue form is 
important to understanding Plato. The opening sequence of 
events lacks any formal presentation of philosophical views 
and relies on dramatic action to convey certain ideas. 
Consequently, we have to exercise additional interpretative 
skills to discover Plato’s meaning. The dialogue opens with an 
unnamed character greeting Socrates with erotic banter about 
the latter's pursuit of the young Alcibiades. Socrates responds 
that he has just been with the boy, but hardly noticed his 
presence. He was captivated instead by Protagoras, whose 
"beauty” lies in his wisdom (the irony becomes clear when we 
see how Socrates deflates the sophist). The friend is intrigued 
and has Socrates relate the entire encounter. By the time the 
dialogue turns to the encounter with Protagoras, we will have 
seen a shift from the random pursuit of appetitive desires to a 
reflective stance with regard to such wants.
That shift is mirrored in the opening lines as Socrates moves 
the conversation away from his physical interest in Alcibiades 
to an intellectual interest in the nature of virtue. The first soul 
that is rescued from the enslaving power of appetite is 
Socrates’ own. Nussbaum describes this exchange in terms that 
remind us of a Benthamite utility calculus.29 She says that 
Socrates’ placement of beauty and wisdom on the same scale 
foreshadows his hedonic calculus. Nussbaum seems to have
29Nussbaum (1986), 106 ff.
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put an interpretative gloss on this that requires us to ignore an 
important Platonic theme. I describe this scene as a move from 
appetite to intellect. But what seems obvious from the text is 
the move from appetitive to intellectual desire. Given the 
implicit division between appetite and reason in this scene, 
there emerges an idea of reason having its own peculiar 
desires. Therefore, Socrates is not saying that we can compare 
apples and oranges, as Nussbaum believes (and which is a 
common argument against utilitarianism30). He is making a 
statement about the operation of the soul. In terms of priority, 
Socrates’ statements clearly show that he thinks that the 
intellectual desires are either more legitimate or more 
compelling, but it is still open to the view that the desires 
differ qualitatively and not (or not just) quantitatively.
The story begins with Hippocrates calling before daybreak at 
Socrates' house with news that Protagoras is in town.
Hippocrates intends to enrol with the sophist, but fears that he 
may need a “referral” from someone older and more 
experienced (310e). Socrates promises to go with him to see 
Protagoras as soon as it is light.
Hippocrates typifies the man with no science of living. He acts
unreflectively. His agitation and excitement impel him to act,
but provide no guidance in determining how he should act. It
seems that the presence of a desire automatically provides a
30An excellent recent discussion of contemporary utilitarianism can be 
found in Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (O xford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), Ch. 1.
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reason for acting in a particular way. This sort of reason, 
however, inevitably reduces to an excuse to act in a particular 
way because it has more to do with contingent happenings than 
with rational assessment. Hippocrates will be unable to explain 
the relationship between what he wants and what he does in 
anything other than causal terms. That he wants something is 
his reason to act. Socrates’ questioning implies that wanting 
something is insufficient. Prior to the desire is a method for 
determining what is a proper desire and, thus, what is proper 
action.
It is also clear that Hippocrates receives and accepts 
information uncritically. He admits that he has never even 
heard Protagoras utter a word (310e), but agrees with the 
general opinion that he is a clever speaker. This is an opinion 
based on hearsay and Hippocrates has assumed that a 
preponderance of witnesses for a particular view conclusively 
establishes its truth (cf. Crito 46c-47a). But, worse still, he is 
not even certain what he will acquire by associating with 
Protagoras. Hippocrates has a vague notion that Protagoras will 
make him “wise”, but he has no clear understanding of what 
that may mean in practice. The general philosophical problem 
to which this passage alludes is presented in the Meno. T here, 
Meno poses the riddle of how we recognise what we are 
looking for, when we don’t know the nature of the thing we 
seek {Meno 80d ff.). This is not the precise difficulty in the 
Protagoras. Socrates wants Hippocrates to reflect upon wisdom 
with regard to activities that are (assumed) known or
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understood. In other words, Protagoras must have an area of 
expertise with regard to which he is considered wise.
This is surely a peculiar concern for Socrates, since it is he who 
will make the philosopher in the Republic wise as such.31 But, 
at a second glance, this is not as peculiar as it seems. The 
demand that Socrates is making in the Protagoras is for a 
statement about what Protagoras knows. Hippocrates cannot 
answer, except to say that Protagoras is a clever speaker. 
Protagoras himself will later say that he has knowledge of 
virtue and that this is what he teaches. Protagoras* claim, then, 
is that he is precisely what Socrates will say the philosopher is 
in the Republic, namely one who knows ethical truths.
Nevertheless, the function of his questions at this stage is to 
reveal that Hippocrates is not so much misguided in his 
pursuits, but completely unguided. Interestingly, when 
Socrates confronts him with the idea that he is going to study 
to make himself into a sophist ( a conclusion reached through 
the craft analogy - 311b ff.), Hippocrates is ashamed and
blushes. All he wants is a liberal education befitting his social
station. There is something dishonourable about sophistry that
exists side by side with Protagoras’ alleged wisdom.
Nevertheless, Hippocrates* shame is puzzling.
31 The philosopher is wise about something in the sense of being wise 
about the Forms. Since the Forms are, in fact, the realm of reality, the 
philosopher is simply wise about being. I take this to mean that he is 
wise as such.
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At the time in which the dialogue is set, sophistry was still 
relatively new. Protagoras claims to have been teaching for a 
number of years, but as a phenomenon with serious social 
implications, sophistry was just beginning to emerge as an 
important part of the Athenian political scene.32 The 420s saw 
this rise begin to accelerate33 and a significant cause of this is 
the patronage of Pericles himself.34 But the puzzle of 
Hippocrates’ shame has more to do with, first, his age and, 
second, his social class. Regarding the latter, we know that 
sophists drew their students mainly from a wealthy elite — 
those who could afford to pay for further education. In this 
sense, the “fruits” of sophistry were distributed in a sufficiently 
undemocratic way to make it popularly suspect. But 
Hippocrates is an aristocrat and his suspicion of sophistry 
would not spring from its anti-democratic tendencies.
This brings us to a second characteristic of sophistry, namely 
the sort of education that was sold. As Protagoras will argue, 
he teaches the “political craft”. The popular suspicion of 
sophistry has to do with the fact that sophists taught what any 
man would desire to know, but the fees put it out of reach for
32See, e.g., G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), especially Ch. 3.
330stwald charts the changes in Athens and the demand for sophists’ 
services. Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty 
of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 237.
34Kerferd argues this point, claiming that without this patronage from 
a prominent politician, sophism might not ever have gained the 
prominence it did in Athens. He uses this to show that the occasional 
intellectual backlash against sophists was simply an indirect means of  
attacking Pericles. Kerferd (1981), 21.
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those who allegedly held the power in Athens. In other words, 
sophists taught aristocrats how to succeed in the democracy, 
and this was perceived as a threat to the dem os.
Thus, we can understand Hippocrates* shame as a confession 
that he wants to join in the activities of the demos and become 
like them in the jury courts and the assembly — the political 
institutions dear to the common citizen’s heart. However, the 
specific assertion that makes him blush is that he is going to 
Protagoras to become a sophist, not simply for the education a 
sophist offers. Here, we can see him as reacting against those 
who effectively sell the ideals of democracy for profit. The 
sophist is a shameful professional because he trains others to 
behave like the demos. The sophist is basically a corrupter of 
the aristocracy. Thus, part of Hippocrates* shame is the product 
of a class bias against the practice of the Athenian 
dem ocracy.35
The second point to examine is Hippocrates’ age. Given that the 
sophists drew their students from the wealthy elite, the best 
the city has to offer (cf. 326c), it is not clear why a young 
aristocrat would suddenly feel ashamed about his interest in
35This, too, must be placed in its context. The period in question is that 
Golden Age of Periclean Athens. The democracy as we know it was itself 
relatively new. Despite the democratic “possibilities'’ inherent in the 
Cleisthenic reforms (510), it was undoubtedly Pericles who brought the 
democracy into being as a codified institutional arrangement.
Hippocrates shame need not be the aristocratic response to democracy.
It may simply be a view about the contemporary political debate from a 
partisan individual.
5 4
sophistry. His initial excitement is the far more typical 
response. To understand this, we must remember the 
“generation gap” that was opening up in the 420s that Ostwald 
describes.36 Sophistry was something for the younger 
generation, not the older aristocrats who could still recall the 
pre-democratic days. Because sophistry contributed to 
antagonisms between young and old, Socrates uses it to remind 
Hippocrates that his intended pursuit is a rebellious act. More 
than this, it is a rebellion against immediate family. Another 
reason that Hippocrates feels ashamed, then, is that sophistry 
contributes to the breakdown of traditional bonds of kinship.
He is effectively siding against those to whom he owes the most 
respect. Socrates alludes to this when he reminds Hippocrates 
that he has decided on enrolling with Protagoras without 
consulting family or friends — presumably the first allegiances 
of any young man.
A final point to make about Hippocrates’ shame has to do with 
the way Socrates makes use of it. Having kindled the specific 
feeling, Socrates causes Hippocrates to pause momentarily and 
consider what he is about to undertake. It becomes the vehicle 
for introducing a reflective stance that Hippocrates hitherto 
lacked. In this sense, the specific object that causes shame is 
unimportant. It is only necessary for Socrates to bring about 
the feeling to show an awareness that there is a scale by which 
we can adjudicate between desires. In this instance it is a 
moral scale revealed by an intuitive sense of wrong conduct. 
With this scale present, the creation of order from disorder can
360stwald (1986), 229 ff.
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begin. Moreover, we see now that reflection is a process of 
remembering what one already knows. In this case,
Hippocrates is made to recall who and what he is in his own 
com m unity.
We need to return to examining Hippocrates’ character to 
understand more fully the nature of the disorder. Hippocrates 
recounts his actions over the past day. First, he went after a 
runaway slave and was gone all day. He may have had an 
appointment with Socrates or been in regular contact with him 
because he says that he meant to tell Socrates where he was 
going, but something put it out of his head. He cannot 
remember what it was. Secondly, after returning with his 
slave, he learned that Protagoras had arrived. His immediate 
intention was to fetch Socrates and rush to Callias’ house, 
where Protagoras was staying. He decided against it because of 
the late hour and his own fatigue. He slept for a few hours, just 
enough to feel reasonably rested, and rushed to Socrates’ house 
where we find him now. Hippocrates may not have a science of 
life, but he has a manner of living. He responds to desires as 
quickly as his mind throws them up before him. He reacts to 
the runaway slave by pursuing him -- not an unreasonable 
action for a slave owner. However, the spontaneous reaction 
obliterates any awareness of competing obligations, effectively 
separating Hippocrates from everything that has occurred 
before this exact moment in his life. He has no awareness of 
himself except as the owner of Satyrus, a runaway slave.37
3 7 It would not be surprising if Plato was having some fun at 
Hippocrates’ expense. Chasing a slave named Satyrus makes it sound as
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When he is aware of conflicting obligations or desires, he has 
no rational means for choosing between them. When he 
arrives home he is tired, but wants to see Protagoras. He not so 
much decides against going to Callias* house as he is physically 
incapacitated by his fatigue. Had the need for sleep been less 
severe, he would have rushed to get Socrates in the middle of 
the night for the visit to Protagoras. Hippocrates is clearly 
driven by appetites. Whichever desire turns out to be 
strongest is the desire he tries to satisfy. The only hierarchy of 
values that we could derive from Hippocrates is that appetites 
which serve our existence as physical beings demand the most 
immediate attention.
Hippocrates represents a life without “proper management”.
He is a suitable student for the type of training that Protagoras 
claims to offer. He has already shown that he is corrigible — he 
is able to step back somewhat from his irrationally organised 
life. The opening scene establishes that the removal of this 
irrationality is the objective Hippocrates should be pursuing, 
even if he does not understand that this is what he needs.
As I said above, Hippocrates, at each moment that he decides to 
gratify some new desire, is completely divorced from any self- 
awareness and even from his own history. He has memories 
and is aware of decisions he has made before, but he is not 
influenced to act by either of these. The experiences he has are
if he spent the day in pursuit of a mythical woodland deity with a 
reputation as a trickster.
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never synthesised into a more general knowledge that can be 
used in future deliberations. As a result, deliberation becomes 
a meaningless word in this context. Interestingly, this 
weakness in Hippocrates’ character directs us more to 
Protagoras than to Socrates. Protagoras has an experience- 
based epistemology that is neatly captured in the quotation 
above from On the Gods. He cannot know the gods, he says, 
because the subject is obscure -- something gets in the way of 
his senses that prevents his mind from developing an 
impression or belief. Even without this obscurity, there is not 
enough time in a man’s life to experience as much as is 
necessary in order to acquire knowledge of the gods.
Protagoras is careful, at least in the opening line of that 
treatise, not to make any claims from his lack of experience. In 
other words, a lack of experience is not a refutation of divine 
existence. Mind simply does not have direct contact with some 
immaterial reality. All knowledge is mediated through our 
bodies. Thus, to know is to know what we have encountered 
before. Knowledge is always attached to something that can be 
experienced and to learn is to experience anew.38 This gives 
some insight into Socrates’ use of the hedonic calculus later in
3 8 If this is so, we can construct some parallels between Plato and 
Protagoras. Plato's doctrine that all learning is recollection sounds like 
Protagoras’ idea that we know what we have experienced. The key 
difference, of course, is that the objects of knowledge for Plato are 
immaterial Forms that are experienced after death/before birth (by the 
disembodied soul), while Protagoras is concerned with physical 
existence and sense perception. This difference is precisely about the 
ability o f the mind to have direct contact with an immaterial reality.
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the dialogue. Assuming an awareness, surely on Plato’s part, of 
Protagoras’ views, the hedonic calculus is the incorporation of 
experience-based knowledge into practical deliberation. It is 
problematic to say that Socrates accepts the hedonism 
expressed in this part of the dialogue. However, I believe we 
can say that the hedonic calculus in its dramatic context is 
intended to reveal the disordered and unsystematic 
understanding that Protagoras has of his own teaching. Had he  
developed the hedonic calculus, he could have used it to defend 
some version of the art of practical deliberation. That he does 
not have recourse to any such understanding of practical 
deliberation is meant to show Protagoras’ own lack of wisdom 
— the “commodity” for which Hippocrates admires him.
In certain respects, then, the dialogue is a competition to see 
who is more likely to bring benefits to Hippocrates* soul. 
Furthermore, the benefit in question is definitely order. We 
see it through its absence in the opening scene and we hear 
Protagoras offer it as his course of study (the ambiguous 
“proper management” of personal and public affairs — 318e). 
Socrates and Protagoras are at odds with one another over how 
best to improve this young man.39 Judging from Protagoras’ 
view that knowledge and experience are inseparable, we would 
expect that he will teach some sort of critical self-awareness, 
giving the student the means of evaluating his experiences 
through a method of practical deliberation. Socrates agrees. 
Without this, Hippocrates will remain unable to deliberate —
39The idea of a competition for Hippocrates’ soul is found in Nussbaum 
(1986), 93.
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the word will continue to be meaningless in the context of his 
life ~ or even regulate his life in any way. He will pursue a 
slave one day and wisdom the next.
If the dialogue is a competition for Hippocrates' soul, then 
Socrates has a head start. Hippocrates is, after all, in his house 
and Socrates has the first opportunity to teach him something 
new. As I sketched out above, Hippocrates is agitated and 
directionless, except for the irresistible demands of desire. He 
personifies a disorderly life. Socrates begins immediately to 
impose order on this young man's soul. He asks a question 
which in normal circumstances is in no way extraordinary: 
what will Protagoras make of you? For Hippocrates, however, 
it is more than a question about his intentions. It is a jarring 
reminder that there are standards by which one can determine 
the value of actions.
Hippocrates is correct to want wisdom — as Socrates says, he is 
probably more interested in a liberal education than sophistry 
as a profession (312a-b) -- but one has to examine the goods 
before handing over the money. Wisdom is a valuable 
commodity and Hippocrates asks that he is willing to sacrifice 
all the money he can find to acquire it (310e). The metaphor of 
wisdom as a commodity is interesting in the context of the craft 
analogies. Socrates characterises the sophists as peddlers in 
the market who "say that anything in their stock is good"
(313d). But the peddler is not necessarily the producer; he 
need have no knowledge of how the commodity was produced. 
The point is that no genuine knowledge is required in order to
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make the sale, simply an ability to persuade the buyer that the 
commodity is of high quality. Socrates’ comparison leads us to 
believe that the sophists are wise at convincing people that 
they are wise. The profit motive, then, becomes the basis of 
their interaction with a student and the actual content of their 
wisdom becomes secondary. Protagoras is keen to establish the 
value of his wisdom. He says at 328b-c that any student who 
does not wish to pay the fee he charges may swear to what he 
thinks it is truly worth and pay that amount instead. Thus, he 
is saying that if he has failed to persuade a student that what 
he offers is of high quality, the student becomes the arbiter. 
While this shows Protagoras’ self-confidence, it also confirms 
what I have just said. Throughout the course of study that he 
offers, he is engaged in a project to persuade the student that 
he, the teacher, is as wise as he claims to be. The course of 
study becomes the means for determining fee.
The risk of buying the sophists’ goods that Socrates mentions is 
that the “commodity” must be carried away in the soul. The 
goods that the peddlers sell, however, can be placed in a 
container and taken away for later inspection (314b). It is as 
though the food one bought had to be eaten immediately after 
purchase without an examination of its quality. The trouble 
with sophistic teaching is that, being contained in the student’s 
soul, it effectively corrupts the capacity to judge correctly. The 
part of the student that is sick and operating improperly must 
somehow diagnose its own disease. Yet, the corrupting 
influence of the sophist’s teaching makes it incapable of doing 
so. We see in the opening scene that Hippocrates is unable to
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bring himself under control and that he needs Socrates’ mild 
scolding to make him pause and reflect. Nevertheless, as I 
argue above, Hippocrates’ shame indicates that there is 
something within him around which can be constructed a 
principle for ordering his life. The higher ethical standard that 
his shame reveals is not simply imposed from without, but 
generated out of his own psyche and brought before his 
conscious mind with the help of an external agent.
The analysis of this opening scene has necessarily brought in 
elements from other parts of the dialogue. However, the point 
has been to characterise Hippocrates as the disordered soul in 
need of a cure. His essential character is clearly shown in his 
actions. It becomes apparent in Protagoras* Great Speech that 
the creation of order in the soul is a part of the creation of 
order in the polis. More accurately, these are mutually 
influencing and reinforcing levels of order. The Great Speech 
will show us the creation of order in human society as 
contingent upon the capacity for order in individual human 
souls.
The Great Speech
Protagoras’ long response to Socrates’ question about the 
teachability of the political craft is a free sample to advertise 
his skills. In it, Protagoras demonstrates his competence in 
different modes of argumentation, his ability to construct an 
argument in response to a challenge, and his ability to adapt an 
argument to a particular audience. Thus, we hear both a myth
6 2
and a more analytical argument; a rapidly devised response to 
Socrates’ question; and a speech that seems to praise 
democracy from a person whose theories should be neutral 
between systems of belief.40
In addition to his straightforward display of his skills,
Protagoras tries to distinguish himself from other sophists.41 
He says that he offers a less specialised curriculum than (it is 
implied) Hippias (318e). We get the impression that Protagoras 
is offering “well-roundedness” and not a collection of factual 
material. As he claims to teach proper management of one’s 
personal affairs and those of the city, it is clear that the 
training has to do with generalisations about what is known.
He assumes the availability of all the “data” and now what is
40The ability to respond to such challenges was, certainly, one o f the 
skills common to the teaching of sophists and rhetoricians. Protagoras 
is merely demonstrating that he is exceptionally able. Regarding the 
apparent democratic leanings of the Great Speech, I think it is 
important to read it as a speech addressed to a particular group o f
people. Socrates has made a point drawn from the popular beliefs of the
Athenians and Protagoras tries to show that those beliefs are not 
inconsistent with what he has said. The result is that he does not reject 
that the Athenians are correct (making it sound as if he agrees with 
Athenian democratic sentiments), and does not retract his own
assertion. He must adopt this strategy, furthermore, because he has to 
convince Hippocrates (and other students) that his wisdom has
applications in their particular city. See comments above and 
Nicholson (1981).
41 This is a classic advertising strategy, even in our own time.
Protagoras sets out to show why a person would need what he has to sell 
and then tries to demonstrate the superiority of that product to “brand 
X”.
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needed is a rational organisation to place it at the command of 
the person in question.
Protagoras describes the social position of a sophist in fifth 
century Greece and shows that the pejorative sense of the word 
was already common currency.42 However, Protagoras rejects 
the pejorative sense, of course, by applying the term to himself. 
Part of his objective is to establish the justification for what he 
does. Without this, the quality of his goods will never be 
established. Thus, he claims at 316d-317c that the sophist's art 
is an old one to establish that he is not a dangerous new 
influence on the young. Sophists have been around for a long 
time and there is no reason to fear Protagoras. The sophists of 
the past, however, felt that it might be a dangerous trade to 
practice openly. He says at 316c-d, "A foreigner who comes to 
great cities and persuades the best of the young men to 
abandon the society of others, kinsmen or acquaintances, old or 
young, and associate with himself for their own improvement 
— someone who does that has to be careful." Previous sophists 
found it useful to disguise themselves as poets, trainers, 
experts in music or literature, and religious figures. Thus, his 
profession is so far from novel as to become commonplace. He 
says that such subterfuge simply draws attention to oneself 
and, therefore, he has opted to declare his profession openly. 
Protagoras is being slightly coy here, since we know that he 
benefited from the patronage of Pericles. He is not simply 
being honest about what he does, but has the privilege of doing 
so because of his favoured position.
42Ostwald, (1986), 238.
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The concern in this section is his Great Speech and the 
importance it has for the creation of order. Socrates has heard 
him declare that he teaches the political art and challenges him 
with the common Athenian opinion that such knowledge cannot 
be taught. Socrates uses the example of crafts to show that 
where expert knowledge is available, the Athenians rely on it, 
but that their willingness to listen to anyone who wishes to 
speak in the Assembly is proof that political knowledge is a 
special case. Adding to this, he claims that some of Athens’ 
most respected statesmen have raised sons of no political skill. 
If the political art could be taught, surely these “experts” would 
not have failed to impart their wisdom to their own sons.
So, the argument comes from two directions: it is not commonly 
believed to be possible and experience has shown that it is not. 
This blends nicely into Protagoras’ self-advertisement in the 
Great Speech. He is going to have to convince the audience that 
what he has to sell is needed, thereby refuting the common 
opinion that it is not. Secondly, he is going to have to convince 
them that he can do what fathers have failed to do for their 
sons, thereby distinguishing himself from others who would 
normally be in a position to do what he claims as his special 
expertise. Regarding the first point, he will try to establish that 
he improves the universally shared natural abilities that would 
justify the Athenians’ practice. Regarding the second point, he 
describes a teaching method that does not rely on formal rules, 
but on lived experience within a community. His argument 
that virtue can be taught consists of a story or myth about the
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origin of political society (320c-324d) and a more analytical 
argument about the nature of teaching virtue (324d-328d).
In his commentary on the dialogue, Taylor reminds us that the 
Greeks had two conceptions of the origins of the world and 
mankind. The first is something like that of Protagoras' myth, 
which shows human progress from primitive beginnings. The 
second is the Hesiodic "paradise lost" view, which has it that 
there was somewhere in remote antiquity a golden age. That 
age was corrupted and we are its decadent offspring.43 The 
former is an apparently more optimistic view and, indeed, 
Protagoras’ myth seems confident about the prospects for 
human society. The dramatic date would surely have been a 
time of optimism for the Athenians. The city was assured of its 
position in the Greek world, wealthy, and dynamic. Ironically, 
the period was itself a golden age about to be shattered by war, 
pestilence, and uncertainty. Order is about to become disorder 
in the world the dialogue describes.
The language of the myth is revealing. In the beginning there 
were no mortal creatures, only the gods. When the time came 
to bring the mortals to light, Epimetheus and Prometheus drew 
the task of distributing powers to each. Each creature was 
given whatever was required for its survival as a species. 
Prometheus and Epimetheus are significant, of course, because 
their names translate as "forethought" and "afterthought". We 
would naturally associate an art of any kind with the former, 
and Socrates says that he admires Prometheus as a model for
43See Taylor (1991), commentary, 77-8.
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his own life (36Id). Forethought is to deliberate over possible 
routes to a destination, but afterthought finds one already at 
the destination without a justification for the route taken.
Forethought, then, is the structure-creating tool. But structure 
is something that is implicit in the unformed being that 
Protagoras describes at the beginning of the myth. Before 
Epimetheus went to work the mortal creatures existed in some 
primordial state -- un-empowered and waiting for the 
appropriate time to emerge. Thus, at some conceptual level, 
perhaps, the idea of each kind of creature existed. Before the 
creation comes the thought of the creation; plan precedes 
reality. What was missing from this conceptual construction of 
the physical world was the mechanisms that would ensure 
balance and harmony. Without the powers, the mortal 
creatures would kill each other and the species would die out.
If we assume that the gods intended to create a cosmos, an 
ordered whole, then the aspects of balancing and harmonious 
existence are necessary.44 If each creature exists as little more 
than a unitary, isolated concept, balance is irrelevant. But once 
there is a need to bring the creatures into existence so that 
they roam the planet as physical manifestations of the
44Nussbaum discusses the empowering of the creatures as the 
distribution o f characteristics, not the allocation o f defence 
mechanisms that would promote species survival. I think this can 
mislead us. The words Protagoras uses are logical couplets: strength 
without speed, speed without strength; claws or horns, defence against 
claws or horns; small size and wings or underground dwelling, 
imposingly large size providing safety for a surface dweller. Defence, 
or species survival, is the overriding concern. Nussbaum (1986), 100 ff.
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concepts, the importance of a self-perpetuating system 
becomes paramount.
Therefore, the beginning of the myth reveals half a structure -- 
the pieces are cleverly designed, but they do not yet fit
together. When the distribution that should unite them has
been completed, all but mankind is assured survival.
Prometheus steals crafts and fire to give to mankind and the 
proto-humans are, thus, able to provide themselves with the 
material existence they need. This, however, proves 
insufficient because proto-humans are still prey to the other 
animals. They need an art of warfare, which is part of the art 
of statesmanship (322b), in order to survive. At this stage, 
humans have a unique problem in the myth. The one thing 
that can save them, establishing cities, is hindered by their own 
character. Humans are the only species that has to be
concerned with creating balance and harmony between its own
members. The problem of social arrangements does not arise 
for other creatures. Protagoras is effectively saying that these 
proto-humans lacked an art like that of the gods, which would 
allow them to devise an ordered arrangement for their own 
lives together. And this art is missing because of their own 
initial psychological makeup. They need to be changed from 
creatures who have no higher ethical concern than self- 
preservation (the primary reason they need cities at all) to 
beings who are other-regarding.
We see, then, what it is that distinguishes man from the "non- 
rational creatures" (321c). The peculiarly human frame of
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mind can conceive of another creature as being fundamentally 
similar. With the gifts of aidos and dike45 man can become the 
artificer of his own relations with other humans. We are 
dealing in the myth with the cosmos as an artefact; that is, as 
something conceived and brought into existence by an outside 
power. The power of logical "structuring" that the gods employ 
to produce the world is ultimately embodied in mankind, which 
becomes the earthly artificer, first, through the technical skills. 
Later this is complemented by the ability to form cities, which 
is analogous to the uniting of the disparate creatures into a 
self-sustaining order. With aidos and dike man can form a 
human cosmos as stable as the one he inhabits as a species.
The artificer, both divine and human, can compose in two 
senses: first, in the sense of giving order; but, secondly, in the 
sense of making calm or eliminating conflict. The system 
described in the myth represents the former sense. The 
creatures balance each other as predator and prey. However 
this system institutionalises conflict by making individual 
survival depend on harm caused to another creature. Applying 
this principle to human society, Protagoras* myth describes 
how stability was achieved through the transformation of 
intra-species violence. Human energies can now be directed 
towards self-defence in a system that is still a mechanism for 
containment. The myth thus attempts to describe the origin of
45 Aidos is variously translated. Taylor uses "conscience" and Guthrie 
uses "respect for others". W.K.C. Guthrie, Plato: Protagoras and Meno 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956). The word seems to convey some 
notion of universalising from one's own position.
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political society as the origin of human ethical conduct.
Attempts at social organisation prior to this origin failed 
precisely because moral sentiments were absent. The presence 
of these sentiments, aidos and dike, do not dispel either the 
conflicts or the reasons for them. They simply allow men to 
live together in spite of their disagreements.
The myth does not describe the elimination of conflict because 
it does not describe the elimination of conflicting value 
systems. Socrates’ hedonic calculus, on the other hand, 
describes the possible elimination of conflict through a single, 
shared scale by which value judgements are made. The critical 
component of the hedonic calculus is not its hedonistic 
weighting system, but the unity achieved through the use of a 
single weighting system.
Protagoras gives up the myth in favour of a demonstrative 
account to answer Socrates’ second objection. He feels he has 
established that there is one thing that is necessary for the 
state to exist at all, which he characterises as human excellence 
(325a). He then states that it would be absurd for fathers to 
fail to teach their sons this one necessary thing when it is the 
most important part of human life. It becomes clear that aidos  
and dike are more like capacities than attributes. Protagoras 
maintains that they are developed and honed through an 
informal education process:
No, Socrates, you ought to realise that they begin when their
children are small, and go on teaching and correcting them as
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long as they live. For as soon as a child can understand what is 
said to him, his nurse and his mother and his teacher and his 
father himself strive to make him as good as possible, teaching 
and showing him by every word and deed that this is right, and 
that wrong, this praiseworthy and that shameful, this holy and 
that unholy, 'do this' and 'don't do that' (325c-d).
So, children are guided through a system of rewards and 
punishments to pursue the right things in life. Living 
virtuously becomes a concern of the whole community. Some 
are naturally endowed and excel and others are good enough to 
remain members of the city. This approach is generally a "hit 
and miss" attitude towards educating the young and it fits with 
Protagoras' broadly relativist approach identified in the "man is 
the measure" doctrine quoted above.46 All that the community 
can teach is what the community currently values and 
Protagoras never specifies if the right, wrong, praiseworthy, 
shameful, holy, and unholy might, in reality, be something 
different from what the community inculcates. Through this
method, though, a shared system of moral evaluation emerges. 
The young learn to value things according to the likes and 
dislikes of their elders. This would seem to satisfy the 
requirements that Socrates’ hedonic calculus implies. However, 
the calculus is intended as a shared system that is grounded in
46Importantly, Protagoras’s famous doctrine is never explicitly
mentioned in this dialogue (while it is in the Cratylus and the
T heaetetus). However, we have to note that the hedonic calculus is
precisely about measurement as such and Socrates apparently wants to 
give it an objective character that the man-measure doctrine will not 
allow .
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something unobjectionable. The pleasure-pain calculation is 
intended as a factual method of practical deliberation.
Nussbaum’s Benthamite characterisation appears, then, to be 
right on the mark. Socrates is a straightforward utilitarian in 
these important passages. This is a serious charge to make 
against the author of the dialogue, since, as we know well, Plato 
is decidedly opposed to hedonism as we conventionally 
understand it. It is possible, of course, that the hedonism of 
the Protagoras is so enlightened as to be of an entirely 
different character from that of the Benthamite utility 
maximisation. But the text does not support this entirely. 
Socrates says in response to Protagoras’ assertion that a good 
life consists of praiseworthy pleasures (and implicitly, not all 
pleasures):
Surely you don’t go along with the majority in calling some 
pleasant things bad and some pleasant things good. What I say is, 
in so far as things are pleasant, are they not to that extent good, 
leaving their other consequences out of account? And again it’s 
the same with painful things; in so far as they are painful, are 
they not bad? (351c)
While Protagoras is reluctant to agree with this, the Socratic 
position does not indicate anything other than a conventional 
understanding of pleasure and pain. Gosling and Taylor, 
similarly, conclude that there is no reason to deny Plato’s 
acceptance of an enlightened hedonism and, therefore, these 
passages must be read literally. They arrive at this position
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from two directions. First, they try to show that there is no 
reason to deny that Socrates accepted this enlightened 
hedonism. The evidence they use is from Xenephon and they 
find there no reason to contradict the picture of Socrates in the 
Protagoras. Secondly, they try to show there is no reason to 
reject Plato’s acceptance of an enlightened hedonism. To do so 
they look at other dialogues that deal with pleasure and find 
that, of those dialogues that are earlier than the Protagoras, 
none makes it impossible to attribute the position to Plato. 
Critical to their argument is the later dating of the Gorgias, 
where hedonism is firmly rejected. Their evidence for this is 
the division between knowledge and belief that is lacking in 
the Protagoras, but present in the Gorgias. They also site the 
division of the soul into the appetitive and reasoning as absent 
from the Protagoras. Thus, at this stage, Plato could very well 
have accepted the hedonic calculus.47
It is virtually impossible to refute enlightened hedonism, for 
the same reason that no moral theory could adequately do 
without some degree of consequentialism. Nevertheless, the 
hedonic calculus is part a dialogue — and a dialogue where 
much of the argument is conducted through the action of the 
characters. The easy way to reject the hedonism as a 
fabrication is to attribute it to Socratic irony. This, however, 
does not get us far. It is not at all apparent why Plato would 
have Socrates seek agreement to a position that is intended 
ironically. The quotation above sounds clearly like an attempt
47Gosling and Taylor (1982), 60-61, 65.
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to establish pleasure as a logical category that can then be used 
as an analytic tool.
The view I would like to put forth is that the hedonic calculus 
is illustrative of what Socrates is trying to establish as 
necessary. The way to determine whether or not Socrates is 
meant to take seriously the hedonism is to examine other parts 
of this dialogue. Gosling and Taylor do not do this, even though 
there is some textual evidence that Socrates was more 
interested in an objective scale than in a specifically hedonistic 
scale. The particular evidence I have in mind is Hippocrates* 
shame, which I have talked about already. He feels shame 
because he feels that he is about to do something wrong — the 
intended action has a shameful character. He has a moral 
aversion to some particular action because that action is 
immoral. Certainly, this could be described as a kind of pain, 
but it is pain brought about by a kind of knowledge. The scale 
used in deliberation used in this instance, therefore, has less to 
do with pleasure and pain, conventionally understood, than 
with a sense of right and wrong. If we want to continue using 
the hedonic language that Socrates himself employs, we can say 
that pleasure is associated with doing what is right and pain, in 
this case shame, is associated with doing wrong. However, it is 
not the pain that determines wrong, but the wrongness that 
brings about pain.
Taking this back to the political craft, the sort of knowledge 
that Socrates sees lacking in Protagoras’ account (myth and 
demonstration) is a knowledge of right and wrong. The
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hedonic calculus establishes the type of shared, but objective, 
method of practical deliberation that Socrates would prefer.
The content of that method, I believe, is actually better 
illustrated by the dramatic action than in the defence of 
hedonism. Furthermore, this conclusion rests more 
comfortably with the typical picture of both Socrates and Plato. 
It is correct that nothing in either the external evidence about 
Socrates or the internal evidence of Plato’s earlier dialogues 
would preclude either from accepting hedonism. However, it is 
in only in this dialogue that hedonism is expressly defended. It 
seems plain that the function of this defence in the dialogue is 
the genuine puzzle.
The hedonic calculus has taken the discussion somewhat 
beyond Protagoras’ Great Speech. However, there is a purpose 
in the digression. The myth and the demonstrative account 
that Protagoras offers describe the creation and maintenance of 
political order through the containment of disorder. The 
implication of any system that merely contains conflict is that 
the conflict cannot be eliminated. The hedonic calculus 
undermines this implication. It gives us the possibility of 
constructing an order where practical deliberation takes place 
according to a fixed standard. However, I have tried to show 
above that it is at least problematic to treat that fixed standard 
as hedonism. The text supports the idea that the fixed 
standard is knowledge of moral truths. Furthermore, it is 
textually more appropriate for this to be the case, since it is 
moral knowledge that Protagoras claims to have.
Poetic Interpretation
The analysis of Simonides’ poem seems like an over long 
interlude in the middle of the dialogue, but I think it can give 
us some valuable information concerning Plato’s views on 
crafts and order. When we see this section performing in this 
way, the interpretation of the poem joins Plato’s other attempts 
to mimic those whom he criticises. Take, for example, the 
Menexenus, where Plato gives perhaps his most sustained 
effort to demonstrate the vacuity of a particular genre of 
political speech.48 Socrates lampoons the funeral orations 
typically heard in Athens. It is a lampoon achieved through its 
own formulaic construction and adherence to the “rules” of 
such a speech. The numerous technical manuals on rhetoric, 
with which Socrates must have had some acquaintance, can  
guide a person in the production of speeches. The question is 
whether or not this constitutes a techne.
In this section, it is not so important what Socrates says as 
what he is doing in saying it.49 My argument is that Socrates’ 
long exegesis demonstrates the possibility of creating a
48For commentary on the Menexenus see Nicole Loreaux, The Invention 
of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), 264-70 and Stephen G. Salkever, 
“Socrates’ Aspasian Oration: The Play of Philosophy and Politics in 
Plato’s M enexenus”, American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 133- 
46. The former discusses the dream-like state that Socrates claims the 
funeral oration induces in an audience.
49Gosling and Taylor characterise his interpretation of the poem as 
“transparently outrageous.” Gosling and Taylor (1982), 59.
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seemingly ordered whole that, in fact, is still fundamentally 
disordered. Socrates’ ability to take aspects of the poem and 
compose them into an interpretative framework imitates the 
creation of order through the elimination of conflict. The 
interpretative structure, however, becomes simply one possible 
viewpoint. Thus, the conflict-free order supposedly created 
itself becomes an object of contention or conflict.
It is significant that poetic interpretation is introduced in the 
dialogue. In addition to poetry’s role in the education of the 
young, the poets provided the value system that was the basis 
of conventional morality. In other words, the moral language 
that Protagoras thinks society constantly teaches the young 
grows out of the poetry he considers important.50 As I read 
this section of the dialogue, Socrates is trying to accomplish 
three things. First, he is trying to show that no coherent 
evaluative system arises from poetry. Secondly, and related, 
the evaluative systems that are conventionally thought to arise 
are simply contentious interpretations with no grounding in 
knowledge of the subject matter. That is, the interpretations 
are ultimately about moral truths, but are not developed from 
a position of knowledge about those truths. They become 
interpretations of someone else’s assumed knowledge of 
morality. This point is illustrated well in an early Socratic 
dialogue, the Ion. There, Socrates is talking to Ion, a rhapsode,
50U is important to be clear on one textual point. Protagoras values 
discourse on poetry and, thus, the poem is a vehicle for improving one’s 
rhetorical skills through disputation. This is significant later in my 
argum ent.
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about this supposed craft. He has been facetiously praising the 
rhapsodes and adds:
And how enviable also to have to immerse yourself in a great 
many good poets, especially Homer, the best and most inspired of 
them, and to have to get up his thought and not just his lines! For 
if one didn’t understand what the poet says, one would never 
become a good rhapsode, because a rhapsode has to be an 
interpreter of the poet’s thought to the audience, and that is 
impossible for one to do properly if  one does not understand what 
he is saying” (530b-c).^1
The Ion is certainly much earlier than the Protagoras, but the 
quotation reveals an important point about poetic 
interpretation in general, which Plato does not modify in any 
later dialogues. Finally, Socrates is trying to emphasise that 
any political order towards which Protagoras* teaching 
contributes is no more than a containment of disorder. The 
methods he employs assume that disorder is the norm and is 
fundamentally irreducible.
The discussion prior to this section of the dialogue has allowed 
Socrates to deflate Protagoras somewhat. Protagoras has been
5 Trevor J. Saunders, ed., Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987). The conclusion o f the dialogue is 
simply that rhapsodes have no skill. Instead, Socrates gets Ion to agree 
that whatever ability they have is from divine inspiration and not from 
a knowledge-based craft. Ion is reluctant to accept this, but eventually 
seems to accept it as almost a compliment.
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coaxed by the others in the room to acquiesce to Socrates’ 
method of question and answer, after being reluctant to 
abandon his own tendency to make long speeches. With the 
threat of Socrates’ leaving, Protagoras gives in to the wishes of 
the spectators. He will now ask questions and will then submit 
to Socrates’ questions and provide short answers. Protagoras 
introduces the topic of poetry as a way of regaining a certain 
amount of momentum that he lost in answering Socrates 
earlier. The persuasive power of the Great Speech was 
dissipated when Socrates took the initiative away from 
Protagoras. Now he feels that he can re-assert his 
argumentative strength with a different approach. We should 
note the competitiveness between the characters as a reminder 
that Protagoras assumes public deliberation to be a contest for 
the minds of the decision-makers.
It seems peculiar that Protagoras should maintain that poetry 
is critical to a man’s education. He says at 338a, “I consider, 
Socrates, that the most important part of a man’s education is 
being knowledgeable about poetry.” He has said earlier (318d 
ff.) that the over-specialised curriculum of other sophists is a 
disservice to their students. This peculiarity is easily 
explained. In addition to the fact that the poets were the 
foundation of Greek moral (and practical) education, Protagoras 
uses poetry as a means of teaching skill in public debate. What 
he values is “the ability to grasp the good and bad points of a 
poem, to distinguish them and to give one’s reasons in reply to 
questions” (339a). Thus, poetry is a convenient starting point 
in learning how to analyse something and to hold forth against
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others who may disagree.52 Thus, rhetoric is a key component 
of the education he provides, which corresponds to the idea 
that the Great Speech is an advertisement in a quite 
conventional way.
Protagoras starts the discussion with an examination of 
Simonides’ poem, which he claims is self-contradictory. The 
relevant lines are:
It is hard, rather, to become a truly good man,
Foursquare in hand and foot and mind, fashioned without fault. 
(339b)
and
Nor do I hold as right the saying of Pittacus,
Wise though he was; he says it is hard to be noble. (339c)
Socrates says that he has studied the poem himself and cannot 
see the contradiction Protagoras finds. When Protagoras 
explains the point of contradiction (Simonides criticises Pittacus 
for a view which he himself has made), many in the audience
52U is not necessary at this point that it be a competition as such. As we 
saw in the Great Speech, Protagoras values the ability to think on one’s 
feet. Socrates’ question may not have been expected, but Protagoras was 
able to respond using precisely the method he alludes to in this 
quotation. He divides the question, distinguishes the good and bad 
points Socrates makes, and tries to defend himself against further 
questions. Unfortunately, the questions seem too precise for the 
persuasive technique he uses.
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shout their approval. The room has become an arena 
containing a competition. The competition, moreover, is simply 
about who is wise. Protagoras defines the ground rules when 
he says that knowledge of poetry is essential to a man’s 
education. Thus, the standard by which the contest is to be 
adjudicated is knowledge of poetry. Insofar as this defines the 
scope of the conversation, it is important that Protagoras have 
the better interpretation of the poem. By the time we reach 
the end of this section, it will become clear that Socrates is 
capable of operating within this particular scope, but that he 
sees the standard for judging wisdom as something broader 
and more encompassing.
Socrates tries to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the 
most obvious way. He says the lines do not conflict because 
one refers to becoming and the other refers to being good.
Since, as he has Prodicus confirm, being and becoming are not 
synonyms, the passages are not so much free of conflict as they 
are about two different things.53
Protagoras rejects this out of hand. “It would show great 
stupidity on the poet’s part,” he claims, “if he says that it is so 
easy to keep excellence once you have it, when that’s the most 
difficult thing of all, as everyone agrees” (340e). Protagoras is 
using a dual-approach in this contest. His first assertion is that 
the lines contradict each other. He does not say anything about 
the correctness of either view that he sees expressed in the
53Prodicus is shown as having a speciality in fine distinctions between 
words. See 339e ff. for an example.
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conflicting lines. Next, after hearing Socrates’ response, he 
temporarily abandons the problem of self-contradiction to say 
that the argument implied by Socrates’ interpretation is simply 
wrong. This should, in fact, be a different argument that 
Protagoras makes, according to the original claim he made 
about the poem. If he concedes that Socrates has reconciled 
the lines of the poem, it would be clear that Protagoras has lost 
the first “match”. But the objective is not to analyse the poem. 
The competition ultimately has nothing to do with the poem, 
but with each individual’s ability to gain the approval of the 
auditors.
The weight of popular opinion is important in this context. As 
Protagoras says, everyone agrees that keeping excellence is the 
hardest thing of all. The successful rhetorician appeals to the 
values held by his auditors in order to produce a particular 
deliberative outcome. The deliberation is not over what values 
to hold, but over what action is in accordance with one’s 
current set of values.
Socrates’ next attempt to respond is plainly intended as a joke. 
He says that Simonides faults Pittacus for saying that it is bad 
to be noble, on the grounds that Simonides’ dialect might have 
used “hard” to mean “bad”. If that is the case, the conflict 
between the poets is merely a confusion over language. The 
significant point is that the contested meaning of the poem may 
have to do with the contested meaning of particular words. 
Socrates has picked up on Protagoras’ shift from the 
contradictory elements of the poem to its possibly incorrect
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assertion. He tries to rescue Simonides with an appeal to 
linguistic differences in order to show that, if we take a 
particular word to mean something other than its generally 
understood definition, the conflict between Simonides and 
Pittacus disappears. Another way of putting it is to say that 
conflicts between interpretations of moral truth, which is the 
conflict between the poets, can be resolved through 
examination of the meanings that lie behind the words used. 
The standard used to adjudicate between conflicting views is 
something that necessarily exists prior to those views 
themselves. Socrates is obviously facetious in this exchange 
about the meaning of “hard”, and Prodicus is clearly enjoying a 
joke at Protagoras* expense. What appears to be harmless fun 
is actually a description of the rhetorician’s power to persuade 
through the manipulation of the language. Protagoras responds 
that everyone knows Simonides had a conventional 
understanding of “hard” and, therefore, the meaning of the 
words is not the issue.
These half-hearted attempts that Socrates makes are merely 
the preface to his real effort in this section. He recognises the 
sort of interpretative skill Protagoras values and he 
accommodates him in a long speech about the poem. As I say 
above, the detail of his interpretation is hardly the issue here.
It is the placement of this exegesis within its dramatic context 
that confirms the competitive nature of the whole event. 
Socrates shows that by using the poem as the entire scope of 
the discussion it is possible to construct a plausible account of 
its meaning. This, in a way, is like any practical craft that
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simply sets out to produce some artefact. The materials with 
which the craftsman works are simply the lines of the poem, in 
this case.
Socrates* first attempts to reconcile the lines of the poem 
highlight the problem with this approach. It is possible to 
construct a plausible account of the poem by looking no farther 
than the poem itself. But the objective is to recapture the 
meaning of the lines, which is prior to the words Simonides 
wrote. As the quotation from the Ion makes clear, 
interpretation is getting to the ideas that the poet had before 
writing the words.
Socrates* long interpretation takes the poem as a closed system 
and shows how it can be understood simply through cross- 
referencing the lines. But there is no evidence offered as to 
why this interpretation is final. There is no standard other 
than the text for determining the truth of the account. Socrates 
tries to establish that the meaning is somehow prior to the 
poem with his word games at the start. Protagoras angrily 
rejects Prodicus’ contribution about “hard” and “bad”, implying 
that we do not need to examine anything other than the poem 
itself to grasp its meaning. The sense in which the words are 
used is self-evident because it is conventional.
Plato is trying to show that such interpretations will never be 
final. After Socrates finishes, he is praised for his 
interpretation. However, Hippias immediately offers to give an 
alternative interpretation that he also thinks is good (347a-b).
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The question of whether or not Socrates* interpretation is 
correct is not a factor in this discussion. The “cleverness” of the 
account is more important than what the poem actually means.
We can see parallels between this and Protagoras* ideas about 
society’s role in teaching excellence. The scope of this 
education, as he presents it, will never be more than the values 
currently held by the community. Just as the poem consists 
simply of its lines, excellence consists entirely of current beliefs 
about excellence. Protagoras says that he can refine one’s 
understanding of these beliefs, but this amounts to no more 
than critically analysing a poem as a self-contained text.
Hippias* desire to contribute his own views shows that within 
this activity of deliberating over the poem disagreements must 
simply exists alongside one another because the “rules”, the 
unwillingness or inability to look beyond the particular work, 
denies the participants access to some external standard with 
which to adjudicate between themselves. Once again, the 
hedonic calculus illustrates the idea of a standard that is not 
itself part of the circumstances to which it is applied. The 
poem, just like currently accepted values about right and 
wrong, is simultaneously the thing to be understood and the 
thing by which the understanding takes place. This method 
uses what is problematic as an unproblematic device.
The implication of this contest with the poem is that the 
disagreements between the participants are to be expected 
and, indeed, are irreducible. However, the forum within which
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the disagreements takes place acts as a container for the 
conflicts and establishes rules by which disagreeing parties can 
co-exist. This container is constructed when Socrates threatens 
to abandon the group and a set of procedures is quickly 
introduced that will allow him and Protagoras to participate 
without acrimony.
A procedural system that contains conflict may not seem like a 
terrible thing, if we accept that conflict cannot be eliminated. 
However, this is not the position Plato develops in the dialogue. 
Dramatic details, such as Hippocrates’ shame and Socrates’ 
initial attempts at reconciling the poem’s lines, and the explicit 
argument that results in the hedonic calculus point towards a 
view that there is a truth that lies outside the circumstances of 
deliberation and that this truth is the guide to arriving at the 
correct outcome. The aporetic conclusion of the dialogue brings 
this out clearly. If we had knowledge of excellence, it would 
enable us to deliberate correctly about whether or not it could 
be taught. As Socrates says at 361c, he is left with nothing but 
confusion because this single, external standard has not been 
achieved.
Conclusion
I have tried to argue in this section that the Protagoras 
explores the idea of establishing order in politics. Part of this 
argument has dealt with the need to acquire what amounts to 
an organising principle in the form of some external standard 
of value. In this regard, I look above at Socrates’ use of the
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hedonic calculus to show that this is an image of the type of 
standard he has in mind. I also try to show that the hedonism 
itself is not the point of the calculus, but the external nature of 
the scale used. My argument is that Plato indicates through the 
dramatic action a scale more sophisticated than hedonism. In 
conjunction with the aporetic ending, we can see that the scale 
becomes a knowledge of moral truths, which is the sort of 
knowledge Protagoras implicitly offers his students.
Nevertheless, we see by the end that he offers no more than a 
knowledge of the values they already have acquired through 
their upbringing in a community. I compare this to the 
analysis of a poem when the only terms of reference are the 
poem itself. The poetic interpretation becomes important for 
understanding how political order can be constructed out of the 
existing values held by the community. However, this order is 
simply one possible construct. The best possible order than can 
be arranged is simply a means of containing the various 
attempts at defining an order. At a practical level this may 
work, but it violates the objective of a techne that Nussbaum 
points out. Socrates perceives that there is a way of finding an 
objectively grounded political order that would eliminate the 
sorts of conflicts that the poetic interpretations point out. Since 
this is available, in his view, allowing conflict to persist is to 
choose tuche over techne. In short, it would be choosing 
uncertainty when certainty is possible.
87
SPEECH, TRUTH AND POWER IN THE
GORGIAS
Sum m ary
In this section of the thesis I will try to establish that there are two 
conceptions o f power that the interlocutors in the Gorgias r e p re se n t  
and against which Socrates argues. The first conception of pow er is 
the power of persuasion, exercised through speech. The second is 
the power o f superior force, to which speech may contribute, but is 
basically direct control over other people. I claim that Socrates tries 
to redefine power and self-interest to exclude the latter and to 
connect the former with the search for truth. His effort is an 
attempt to stabilise the political language in order to stabilise the 
state. If the language can be used in ways he finds improper, then 
the interests of both state and citizens are neglected. Those who 
argue against the Socratic view he sees as undermining their own 
welfare. The progression o f interlocutors coincides with the 
movement from the first to the second conception of power. Thus, 
Gorgias defends the power of persuasion, Polus modifies this to 
include a human desire fo r the power o f superior force, and Callicles 
argues fo r the desirability of absolute despotism -- the logical 
extreme o f superior force.
In troduction
Is there a necessary, or even desirable, limit to the content of 
political speech, beyond which it ceases to be political speech at 
all? Does political speech have a proper function that might
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inform such a limit? When Socrates confronts these issues in 
the G orgias54 he faces three men who believe they know the 
role of political speech — it is a tool that serves the interests of 
the speaker, not the state. Given this function, no limit on the 
content of speech can be imposed, except considerations of 
what is likely to be of greatest instrumental value in helping 
one gain power. In other words, evaluations of worth become 
evaluations of usefulness. The interlocutors represent three 
"character types" of fifth-century Athens: the famous teacher 
of oratory, the teacher's ambitious disciple, and the practicing 
orator. As sophistry became more and more prevalent, and 
more and more openly practiced,55 these three types become 
especially important to any understanding of Athenian politics. 
Their presence demonstrates the important role of rhetoric at 
that time.5 6
54Terence Irwin, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
All references will be from this translation of the text.
55A reference to this new development occurs at Protagoras 3 1 6 c -3 1 7 e ,
when Protagoras identifies several historical figures whom he claims
were actually sophists, but hid their practice under the guise o f more 
"respectable” professions. See also Phaedrus 257d where Phaedrus says, 
"And you yourself, Socrates, are perfectly aware, I'm sure, that those
who occupy the positions of greatest power and dignity in our states are 
ashamed to write speeches or to leave written compositions behind 
them, because they are afraid that posterity may give them the name of
sophists." Both references also point to the difficulty faced in 
establishing a workable definition of "sophist". Kerferd says that the 
sophists of the latter half of the fourth century were distinguished by 
their professionalism from any supposed predecessors. G. B. Kerferd 
(1981), 25.
560stwald states the case succinctly, "Rhetoric came into its own in 
Athens in the 420s, because of the importance public speaking had come
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The dialogue is an inquiry into the nature and value of rhetoric 
and the chief issue is the connection between political power 
and political speech. It is a prime example of what I claim is 
Plato's concern that controlling political speech is part of the 
battle to control the state. And by control we should 
understand Plato to be interested in stabilising the political 
community, not merely in running its affairs. He wants to 
promote orderliness and continuity. The fight over political 
speech is fought with political speech. The two sides of the 
debate are doing more than trying to win points in an 
argument. Both parties are trying to define what is and is not 
allowable for political speakers to say in general by using the 
language in particular ways. An interlocutor’s concession to an 
argument effectively contracts or expands the scope of 
allowable political speech. Thus, each concession becomes 
crucial to winning the overall argument and gaining control of 
the political language. Socrates' fear is that the interlocutors 
allow the scope of political speech to become too broad, robbing 
us of any means of evaluating its moral content, and making 
joint political action and harmonious political associations 
impossible.
to assume in trying to sway Council, Assembly, and the juries, where 
power was exercised." Ostwald (1986) 237. See also Ober, who states, 
"Skill in public address was the sine qua non for the politician. This 
meant not only skill at putting words together but also in putting them 
across." Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 113.
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The three character types mentioned above oppose Socrates 
with differing conceptions of power and self-interest. The 
problem is more than the meanings of these words because, for 
example, self-interest can be masked by an ostensible concern 
for the interests of the state. One must dissect the rhetoric by 
examining the rhetorician, thus, making the speaker's motives 
and personal morality central concerns. Plato, therefore, looks 
at the moral character and beliefs of the orators to discern the 
value of their speech (and also to find agreement with his own 
view s).57 If their beliefs and motivations prove questionable 
in any way, then the ideas they defend become suspect. This 
assumes that speech automatically reflects the mind of the 
speaker and a corollary to the debate is whether or not word 
and speaker are as indistinguishable as Plato seems to insist. If 
they are distinguishable, a speaker is freed from his own moral 
beliefs and may make arguments which he himself does not 
accept. Socrates will try to show that certain basic moral 
sentiments are shared and that these put logical limits on the 
use that can be made of language.
I have devoted a section below to Gorgias and Polus and will 
try to distinguish the two concepts of power that I see 
presented in the dialogue. Before this, however, I will briefly
57This is not an idea peculiar to Plato or Socrates. Ober says, "The demos 
judged a politician's policy at least in part by reference to his character, 
to his worth as a citizen. Hence, if a politician hoped to have his policy 
suggestions greeted with sympathy by the demos, it was incumbent 
upon him to demonstrate to the demos his personal worth." Ober (1989), 
126.
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examine how I see the idea of power being used in the dialogue 
(and the relevance to the politics of Plato’s Athens).58
The Legitimate Use o f Power
The modern world has a very simple way of expressing the 
idea of legitimate power: we usually call it authority.
Embedded within the concept of its legitimacy is the idea that 
power has proper and improper uses. Legitimacy can thus 
mean either that power has proper or improper users or that 
its users may apply it properly or improperly (though, these 
two meanings are not necessarily exclusive of one another). In 
this dialogue, the users of power, the power holders in 
question, are the rhetoricians and their possession of power is 
simply taken for granted. However, we can observe in Plato’s 
treatment of the rhetoricians and the practice of rhetoric a 
subtle critique of the democratic institutions that allow them to 
thrive and maintain that power. Thus, running alongside the 
critique of rhetoric’s use is a sub-theme that basically asks why 
rhetoricians should be allowed the power they have. This 
question will be addressed later in this section, where I try to 
show that the rhetoricians’ power can be legitimated in Plato’s 
terms through a knowledge of moral truths. This will become 
the sole means of legitimating power for Plato.
5 8 it may be relevant at this point to ask whether Socrates presents a 
third definition of power to counter the two I will examine below. In 
effect he does and it is the power of the true craftsman. Such a person 
actualises the innate moral beliefs or sense that Plato assumes all men 
possess. More will be said on this point in Sections Three and Four.
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The dominant issue for the most part, though, is how should 
the power of rhetoric be applied, given the fact that public 
speakers have recourse to persuasive language and techniques, 
giving them disproportionate opportunities to achieve their 
ends. Plato’s method is indirect, leaving us to piece together 
his thoughts on the legitimate use of power. This section is 
intended to examine some aspects of the concept that I think 
will be relevant to the following analysis of the characters of 
the dialogue. In brief, we can see Socrates as defining 
legitimate power as the promotion of the common good — 
defined as the genuine interests of the community. In typical 
Platonic style, we should understand genuine interests as 
something distinct from preferences. A central argument of 
the dialogue has to do with the possible gap between these 
concepts.59 The interlocutors, in opposition to Socrates, will 
present legitimate power as the advancement of particular 
interests, which they will define as preferences. I try to work 
out a rough schematic presentation of how these concepts 
differ in this section of my analysis.
As I said, legitimate power is another way of saying authority 
in the modern world, but this simply reflects that power is 
itself a contested term for us. Power and authority are related, 
but not identical. For Plato and his contemporaries the notion 
of power must have seemed rather straightforward. Power
59This distinction is developed in Socrates’ argument with Polus, who 
wants to argue that a man with power gets what he wants. Socrates tries 
to show that the wants Polus envisions are merely preferences. See 
467a ff.
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related to who had ultimate control. The democracies and 
oligarchies of the Greek world reflected the power of the 
“many”, and the “few”, respectively. Thus, the Gorgias does 
discuss power, as I will be describing below, but the concept is 
not scrutinised as it would be in the modern literature on the 
sub ject.60 In other words, the ancient debate was about the 
distribution of influence over political outcomes.61 In Athens 
the arenas where these outcomes were produced, of course, 
were the Assembly, the Council, and the jury courts. Each 
reflects the Athenian concern to distribute widely the influence 
over outcomes62 The dialogue does not address these
60Some important discussions of power and authority can be found in 
Stephen Lukes, ed., Power (New York: New York University Press, 1986); 
Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan, 1974);
Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” in Roderick Bell, David V. 
Edwards, R. Harrison Wagner, eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory 
and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Talcott Parsons, “On the 
Concept of Political Power” in Bell et. al., eds., (1969); Carl J. Friedrich, 
“Authority, Reason, and Discretion” in Richard E. Flathman, ed.,
Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan,
1973).
61 Not that such a debate was very evident in any theoretical texts, at 
least not in the terms I have used. We can read Aristotle’s and Plato’s 
descriptions of deviant constitutions more as moral assessments of 
certain institutions, rather than critiques o f the distribution o f power 
as such.
62With regard to the Athenian democracy, we can think of this as 
procedural equality -- what Charles Beitz refers to as the “simple view” 
of political equality in contemporary political philosophy. Charles R. 
Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 4. The difficult concept to grasp with 
respect to the ancient world is the idea of isonomia. Whether or not this 
was synonymous with democracy is discussed thoroughly by Gregory 
Vlastos, “Isonomia Politike” in Platonic Studies, (Princeton: Princeton
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constitutional matters. Instead, the scrutiny is cast upon the 
proper use of the rhetoricians’ power and, specifically, how 
power is misused in the Athenian democratic institutions. It is 
essential to read the criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias as 
related specifically to the practice of the democracy.
Persuasive speech was the fuel of Athenian democracy. To 
criticise the practice of rhetoric as Plato did was to criticise the 
institutions which nurtured it and which, in turn, it supported. 
Nevertheless, we should be aware that, for more conventional 
reasons (i.e., reasons not inspired by Plato’s moral realism), the 
Athenian demos was also suspicious of the rhetoricians.63
Looking at modern scholarship surrounding the idea of power, 
this suspicion would be considered unfounded. Beitz, for 
example, following Parsons, concludes that influence is not a 
form of power. He writes:
[E]ven if the desires of one agent are taken as fixed, and attention 
is directed at that agent’s capacity to influence the desires of 
others, it would...be unilluminating to characterise this capacity 
as a form of power. The means by which it can be exercised 
consist of education and persuasion, and although it may be no
University Press, 1981), 2nd edition, 164-203. See also R.K. Sinclair, 
Democracy and Participation in Athens, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 16; Ober (1989), 68-69, 74-75; Ostwald (1986), 27, 
50. The last two deal specifically with isonomia as a part of the 
Cleisthenic reforms of 510.
63See especially Ober (1989), 104-118. The rhetoricians were widely 
perceived as possessing the ability to mislead. Nevertheless, as Ober 
describes, the rhetoricians had a quasi-official duty to inform and lead 
the demos -- a duty which the demos itself expected to be performed.
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abuse of ordinary language to describe these as kinds of power, it 
is enormously difficult, and perhaps impossible, to formulate any 
systematic analysis of power that would permit meaningful 
comparisons to be made among the capacities of different 
individuals to employ these means of influence.^4
I use this quotation simply to emphasise the enormous gulf 
that exists between contemporary political philosophy and the 
sorts of issues that occupied Plato and, indeed, Athenian 
democrats. Several points emerge from this passage. First, 
Beitz identifies a capacity to influence desires. Second, he says 
that influencing desires is done through education and 
persuasion. Third, it is virtually impossible to measure this 
capacity. Now my view is that the average Athenian would 
concede all three of these points, but would still characterise a 
capacity to influence desires as power (and would think it 
“illuminating” to do so). Why might this be so? The chief 
reason I can see is that this capacity was embodied in a 
practice that was becoming a quasi-technical subject of study, 
namely rhetoric. In other words, the capacity to influence 
desires was turned into a commodity that promised greater 
than normal opportunities to achieve one’s own ends. The 
result was that the capacity to influence desires came to be 
assessed somewhat systematically in terms of the effectiveness 
of particular rhetorical “strategies”.
64Beitz (1989), 13.
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Clearly, one important reason that a contemporary liberal such 
as Beitz would reject the idea that influencing desires is power 
arises from a belief that the agent is, by some definition of the 
word, free to form his desires despite the effort to influence 
him or her.65 Socrates implicitly argues against this in the 
Gorgias. Rhetoric works because it clouds the individual’s 
ability to judge and makes one more open to the suggestions of 
the rhetorician. It does this, according to Socrates, because it 
affects the emotions or appetites. Surely, however, there is 
some difficulty in calling the rhetorician’s ability “power” in 
any straightforward sense because he is fundamentally 
offering suggestions that manipulatively draw on a body of 
shared symbols and values. Nonetheless, we can say that, in 
terms of Platonic moral psychology, rhetoric’s success does 
equate somewhat with power.
Rhetoric’s affective capacity derives from a techne’s 
rationalistic dominance over the irrational element of the soul. 
Because techne represents a higher intellectual level than the 
fundamental randomness of appetite, it is possible to see
65 How we are to understand that a person remains free to choose despite 
the efforts of a persuader is contentious. The issue is really about 
voluntary action and Socrates will later in the dialogue develop the 
distinction I have already mentioned between wants and preferences. I
interpret his argument as relating to the idea that we voluntarily act 
when our action is directed towards a genuine want (or a preference 
that coincides with a genuine want). This links voluntarism to 
knowledge, since, he would claim, ignorance of our genuine wants 
allows us to form preferences that are contrary to such wants. This 
only works, of course, when one has a conception of the good that is 
prior to the individual.
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rhetoric as the power of reason over unreason. A rather 
significant caveat must be inserted here. At issue in the 
dialogue is the status of rhetoric as a techne. Thus, we cannot 
say that the power of rhetoric is synonymous with the power 
of reason. It mimics reason by organising and using the shared 
symbols and values which ensure its effectiveness. Socrates’ 
analogy with cookery is apt. Both are systematic, but not 
scientific in the sense of techne. Thus, techne, understood as an 
ability to order is problematic. As I try to show in Section One, 
order can be apparent without being real. For Plato the 
problem is making the appearance correspond to the reality, 
which is why the legitimate use of power becomes a concern.
Gorgias
The dramatic date of the dialogue is unclear, but Gorgias the 
sophist66 is shown in the dialogue as roughly sixty years old, 
and Socrates about fifteen years his junior.67 He must be an
66Kerferd insists that Gorgias was a sophist, unless we excessively 
narrow the definition of the term. Kerferd (1981), 45. See also Dodds 
who insists that Gorgias neither was a sophist nor is portrayed as one in 
the dialogue. Plato Gorgias, revised text with introduction and 
commentary by E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5-6. 
Also, Harrison (1964).
6 7 Age is an important factor in understanding the dialogue in relation 
to Athenian political history. Ostwald notes, "Tension between the 
young and the old exists in all times; but the way it set in and dominated 
the internal social and political life of Athens in the course o f the 
Archidamian War is so unprecedented in Athenian history that we are 
justified in treating it as a further feature of the polarisation o f society 
we have been discussing." Ostwald (1986), 229. Ostwald is discussing the 
fissures that were emerging in the 420s.
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old man if we judge by Polus, who is described as very much 
younger than both he and Socrates (for example, 463e and 
466a), but old enough to have published a treatise on rhetoric 
(462c). Also, Gorgias' challenge to answer any question asked 
and his statement that "no one has asked me anything new for 
many years now" (448a) show that he has been practising his 
trade for quite some time.68 We can also see Gorgias' assertion 
as implying that he is not speaking extemporaneously. He has 
set speeches that he delivers in response to the most common 
questions.
The dialogue also makes several references to Socrates' trial 
and execution (521a-522a gives a classic Platonic assessment of 
Socrates' trial and conviction). Allen sees these references as 
quite significant: "The Gorgias is a meditation on the meaning
of Socrates' trial and death, and thereby on the moral 
foundations of law, politics, and human life."69 Socrates also 
takes to the offensive more readily here than in the earlier 
dialogues and gladly consents to give his views when they are
68It also shows the novelty of Socrates' questioning technique. Socrates 
asks a typical "what is x?" question and Gorgias delivers an 
inappropriate answer precisely because he has never been asked such a 
question before. It is common for interlocutors in the early aporetic 
dialogues to misunderstand the gist of the request for a definition, 
demonstrating that Socrates too was contributing to a new mode of 
speech. Richard Robinson notes that the Gorgias abandons "what is x ?" 
in favour of a "is x y?"  Richard Robinson, "Socratic Definition", in 
Gregory Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection o f Critical 
Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980).
69See Allen, (1984), 189-90. One could argue that this conclusion is not 
unique to the G org ia s.
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requested of him. The Gorgias probably dates from late in 
Plato's early period or early in the middle period, not too 
distant in time from the Protagoras.
We have fragments from a number of Gorgias' works: On the 
Non-existent or On Nature, Helen, Palamedes, Funeral Oration, 
Olympic Oration, and Encomium on Achilles. Kerferd remarks 
that he also probably wrote a technical treatise on rhetoric and 
the Onom astikon . 70 If we accept the dialogue as a source, we 
also know that his family must have been somewhat 
prominent; Chaerephon refers to Gorgias' brother, Herodicus, a 
physician (448b) and Gorgias does so again when 
demonstrating the power he has even in comparison to experts 
in a field (456b). Untersteiner charts Gorgias' travels from 
Athens to Thessaly, Boeotia, and Argos. In the last there 
appears to have been some ban or punishment imposed for 
attending his lectures.71 Untersteiner also notes that he was 
reputed to have a strong personality and attracted several 
prominent Athenians as students, including Isocrates, Critias, 
Alcibiades, and Thucydides the politician.72 Originally from 
Leontini in Sicily, Gorgias made a famous embassy to Athens in 
427 (his only attested visit) to persuade the Athenians to ally 
with Leontini against Syracuse, which he succeeded in doing.73 
From this biographical data we can see that Socrates is
70Kerferd (1981), 45.
71 Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1954), 93. Also, Kerferd (1981), 45.
72Untersteiner (1954), 94.
7 3 That agreement is invoked by the Egestaeans in trying to convince 
the Athenians to invade Sicily (Thuc. 6 .6 ).
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challenging a major figure in Greek intellectual life. In 
demonstrating Gorgias’ failure to overcome the challenge, Plato 
is showing the insecurity of the alleged system of knowledge 
even when the master rhetorician leads the defence.
Gorgias represents the "first tier" of character types in the 
dialogue. He is not only the teacher of rhetoric, but the 
innovator. He has contributed to the establishment of rhetoric 
as a practice.74 He fully appreciates that what he teaches is the 
means of acquiring power over other men within the polis:
It [rhetoric] is in reality the greatest good, Socrates, and is 
responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time 
for rule over others in his own city....I say it is the power to 
persuade by speech jurymen in the jury-court, council-men in 
the Council Chamber, assembly-men in the Assembly, and in 
every other gathering, whatever political gathering there may 
be. And I tell you, with this power you will hold the doctor as 
your slave, the trainer as your slave -- and this money-maker 
here will turn out to make money for someone else — not for 
himself, but for you with the power to speak and persuade the 
masses. (452d-e)
Thus, the power of persuasion can take away another man's 
freedom and put him under the control of a clever rhetorician. 
But, despite his choice of words, this could be described as 
tyrannical power only in a metaphorical sense; Gorgias does not
74Rhetoric will be referred to as a practice, since "craft” and "art" have 
certain connotations that bring in Plato's own assessment of rhetoric.
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mean that these other men will literally be the slaves of the 
clever speaker. In other words, given the Greek understanding 
of freedom as something essentially in contradistinction to legal 
slavery, reducing citizens to slavery is not Gorgias* literal 
meaning. He clearly refers to persuasion within the framework 
of existing political institutions. He teaches people to speak 
well in the established arenas of public debate. So what the 
accomplished speaker achieves is popular agreement with his 
own views. The members of the decision-making bodies 
deliberate and choose the recommendations of the man with 
the power to persuade. At some basic level, those who are 
persuaded act voluntarily because they are not strictly bound 
to follow the rhetorician’s lead.75 This is significant in 
comparing Gorgias to the other interlocutors. The institutional 
integrity of the state is not affected, nor is institutional change 
necessarily at issue. If Gorgias meant to deliver this 
“revolutionary” power to his students, he would need a broader 
vision of a successful rhetorician than the quoted passage 
indicates.
Rhetoric merely gives a person what everyone is assumed to 
want. The "greatest good" for a man is freedom for himself 
within the existing framework of the state. To achieve this 
good while remaining a participant in the city's affairs one 
must escape the power of others by becoming a leader of one’s 
legally defined peers. Gorgias is playing to popular sentiments
75Nevertheless, it is a thin psychological model that posits a theoretical 
possibility of acting as one chooses without explaining how deliberation 
w orks.
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that stress the individual's desire to be admired by his fellow 
citizens.76 And the criteria of approval are largely fixed or, at 
least, not questioned. As a public speaker he must employ 
concepts and values that are familiar to his listeners. He does* 
not try to change views of accepted moral principles; he simply 
casts the particular issue in question in sharp relief against 
those principles and casts himself as the defender of those 
principles. In the Meno, for example, Plato gives the Gorgian 
definition of virtue: [Meno speaking] "First of all, if it is manly 
virtue you are after, it is easy to see that the virtue of a man 
consists in managing the city's affairs capably, so that he will 
help his friends and injure his foes while taking care to come to 
no harm himself" (71e). There is nothing uniquely Gorgian, let 
alone revolutionary, about this. As Segal says, "Gorgias' usage 
of arete simply follows the common practice of the fifth 
century before the redefinition of the word by Plato."77 
Assuming that this accurately reflects Gorgias' views and 
seeing it as part of what Plato would have known about the 
historical character, we can say that Gorgias* objectives are 
quite conventional. Certainly, they would not have struck a 
contemporary audience as either alien or audacious.
76Dodds’ description of a “shame culture” nicely captures these popular 
sentiments. Dodds (1985), 11 and E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).
77Charles P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos", H a rva rd  
Studies in Classical Philology, 66 (1962), 103.
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Gorgias' brand of rhetoric is, nevertheless, not benign.78 It is a 
form of power exercised over other men, influencing them in a 
unique way. Gorgias' psychological model is practically a 
physical model, emphasising outside forces operating on a 
largely passive subject. Segal says, "His [model of the] 
psyche...is in contact with physical phenomena and operates in 
a way analogous to theirs. In thus treating the emotions as 
real, almost physiological entities, Gorgias indicates a kinship 
with the scientific rationalism of Greek medicine...."79 In the 
Helen, Gorgias describes plainly what he takes the force of 
rhetoric to be:
The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable 
to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as 
different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and 
some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case 
of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others
78Dodds claims that Plato disapproved of Gorgias' teaching because it 
was ''morally neutral", but this seems to be saying too much. His 
teaching reflects the popular morality of his day. See Dodds (1985), 10 
and 15.
79Segal (1962), 106. Segal would deny the passivity of the subject, since 
he sees Gorgias as supposing something more than a merely mechanical 
model of the psyche (107). But the implication of the dialogue does seem 
to support a passive "mob" of non-experts that can be swayed in any 
direction. Gorgias probably would claim that rhetoric, when practiced 
“scientifically”, does more than influence people. In other words, it 
would be professionally expedient to bill rhetoric as dealing in 
something more than probabilities.
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make the hearer bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a 
kind of evil persuasion. (Helen 14)8 ^
Thus, for the historical Gorgias, of whom Plato would have had 
some knowledge in developing the dialogue’s character, 
rhetoric acts like a drug, distorting one's normal emotional
state in such a way that one's behaviour undergoes a marked
change. The critical point is the use of the emotions as a 
motivational force. Rhetoric produces certain actions by 
inspiring particular emotions that normally promote the 
desired outcome. A general trying to lift the spirits of his
troops, for example, will seek to implant anger and self-
confidence in them.81 Many of the fighters will die and many 
would sooner run than fight, but the emotional "boost” 
produces a willingness to face danger. However, the desire to 
fight is purely voluntary once the appropriate emotional state 
has been achieved.82 It is as though the emotion shifts one’s 
normal conceptual framework, allowing the person to view the 
world from a different perspective. The general might make 
allusions to unjust acts or heinous crimes committed by the 
enemy so the soldiers will see themselves as righteous men 
seeking just vindication. The result is that, within Gorgias’
8®Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1990), 53, (translation of Gorgias frag. 82 Diels- 
Kranz by George Kennedy).
81Nicias achieves this by posing a sobering choice to his fighters in 
Sicily: conquer or die. Thuc. 6 .68.
82Plato stresses the voluntary nature of the act at Philebus 58a: "I often 
heard Gorgias say that the art of rhetoric differs from all other arts. 
Under its influence all things are willingly but not forcibly made 
slaves." Quoted from Sprague, ed., 39.
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framework, the possibility of assigning responsibility emerges 
only when an actor commits himself to one course or another. 
Responsibility begins and ends with the person performing the 
act.
This entails, of course, a certain lack of responsibility for one's 
emotions. If the voluntary nature of the act is to be 
maintained, we could not assign blame for the emotion that 
inspired the action. The emotion simply happens. Dodds 
supports this as a popular view when he writes, "[The thumos] 
may be defined, roughly and generally, as the organ of feeling. 
But it enjoys an independence which the word 'organ' does not 
suggest to us...A  man's thumos tells him that he must now eat 
or drink or slay an enemy, it advises him on his course of 
action, it puts words into his mouth...it commonly appears as an 
independent inner voice."83
So, what is involuntary is the feeling that produces the action. 
That is the rhetorician's power over other men. He can make 
men have feelings that would normally be absent given a 
particular context or can actualise an intuitive moral sense in a 
particular way. Feelings that were previously inspired by 
some mysterious entity within us, or even by a god, are now 
brought about by the words of a speaker. More than some 
conjurer’s trick, the successful speaker brings to mind in the 
listener some memory or vision of a situation where that
83Dodds, (1951), 16. Dodds is commenting on thumos in Homeric man, 
but the general idea seems applicable to later Greeks, at least until 
Plato's rationalising influence.
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emotion would be appropriate.84 Perhaps, through the use of 
historical allusion or reference to the poetry and drama of the 
time, the speaker can make his audience experience the 
sensations of the actors in history or poetry or drama.85 For 
Gorgias* psychology, and for Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric, the 
significance is that an agent can be moved by rational
argument or by his appetites. In fact, Gorgias’ success at
persuading where the rational exhortations of an expert have 
failed (456a ff.) confirms that a deliberative outcome is m ore  
likely to be influenced by emotions than by any reasoning 
capacity of the deliberator.86 Gorgias understands the power of 
emotion and says at Helen 9:
I deem and define all poetry as speech with meter. Fearful 
shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come upon its
hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in
good fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, 
the soul is wont to experience a suffering of its own.87
84Dodds claims, "[Gorgias'] art was in fact the art of verbal magic.",
Dodds (1985), 8. This, I think, takes the analogy between speech aiid 
drugs too far. Speakers may try to cast their verbal spells, but they
were wise to remain sensitive to the changing moods of the people. Cf.
Gorgias 481d-482a.
85Similarly, Aristotle writes at Poetics 1453b, "The plot [of a tragedy] 
should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he 
who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and
pity at the incidents..." Jonathan Barnes, ed. (1984).
86Surely, Plato would agree that Gorgias’ idea of rhetoric is conditional 
upon the ignorance of the audience.
8 7Socrates makes a similar point that poetry stripped o f melody, rhythm
and metre is no more than speech at 502c. Neither addresses whether
these poetic attributes are themselves somehow “persuasive”.
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While poetry can make a person feel what he otherwise would 
not, the political importance is that rhetoric can manipulate 
emotions to translate feelings into deeds. An example can be 
found in Thucydides when he is describing the Athenians' 
eagerness before and anger after the defeat at Sicily. He says:
[before]
All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought 
that they would either subdue the places against which they were 
to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no 
disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sites 
and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home 
again; and the idea of the common people and the soldiers was to 
earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply 
a never-ending fund of pay for the future. (6.24)
[after]
When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they 
disbelieved even the most respectable of soldiers who had 
themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported 
the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. 
When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry 
with the orators, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and 
were enraged also with the reciters of oracles, and soothsayers,
and all other omen-mongers o f the time who had encouraged
them to hope that they should conquer Sicily. (8.1)
There are obvious possibilities for abusing the power of
persuasion (456c-457c). The craft that Gorgias has so far
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described is liable to be used by an unjust person for unjust
ends. Indeed, the same can be said about any craft in the
hands of an unjust person.88 The dialogue takes a decidedly 
Platonic turn once Socrates establishes power presents such 
risks. It is important to remind ourselves that Gorgias makes 
no other claim in this dialogue than to state he is a teacher of
rhetoric. It might be reasonable, in a general sense, to ask
Gorgias what action he takes when one of his students is 
ignorant of the justice that would prevent the misuse of 
rhetoric. It is questionable whether this is a fair question to 
ask, given that Gorgias has been silent about his own interest in 
teaching virtue. Moreover, if we rely on the historical accuracy 
of Meno*s description of Gorgias, it makes this new Platonic 
twist seem irrelevant to Gorgias* claims about himself. Gorgias 
readily concedes that he will teach justice to a student needing 
instruction, but we have to understand him to mean virtue in 
the popular sense that Meno attributes to him. This is not how 
Plato has Socrates interpret him (459c-460a).
Clearly, Plato is constructing a character that compliments his 
own objective in the dialogue. It is not clear that Plato’s desire 
to show Gorgias succumbing to Socrates* philosophical skills is 
best achieved by presenting a straw-man. More may be 
indicated in this passage, though. The possibility o f 
misinterpretation is the point. Gorgias treats the issue as 
trivial because the virtue he has in mind is no more than the 
conventional view quoted above. He seems mildly surprised 
that this should be a problem, since he would expect all his
88Irwin (1977), 116. Cf. Hippias Minor.
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students to arrive with the very same conception of virtue 
indicated in the M eno .%9 However, the casual, imprecise use of 
ethical terms is the hallmark of the interlocutors in the earlier 
Socratic dialogues and we see here that Socrates is trading on 
an ambiguity without seeking to clarify the imprecise term. By 
doing so, he can engage in the practice he criticises in order to 
defeat the master rhetorician with his own weapon.
Additionally, this shows that Gorgias has an understanding 
about the proper use of rhetoric that is distinguished from 
Polus' and Callicles’. Rhetoric is employed for the selfish 
purpose of gaining honour and prestige and it exerts some 
force over men in order to gain those things. But, as Gorgias 
practices it, the rhetorician achieves these things within bounds 
of a conventional moral framework. The rhetorician wants to 
be respected, not feared.
Nevertheless, the man who would rather be feared can find 
much to help him in Gorgias' teaching. The line I am sketching 
between the power of persuasion and the power of superior 
force is thin. What Gorgias' theory hopes to deliver is not what 
his students may take it to mean. The ambiguity of the concept 
of virtue re-emerges as an ambiguity about the proper exercise 
of power. Gorgias grasps this possibility when he delivers his 
speech on the responsibility of teachers (456c-457c). He 
argues that in such cases the student is to blame, not the
89Meno is surprised that Socrates does not know the meaning o f virtue, 
assuming that he should have learned it from Gorgias himself (M e n o  
71d-e).
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teacher.90 The teacher is fundamentally powerless to control 
how his thought will be interpreted and used by disciples with 
their own aims and ambitions. He can direct them towards 
some form of conduct, but he cannot make them follow.91 
Moreover, the teacher’s lack of responsibility is mirrored in the 
issue of responsibility for one’s emotions. Just as the 
antecedents to action are outside the bounds of a discourse on 
responsibility, the antecedent to the misuse of rhetoric 
(instruction in its use) is not an event to which we can assign 
blame. However, it is precisely the assignment of 
responsibility that Socrates is after.
The debate with Gorgias also demonstrates what I described 
earlier as the battle to control political speech. At the end of 
this section (concluding with Polus' entrance at 461b) Gorgias 
capitulates on or concedes a number of points that have forced 
him narrowly to define his practice. The first instance of this
90We can understand this in two ways. Plato could be having Gorgias 
foreshadow Socrates' coming encounter with Polus, Gorgias' own 
student, who, I will argue, is one of the teacher's misinterpreters.
Gorgias could, in effect, be defending himself in advance from what he 
suspects Polus will be arguing. On the other hand, there was a tendency 
to blame the sophists for the sins of their students, evidenced by such 
cases as the alleged burning of Protagoras' works at Athens and the 
exiling o f Anaxagoras.
9 Comparisons can be made with Socrates at Apology 39c when he 
warns that the Athenians that those who will come to examine them 
after him will be more numerous, and possibly more hostile. Up until 
now Socrates has restrained them. Furthermore, Plato has Socrates 
express a similar concern at Republic 539 regarding the use o f dialectic 
by the young. This does not, however, confirm the value neutrality of 
Gorgias' teaching as Dodds claims.
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occurs at 448c when Polus describes Gorgias’ trade (while not 
the words of Gorgias, I take them to express his opinions.). 
Asked for a definition, he gives a rhetorical display, which 
Socrates promptly rejects. It is, first, the wrong kind o f 
answer, as initially occurs in all the aporetic dialogues. But, 
secondly, it is not so much an answer as a defence. Polus 
defends rhetoric against some criticism that has not even been 
made. His aim is to deploy a pre-emptive argument that puts 
his listener on the defensive. In rejecting this type of response 
Socrates is refusing to accept that political argument is a 
competition, rather than a joint quest for right answers. The 
scope of possible answers has been narrowed.
In the sections that follow Gorgias continues this pattern until 
he must reject his claim that teachers are not responsible for 
the actions of their students. Knowledge of the just and unjust 
are necessary components of practising rhetoric because 
rhetoric seeks to persuade people about the just and unjust 
(454b). If students do not know the just and unjust Gorgias 
will teach them (460a). If Gorgias does his job properly none 
of his students will use rhetoric unjustly (accepting the 
argument from analogy at 460b, which Gorgias does, that the 
man who has learned just things will be just). If they do use it 
unjustly Gorgias has failed in the execution of his supposed 
craft and is responsible for this (since he admits that he will, in 
fact, teach about the just and unjust). What this means for 
political speech is that the rhetorician is no longer able to say 
anything at all in order to persuade about the just and unjust; 
he can only express the truth, based on a knowledge of justice.
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What it means for the rhetorician is that his ignorance of the 
subject is grounds for assigning responsibility to him, because 
he claims for himself a knowledge that he does not possess.
Polus
Little is known about the historical Polus other than what Plato 
tells us. He is thought to have written a handbook on rhetoric, 
which Socrates refers to having read at 461c (which may be 
parodied at 448c). The overall impression he makes in the 
dialogue is of someone eager to impress others and hungry for 
praise. We should remember that Polus is much younger than 
Gorgias and still only at the beginning of his career as a teacher 
of rhetoric. Whereas Gorgias is secure in his position as 
"expert", Polus still has to earn his credentials. His eagerness to 
answer Chaerephon's question indicates that he may even feel 
overshadowed by his teacher. "His manners are much inferior 
to his master's", as Dodds says, and he is "as innocent of 
dialectical method as Gorgias himself, but displays an 
unteachable stupidity beside which Gorgias looks quite 
in telligent."92 He represents the "second tier" of sophists -- 
those who have neither been ground-breaking theorists nor 
innovative practitioners, but who practice within the 
framework of an already established profession. He also 
represents the youth who had been captivated by the new 
"science" of rhetoric and sophistic argument and saw in them 
the means of political advancement. Hippocrates' enthusiasm 
in the Protagoras to enrol as the sophist's student is probably
92Dodds (1985), 11. Here he also summarises what is known about Polus.
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not far from the real excitement the young of Athens felt for 
the new style of learning (see Section One for a fuller 
discussion of Hippocrates).93
In the discussion with Gorgias, Socrates has attempted to 
reclaim the content of political speech. The rhetorician must 
now say only what is true. The introduction of moral 
knowledge as a necessary component of teaching rhetoric is 
teased out more fully in this section. In the discussion with 
Polus, Socrates tries to reclaim both the content of political 
speech and the soul of the speaker. He does this by redefining 
what I said at the beginning are the core concepts of power and 
self-interest. Polus presents a somewhat more sophisticated 
challenge than Gorgias. The latter wants to bypass any 
examination of the moral content of speech by defending 
rhetoric as value-neutral (and the teacher of rhetoric as 
blameless for its misuse).94 Polus is in effect defending a 
psychological model that, in Socrates' terms, necessitates unjust 
behaviour. By the end of this part of the debate, Socrates will 
have redefined what it means to do what one wants and, 
indeed, redefined the object of human desire in order to defeat 
Polus. Polus' assertions will no longer be "allowable” because
93 Notice, too, that Hippocrates is made to admit that he has no idea what 
he will learn. Ostwald discusses the interests of the young in sophistry. 
Ostwald (1986), 237-8.
94I note above that, according to Dodds, Plato rejected rhetoric because 
it is morally neutral. I think we can see in the discussion with Polus 
that Plato sees a moral aspect of rhetoric that arises from its use in 
gaining political power. In other words, that it can be used at all 
implies for Plato a statement of fact about its proper use and, therefore, 
the supposedly value neutral tool acquires a moral character.
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they will have been refuted through logical argument. And it 
is important to note at this point that his arguments have been 
refuted by a mode of discourse that he does not practice 
himself.
The treatment of Gorgias above tries to show that he 
recognised how words and speech can be used to persuade a 
group of non-experts. And I also try to show that he has not 
adopted this stance at the expense of conventional morality, 
but sees rhetoric being practiced within an accepted  
framework of established norms and values. The man who is 
"clever at approaching people" (463a) may have power over 
men because he can manipulate the psyche with rhetoric. In 
practice, though, he does this as a participant in the normal 
political institutions.95 Gorgias still adheres to the conventional 
morality that Polus and Callicles reject in favour of the natural 
domination of the "best" man. Conventional morality precludes 
certain actions and desires while the natural law that only the 
strong survive only precludes the inexpedient. Gorgias is at the 
cutting edge of rhetoric as a practice, but he is behind the times 
in the nomos-physis debate. His moral sentiments have not 
begun to approach the ideas we find in Callicles. I think this at 
least partly confirms that the teacher is powerless to control
95 Gorgias talks about power over other men, but he also talks about 
power to get things done. He says at 455d-e, "I take it you know these 
dockyards and the Athenians' walls and the harbour equipment have 
come from Themistocles' advice, some from Pericles', but not from the 
craftsmen." Themistocles and Pericles have won fame, honour, and 
power by doing some good for the city, even though they also served 
themselves in the process.
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those who interpret his thought. As I said earlier, there is 
ample material in Gorgias' teaching to derive conclusions 
contrary to his implied wishes and we shall see that Polus has 
done so.
Polus, unlike Gorgias, is talking about controlling the state 
through force, not persuasion. His ideal person is the tyrant 
Archelaus who is described as seizing power "unjustly" (471a) 
and crushing any political opposition, down to the child who 
might some day lay claim to the throne (471c). He thinks that 
this is the archetypal instance of power exercised in pursuit of 
self-interest. To do whatever one wants is the sum of all 
desire. In this framework, the opinions that others hold about 
one's actions are unimportant because the person seeking 
power demands compliance, not approval. In fact, the majority 
will never approve of this person's ultimate objective simply 
because his success is at their expense.96 Polus rejects Gorgias' 
qualifications about conventional morality and adopts a model 
of the psyche that is based on an insatiable appetite for power. 
He says at 461b-c that Socrates should not suppose he has 
defeated Gorgias just because the latter was shamed in to  
admitting that he knows justice and will teach it. Polus asks 
what sensible person would not claim that he knows the just 
from the unjust. Gorgias was motivated by a feeling that Polus 
feels is either undesirable or unreasonable (which amounts to 
the same thing). Nevertheless, Polus is not saying that Gorgias
96In the case of Archelaus, of course, the pursuit of power took place 
amongst those who already had access to power. Archelaus was a 
usurper who came into conflict with established authority.
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believes what he is shamed into admitting. Everyone wants 
the power of the tyrant -- allegedly even Socrates (468e).97 
Thus, the clever speaker is not above a little mendacity to
conceal his true ambitions. Polus gives Gorgias the benefit of
the doubt by assuming that his shame was merely an act.
Polus is attempting to expand the scope of allowable speech at 
this point. His contention, which Irwin notes may be long
overdue in the Platonic dialogues98, is that shameful need not
entail evil. Injustice may be shameful, but it might be better to 
act unjustly rather than be at the receiving end of someone 
else's injustice. Injustice is prudent, thus, everyone who wants 
the best for themselves wishes to be unjust. The structure of 
Polus’ argument appears to be:
(1) everyone has desires (interests) that they wish 
satisfied (served)
97On Socrates' use of shame in arguing his point see Richard McKim, 
"Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias", in Griswold, ed. (1988). McKim 
makes the point that Plato is not interested in logically proving his 
thesis that to suffer injustice is better than to do it. Instead, he claims, 
the dialogue is constructed to expose that everyone does, in fact, believe
this, even if they currently think that they do not. McKim overlooks, I
think, the fact that exposing this implicit agreement between Socrates 
and the interlocutors does prove for Socrates that a higher ethical
standard exists, which will be the basis of any true order for Plato. See
Section Four for a discussion of moral intuitions and political order.
98Irwin (1977), 117. Of course, it must entail evil for Plato. Shame is 
like an intuitive signal to warn a person that some fundamental 
principle has been violated.
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(2) if there is a good that is necessary before any desires 
can be met, this good will be a superordinate d esire"
(3) power to do what one wants is the superordinate 
desire because it is necessary before all other desires 
can be met.
With unlimited power one can gain unlimited satisfaction. 
Therefore, all men desire power most of all.100 Without it, 
nothing follows and one has the choice of being victim or 
victimiser. Not everyone can do whatever they want 
simultaneously. But the person with power can ensure that he 
will not be thwarted by the desires of others. That is the 
lesson of Archelaus. Tyranny is no longer a metaphor for the 
rhetorician’s objectives; it has become a synonym.
Rhetoricians, on this view, are once again liberated from the 
truth and are free to say anything that serves their desire for 
power. If the choice is as stark as I make out -- abuse or be 
abused — politics has become a contest to achieve maximum 
power. The speaker who does act within the institutional 
framework that Gorgias takes for granted is either masking his 
self-interest with concern for the state or is himself deceived. 
When the power of the rhetorician has become all
9^Assuming that people will want what it is necessary for them to have. 
Socrates’ argument hinges on a distinction between wants and 
preferences. Polus is not making this distinction and this is how 
Socrates will attempt to undermine his position.
10°It is necessary to assume at this point that Polus agrees with Callicles 
who says that the man with the most extensive and extreme appetites is 
the best person.
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encompassing and he effectively becomes the only citizen, his 
interests and the state's will coincide. Until then, the interests 
of the state are secondary to the rhetorician's interest in power. 
This is no longer desire for prestige, but for tyrannical 
dom ination.
Once this motivating principle is established, the "moral" 
content of one's speech cannot be evaluated. If the moral 
content of speech has no significance, then the moral quality of 
the speaker is equally irrelevant. Word and speaker have been 
separated and the rhetorician's arguments, accounts, and claims 
are no longer reflections of an underlying moral condition. 
Morals and politics have come unjoined and arguments are 
seen as expedient, not correct. Instead of ethical character, a 
basic psychological condition is assumed (desire for power) and 
speech is the morally neutral tool for satisfying an innate want. 
Like any tool, the worth of an argument is measured in terms 
of effectiveness and the test of worth is refutability.
Refutation has different implications for Socrates and Polus, 
since they practice different modes of discourse.101 Since Polus 
imagines politics to be a power struggle, a refuted opponent is
10Socrates establishes the mode he prefers at 46 Id. To some extent 
there is a conflict of modes in the dialogue and the outcome is double- 
edged. Socrates has shown that rhetoric cannot withstand the elenchus. 
But, surely, the fate of Socrates himself shows that the elenchus cannot 
withstand rhetoric when it is practiced in its intended context (e.g., the 
courts). In other words, Socrates does not prove that rhetoric fails to 
accomplish what Gorgias claims it can do. He probably fears that 
Gorgias is only too correct.
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defeated and humiliated. The unrefuted participant is 
victorious, glorified, and more powerful. With the Socratic 
elenchus the person who successfully refutes is actually no 
better off, but the person who has been refuted is morally 
improved (458a). He has been disabused of his false beliefs.
In making an analogy with disease, Socrates says that never 
having the sickness is better than falling ill, but once ill, it is 
better to be cured (478d-e).
The purpose of his argument is to rejoin word and speaker, 
which Polus has been trying to keep apart. Socrates insists that 
the interlocutors state what they really believe. If a belief is 
logically refuted he thinks that the person can no longer hold 
that belief; that is, once a person understands  that they are in 
error about a certain point they will change their mind 
accordingly. They logically cannot and, thus, will not hold false 
opinions. At a very minimum, they will no longer claim to 
know anything about the subject. Thus, Socrates undertakes to 
prove to Polus that what is shameful is also evil and harmful to 
the actor (or convince Polus of what he supposedly already 
believes, as he says at 466e). If he succeeds in this, Polus will 
not be able to support unjust acts unless he also supports self- 
harm, which would be inconsistent with his praise of unbridled 
self-interest. He will not do this unless he rejects the earlier 
conclusion that everyone seeks the good (468b). Furthermore, 
assuming Polus continues to state what he believes, he can no 
longer say that injustice is beneficial. By dis-allowing such a 
claim, Socrates has shown that there is a proper use of rhetoric.
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By preventing Polus from developing a defence for injustice, he 
restricts the possibility of teaching that belief.
Callicles
The argument with Callicles is the heart of the Gorgias, w here 
all the implications of the previous discussions culminate in an 
ideology of power. Here we see disorder at the micro level — 
the human psyche. Callicles’ sentiments are compatible with 
Gorgias’ statements about the power of rhetoric (see above) 
and at the same time represent a twisted version of his 
thought, extending ideas we encounter with Polus to the 
extreme. The power of speech becomes the power of force. 
Either because of this or in spite of it, Callicles is enigmatic. 
Modern scholars have examined his words to discover the 
nature of his political loyalties. His speeches in the dialogue 
cover the ancient political spectrum from committed democrat 
to single-minded tyrant. Dodds has even analysed him in 
terms of Nietzsche’s thought.102 Actually, Callicles is a man of 
his own time, who has taken to heart the arguments for phys is  
over nomos. His political loyalties, then, are to the tyrant 
within himself — the man who is held in check by the 
conspiring minions of conventional morality. His moral code is 
domineering self-interest.
102Kerferd argues that, to Plato's mind, Callicles is a democrat. 
Interestingly, he fails to note the close connection that Plato makes 
between tyranny and democracy at Republic 562, which makes the 
distinction less controversial. G. B. Kerferd, "Plato's Treatment of 
Callicles in the 'Gorgias'", Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological 
Society 200, n. s. 20, (1974), 48-52. See also Dodds (1985), 386-391.
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No evidence has survived to give us any biographical 
information on Callicles beyond what Plato provides.103 We 
should assume, though, that fictional or otherwise his ideas 
must have had some currency in Athens, giving Plato good 
cause to argue explicitly against them.104 Plato is surely 
interested in him as somehow typical and he is probably a 
spokesman for the views of many at the time. The dramatic 
date of the dialogue is uncertain because of the obvious 
anachronisms in the text. Irwin lists six details that point to 
conflicting dramatic dates. These include a reference to the 
death of Pericles (503c) and a prediction about the political 
career of Alcibiades (519a).105 These have particular 
significance for the enquiry into rhetoric and the true political 
craft.
It is possible to discern in these two cases a progression from 
almost benign ignorance to cunning deceitfulness. At that point 
the progression comes to a divide. We can either go the way of
103Ostwald (1986), 245. Callicles is probably not a fictional person 
created for the purposes of this dialogue, judging from the details that 
Plato provides of his deme and friends. Dodds hypothesises that he may 
have died early in his career. Dodds (1985), 13.
104Callicles and the Thrasymachus of Republic Book 1 are an 
interesting pair. While certainly not identical, we can see similarities, 
especially with regard to the acquisition of power.
105Irwin, trans., (1979), 109-10. The other anachronisms are references 
to Socrates’ actions during the trial of the generals after Arginusae, 
references to Archelaus the Macedonian tyrant, references to Euripides' 
Antiope, and the presence of Gorgias himself, who only made one 
documented visit to Athens.
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Callicles or Socrates. Plato has given us a striking juxtaposition 
that in the dramatic context points to a choice between two 
opposing schools of thought and two opposing schools of 
political speech. This is the theme that I will develop in the 
following section. Before turning to Callicles I examine first the 
inclusion of Pericles and Alcibiades in the dialogue.
Pericles enjoyed immense popularity in his own time and 
modern scholarship still tends to venerate him as the symbol of 
the Athenian golden age.106 He serves as the representative of 
the democratic ideal itself.107 Thucydides attests to his 
eloquence as a public speaker:
Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was 
enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude -- 
in short to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he
10^Hannah Arendt, for example, who tends to mythologise Athens in 
general, awards the Pericles of the Funeral Oration her particular 
respect. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958), 205-6.
107Athenian democracy is enjoying something o f a boom. The 2500th 
anniversary of the democracy was celebrated in a recent issue of PS:  
Political Science and Politics, which commissioned articles by Sheldon 
Wolin, J. Peter Euben, Josiah Ober, Arlene Saxonhouse, and Michael T. 
Clark. Each to some degree extols the virtues o f Athens and instructs us 
on how much we could learn from its institutions. PS: Political Science 
and Politics, September 1993, 471-494. For a less flattering account, if  
not more realistic, see Blair Campbell, “Paradigms Lost: Classical 
Athenian Politics in Modern Myth”, History of Political Thought, 10  
(1989), 189-213. A detailed examination of Athenian public life, across 
classes and occupations, can be found in L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled
to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an
estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. 
Whenever he saw them unreasonably and insolently elated, he 
would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if 
they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to 
confidence (Thuc. 2 .65 ).
The passage indicates Pericles' ability as a statesman, but also 
the potential power of speech in general. If he can manipulate 
emotions as readily as Thucydides makes out, then the 
potential for misuse is obvious. It is the joining of this ability 
with Pericles' "known integrity" that Thucydides admires. In 
other words, behind his ability to speak persuasively is a moral 
sense that informs the use he makes of his own ability. What 
should follow from this is that Pericles will not (or did not) use
his power to do wrong and that is the message Thucydides
wishes to convey.108 We discover from the Meno that it is the 
random occurrence of this integrity that disturbs Plato about 
Pericles, however. Pericles is criticised in that dialogue for 
lacking knowledge and being guided only by right opinion 
(Meno 99b-c). He behaves correctly, but cannot give an 
account of why it is right. It is doubtful that Plato would 
accept that Pericles' actions were right, especially in the Gorgias
108 This may be Thucydides’ attempt to vindicate Pericles, given the 
historian’s manifest dislike for Pericles’ successors.
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(515e). Not only did he fail to improve the citizens, according 
to Socrates, but he actually made them worse (502e ff.).109
I try to show in my treatment of Gorgias above that he, too, 
falls short in his ability to give an account. But worse than that 
for Plato, what he does is only an imitation of what Pericles 
does imperfectly. At 465c, Socrates makes a connection 
between rhetoric and justice, on the one hand, and sophistry 
and legislation, on the other.110 Gorgias is effectively twice 
removed from knowledge of the art of statesmanship, aspiring 
to systematise the "knowledge" of Pericles which is no 
knowledge at all. Given that, he can never be expected to 
impart true understanding to his own students. He does no 
more than give them the weapon of rhetoric with only vague 
guidance for its use.
Alcibiades, on the other hand, is the unjoining of this fortuitous 
integrity and rhetorical skill. Pericles at least contributed to 
the image of Athenian success and, thereby, presents himself
109Thucydides would surely reject this. The passage quoted implies that 
Pericles tempered the extreme moods of the demos. Plato seems to give 
Pericles some credit in the Meno, as well. It seems that right opinion is 
flawed by its instability, but when present is indistinguishable from 
genuine knowledge. Pericles may, indeed, have done some right things, 
but not consistently and not by design. See below for further discussion 
of improving the citizens. Regarding Plato’s treatment of Athenian 
politicians in the Meno and the Gorgias see Brian Calvert, “The 
Politicians of Athens in the Gorgias and M en o”, History o f  Political 
Thought 5 (1984), 1-15.
110This schema provides some support for the claim that Gorgias was 
not a sophist. See above. Nevertheless, it is Plato’s schema and not 
necessarily the popularly accepted impression o f sophists/rhetoricians.
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as a civic-minded man. He helped provide those things that 
common wisdom valued as the signs of wealth and power. 
Alcibiades is more the egotist111 who calculated his personal 
gain before speaking in favour or against any public 
p roposal.112 Thucydides certainly has his biases, but the words 
and beliefs that he attributes to Alcibiades must have a 
reasonable basis in reality. The presentation of his speech in 
favour of the Sicilian invasion, side-by-side with Nicias' 
cautious warnings, shows a man with a good measure of the 
attributes that Callicles admires (Thucydides 6.9-6.18). But 
they are concealed by clever speech about the needs of the 
city. He is not only greedy for himself, but believes that greed 
is the natural mode of behaviour for all men. He defends the 
pursuit of greater empire on the grounds that constant 
additions to Athenian holdings is necessary simply in order to 
retain what is already possessed. Such logic leads to an empire 
that expands indiscriminately, unable to determine what 
imperial adventures are actually worthwhile because each is 
equally necessary. The “system” of knowledge this implies is 
maximisation of one’s material gain by all means available. We 
can find similar values in Polus' praise of Archelaus. While not 
described as having imperial ambitions, he is a microcosm of a 
war-mad imperial state. Alcibiades’ recommendations are that 
Athens become like Archelaus.
11 ^hrenberg's term. Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates 
(London: Methuen, 1968), 284.
112See Protagoras 336e where Critias expresses the same view.
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The progression I have constructed from Pericles to Alcibiades 
leads to a choice. We can continue down the same road of 
Alcibiades’ disguised self-interest, and find a full-blown 
defence of domination at the end. But, Plato offers an 
alternative in Socrates, who offers a different conception of 
self-interest and different style of political speech. The chief 
irony of the dialogue is Callicles' insistent claims that Socrates 
could never defend himself in court, while the debate with 
Callicles is no less than Socrates doing just that. Socrates 
recognises what Callicles is doing, but Callicles cannot see 
Socrates’ behaviour for what it is.113
Like the Protagoras, hedonism has an important part to play in 
the discussion with Callicles. Similar to its treatment there, 
hedonism in the Gorgias invites a consideration of how best to 
live one’s life. Whereas in the Protagoras hedonism is a
symbolic marker for the rational life, in the Gorgias it becomes
a symbolic marker for the opposite. The difference arises from 
Callicles’ rejection of the hedonic calculus and forthright 
defence of hedonism as such. It is in the discussion with 
Callicles that Socrates also develops the theme of statesmanship 
as a craft -- and this is partly due to the eager defence of the 
hedonist's creed that Callicles launches. He combines this 
sentiment with a political outlook that necessitates the use of
^ 3Socrates loses this trial as well. He does not appear to have
convinced Polus. He does not convince Callicles. And, as in the A p o lo g y , 
he departs with a stark warning about what will follow. In the A p o l o g y  
he predicts that Athens will be plagued by Socratic imitators. In the 
Gorgias he offers the judgement myth that underwrites his defence o f  
ju stice .
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the craft analogies even more than the blatant admiration of 
hedonism would require. Callicles is a "naturalist” in the fifth- 
century way. He says at 483d that justice is simply the 
superior ruling over the weaker, which all but crystallises the 
political thought of those who defended physis over nom os .
Plato has him deliver a clearer expression of this idea at 484a- 
b:
Our way is to mould the best and strongest among us, taking them 
from youth up, like lions, and tame them by spells and 
incantations over them, until we enslave them, telling them that 
they ought to have equal shares, and that this is the fine and the 
just. But I think that if a man is born with a strong enough 
nature, he will shake off and smash and escape all this. He will 
trample on all our writings, charms, incantations, all the rules 
contrary to nature. He rises up and shows himself master, this 
slave o f ours, and there the justice of nature suddenly bursts into 
l ig h t.
These words are Callicles’ definition of the ideal statesman and 
one that is intended to rival the version Socrates has been 
sketching in the previous pages (Callicles has already accused 
Socrates of turning the world upside down — 481c). The 
problems that Socrates tries to expose in this conception are 
the ambiguity of the terms “better” and “stronger” and the 
accompanying rule that this type of person should get more. 
Note that the content of the rewards to be distributed is largely 
unspecified. Callicles insists that the best man should have
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more of whatever he desires. The content of desire is left open, 
reducing need to preference.
Regarding the definition of superiority, Callicles has merely 
vague notions that can only be summarised as some character 
type that is free from conventional prejudices and is pre­
eminently self-interested. But the superior man is also 
somehow politically effective in a rather conventional sense.
He says at 491a-b, "First of all I say who the superior men 
are...they're whoever are wise in the city's affairs, about how to 
govern it well, and not only wise, but also brave, and capable of 
fulfilling what they intend — and who don't slacken because of 
softness of soul." There is nothing extraordinary about this 
treatment of the superior man; we might even say that it fits 
the mould of a Homeric hero, Agamemnon, for example. Or we
might even say Oedipus in Sophocles' tragic play. Wise and
strong, Oedipus both saved his city and very nearly became its 
downfall. Until the end, though, he never slackened because of 
"softness of soul", insisting that the truth be revealed and that 
he learn what no man could want to know.
As Euben has says, "This man [Oedipus] of unparalleled 
intelligence is a creature of the wild. He organises, divides, and 
orders things, events, and eventually people, yet violates the 
most sacred boundaries, caught in a net woven jointly by his 
acts and Apollo."114 Oedipus is "standing outside and above the
114J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road not Taken 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 102.
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forces that constrain lesser men."115 Even as the truth becomes 
clear, he remains superior, selecting the punishment that he 
must endure rather than defer to the judgement of "inferiors". 
In a sense, Callicles is adopting the heroic ideal, but turning the 
hero into the sort of civil actor that the Homeric characters are 
not. The strong man tramples on convention, but still looks to 
the polis for a sense of self.
But almost immediately after this statement Callicles reverts to 
the "naturalist" viewpoint: "The fine and just according to 
nature is this...the man who is to live rightly should let his 
appetites grow as large as possible and not restrain them, and 
when these are as large as possible, he must have the power to 
serve them, because of his bravery and wisdom, and to fill 
them with whatever he has an appetite for at any time" (49 le- 
492a). The best man is now seen as insatiable, acting for no 
purpose but his own satisfaction. The governing of the city is 
secondary. Thus, Callicles still harkens back also to archaic 
Greece and an "agonistic" approach to politics. "An exaltation of 
the values of struggle, competition, and rivalry was associated 
with the sense of belonging to the community, with its 
demands for social unity and cohesion. The spirit of agon that 
animated the gene of the nobility was manifest in every 
sphere."116 Callicles can be seen as part of a pre-Socratic 
tradition going back at least to Homer. He wants to be the best
115Euben (1990), 98.
116Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, (L ondon: 
Methuen, 1982), 45-6.
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man among his peers and surpass the others, achieving a type 
of virtuosity.
But Callicles is more than a throwback to a past age; he is 
heavily influenced by sophistic thought. Judging from the 
quotation of 484a-b he is an aristocrat who experiences 
frustration with the democratic regime. The political system is 
stacked against those who want to surpass others and there are 
no institutional means for gaining control and leading the state. 
One must acquire power by playing the established game 
better than everyone else, even though the game favours the 
equal distribution of power, at least in principle. The member 
of a phalanx has no means of glorifying himself as an 
individual, only as part of a group to which he must defer. The 
ambitious citizen who wants to establish publicly his unique 
identity may find himself at a loss and, like Callicles, resort to a 
rejection of the "social phalanx" that he sees holding him down.
The is an apparent incompatibility between these statements; 
the best man is simultaneously other-regarding in his outlook 
and self-centred. He wants what is good for the city and for 
himself, but these things do not appear to be identical from 
what Callicles says. The best man can be both interested in the 
city's affairs and extremely appetitive, seemingly to the extent 
of harming the city. To understand this we must fill in the 
content of the best man’s appetites. There are presumably 
rewards attached to effective management of the city. Callicles 
apparently values that type of reward. It transcends material 
gains and becomes something intangible, such as honour,
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prestige, respect, and so on. We can label these psychological 
gains. Accompanying these would surely be material gains, as 
well, but we would, I think, be mistaken in attributing to 
Callicles a purely materialistic outlook. If we do that, the only 
virtue that his superior man genuinely needs is the ability to 
muster superior force to take whatever it is that he wants. But 
he wants his superior man to be "wise in the city’s affairs" and  
immensely appetitive. We, thus, need to find a type of appetite 
that is compatible with ruling well.
This need is basically the point of Socrates' examination of 
Callicles' loose rule-based system of distribution; that is, the 
stronger get more than the weaker. A component of 
superiority that Callicles mentions is wisdom and this allows 
Socrates some room to compare the best man to a craftsman.
At 490b Socrates asks if the doctor should be given more food 
because he is wise about healthy eating. Following on this, he 
asks if the best cloak maker should have the biggest cloak and 
the shoemaker the biggest or most shoes. The point is that we 
need to determine the area of wisdom that is relevant to ruling 
the state and the nature of genuinely valuable rewards. 
Callicles’ scoffing at these examples confirms that he imagines 
something more than material advantages. What Callicles' best 
man wants is respect and this is gained by running the city 
well. This man is the person who is needed the most, but who 
himself needs the least. He requires the city for the praise of 
its citizens — his arete is real only when recognised by others. 
Reputation is not self-generating. It is the assessment other’s 
make of one’s value.
1 3 2
Socrates identifies skills that have recognised objectives and 
pushes Callicles into specifying the analogous objective for the 
statesman he has been trying to describe. His question is 
basically an attempt to have Callicles describe the purpose for 
which the political craft is practiced. Callicles initially claims 
that the pursuit of pleasure is the aim of all action (or rightly 
should be). But this will not do; some pleasures produce harm 
or are shameful. Pleasure cannot be good without further 
qualification .117 In fact, it can only be desirable when it 
contributes to the good. Thus, we read at 500a that we do 
pleasurable things for the sake of good things and not the good 
for the sake of pleasure.
Callicles is made to qualify his earlier statement that unlimited 
desire satisfaction is happiness and now concedes that some 
pleasures should be avoided for their consequences (499b).118 
If the best man, the one who should rule the state, is not 
simply the person with the greatest appetite backed by the 
power to satisfy it, Callicles must redefine the character traits 
that qualify one for rule. He concedes that a craftsman is 
needed to distinguish good from bad pleasures (500a) and this
117Cf. Section One on the hedonic calculus and the discussion earlier in 
this section.
1 1 8 A 1so , Plato constructs a proof that tries to demonstrate that the good 
cannot be something that is simultaneously present with evil and goes 
on to show that pleasure violates this principle. Using the example of 
drinking, he notes that the pleasure from drink is only present when 
the distress of thirst is also present. Once the distress is gone, the 
pleasure ends, as well (496c-e). This is an argument that we do not find 
in the P r o t a g or as .
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brings him and Socrates into a common pursuit of the political 
techne. Socrates has moved the discussion towards the 
eventual acceptance of the need for order, structure, and 
stability.
Socrates states more clearly at 501a what he takes to be the 
distinction between a craft and a "knack", the word he uses to 
describe rhetoric earlier in the dialogue. Medicine, for 
example, is a craft because it "has considered the nature of 
what it cares for and the explanation of what it does, and can 
give a rational account of each of these things." Later at 503e 
he says that "the good man who speaks with a view to the 
best...will be like other craftsmen; each of them selects and 
applies his efforts with a view to his own work, not at random, 
but so that what he produces will acquire some form." Each 
craftsman also "arranges in a structure" and "compels one thing 
to be fitting and suitable to another." Socrates is expressing the 
idea of the cosmos as an artefact. The components of the whole 
fit together because the artificer, the designing agent, envisions 
the whole.
A knack, however, is practice based on experience. The 
practitioner does not know why a certain technique works, but 
has a quasi-theoretical understanding of the causal relationship 
between particular events and outcomes. In making this 
distinction between knack and craft, Socrates is removing 
political order from the realm of chance and establishing it as a 
function of the statesman’s own psychological make-up.
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Introducing the idea of a craft will be Socrates' final attempt to 
establish the proper style of political speech. Rhetoric has been 
described as something that gratifies or provides pleasure 
(462c). The good has been identified as something other than 
pleasure (497d). Thus, rhetoric does not contribute to 
achieving the good.119 The political craft, on the other hand, 
looks to improve the soul and this sometimes means the denial 
of immediate gratification (503a-b), which Socrates* beliefs 
about rhetoric preclude. He is willing to countenance the 
possibility that rhetoric can be used properly, i.e., to improve 
the citizens. Despite this, he, in agreement with Callicles, can 
think of no current statesman who does so (though Callicles 
thinks that the great Athenian statesmen of the past did - 
503b-c120). A good rhetor will try to rid souls of injustice and 
instil temperance. Like the conclusion reached with Gorgias, 
the rhetor, as craftsman, is required to speak in a particular 
way. Unlike that earlier conclusion, he must now also speak to 
achieve a particular goal. Socrates has added a requirement for 
the moral improvement of the audience. The product of 
politics becomes ethically sound citizens.
119The correct use of rhetoric is discussed in the dialogue, as well as in 
the Phaedrus. Plato seems to be assuming the use o f rhetoric within the 
democratic institutions of Athens, which might lead him to conclude 
that rhetoric is never used for the good. I do not think that he bars the 
idea that the true statesman will be persuasive, though.
129This complicates matters for anyone wishing to treat Callicles as a 
Nietzschean. The statesmen whom he admires did not defy conventional 
morality. Rather, they sought the psychological gains that I describe 
above.
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A craft can be conventionally described as the uniting of 
method and objective, but it also implies an ability to speak in 
a particular way.121 When Gorgias tries to describe rhetoric as 
the power to persuade (452e), Socrates rebuts that the teacher 
of any craft has the power to persuade when speaking about 
his subject (453d).122 The point is that persuasion does not 
distinguish rhetoric from any other craft and, thus, Gorgias has 
failed to establish rhetoric as a unique science. This is what 
singles out the true craftsman. The craftsman conveys the 
structure and order of his skill in speech and argument. We 
can say that the expert practitioner is distinguished by his 
ability, first, to give an account (logos) of the unique features 
that define his skill from all others and, second, to defend his 
statements in cross-examination. The idea of giving an account 
reinforces the status of techne as the solution to chance in the 
universe. Techne is the antithesis of randomness.123 An 
account is necessarily ordered, composed, and presented as a 
comprehensive statement. This is what Socrates appears to 
believe will make a craftsman persuasive. Moreover, a student 
of the craft will learn in an orderly fashion, acquiring the basic 
skills before moving to the more complicated aspects. This is 
the significance of Socrates' remark to Callicles at 497c: "You're 
a happy man, Callicles; for you're an initiate of the greater 
mysteries before the lesser." Socrates is being ironic to indicate
1211 discuss the craft analogy in Section One.
122This is actually a difficult position to uphold, unless we assume, as 
Socrates appears to, that a rational account is by its very nature 
persuasive. As I note earlier, the dialogue dramatically confirms that 
this is not necessarily the case.
123Cf. Nussbaum (1986), 89 ff.
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that Callicles is not thinking methodically; he grasps at 
arguments and makes premature conclusions. For example, his 
long speech at the beginning of his section in the dialogue 
contains several references to the teachings of the poets. 
However, he has had only incomplete lessons (484b-485a). He 
has to paraphrase the relevant poetic passages because he 
cannot remember the exact wording of the poems. The same 
sort of thing can be found in Socrates’ constant rebukes to 
Polus for skipping "dialectical steps". Thus, Polus wants to say 
rhetoric is good, having only been told that it is a knack which 
aims at gratification (462c-d).
The idea of orderliness is driving Socrates* criticism of rhetoric 
as a craft. The false statesman who gives the citizens 
whatever, in their ignorance, they want illustrates the dangers 
that he feels await a polis run on these lines. If the statesman 
is to improve the citizens, Socrates indicates that he must first 
restrict himself to giving the citizens what they objectively 
need. This implies knowledge of human needs and further 
implies that the statesman satisfies only those objective needs 
for himself, as well. Socrates is saying that no state can be 
harmonious and temperate if the person who authored its 
existence is not. So, the fabrication of this state begins 
internally, within the artificer himself. Structure is something 
he imposes on his own soul before he imposes it on the souls of 
others. The ruler should have an internal order that controls 
his desires and prevents him from pursuing what should be 
undesirable. Callicles says the opposite — order is unimportant 
in comparison to pleasure-maximisation. The extent of desire
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per se and the ability to satisfy it are the important criteria of 
superiority .
As the creation of order moves outwards the statesman's duty 
qua statesman translates into controlling the citizens' 
appetitive desires. He says at 503 c-d that if real virtue is not 
filling up appetites, our own or those of others, then the 
allegedly great Athenian statesmen of the past failed; they did 
not "fulfil those appetites which make a man better when they 
are fulfilled". Later at 517b-c he says of the same men:
[Tjhey've proved to be better servants than the present people,
and more capable of supplying the city with what it had an
appetite for. But for forcing change in their appetites, not 
indulging them, persuading and forcing them towards what will 
make the citizens better — here they were virtually no different 
from the people now — and that's the only work for a good 
c itiz e n .124
But the statesman has a unique craft, confronting a problem 
that the practitioner of no other skill has to face. The 
statesman has to improve those who may wilfully resist 
im provem ent.125 At 505c Callicles refuses to go along with the
124it is important to Socrates’ argument that false statesmen be seen as 
servants of the people. Just as Callicles bends to the whims of the demos, 
the false statesman is a leader only in name.
125An argument could be made, and much of the dialogue’s language
supports the view, that Plato sees the objects of the statesman's craft as
passive subjects. In other words, they are improved without taking part 
in their own improvement. This is the argument in Robert W. Hall
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dialogue, refusing to answer more questions and protesting 
that Socrates should carry on by himself. Socrates exclaims 
that Callicles will not "abide being helped and tempered, and 
himself undergoing the thing our discussion is about — being 
tempered." What can a statesman do if the subjects will not 
submit? The elenchus presupposes a willing participant, not a 
hostile adversary. The statesman cannot make a better state if 
the citizens prefer their old, corrupt ways.126 In carrying on 
the dialogue as a monologue, Socrates is demonstrating that the 
only option left him is teaching through example.
So, the statesman-craftsman is singularly challenged. Unlike 
the other crafts, there is no mechanistic application of 
techniques to "raw materials". This would attribute to Socrates
“Techne and Morality in the Gorgias” in J.P. Anton and G.L. Kustas, eds., 
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1971). Similarly, Irwin writes in his notes for 517b,
“Socrates’ authoritarian views are clear when he says it is the 
politician’s...or the good citizen’s task to ‘force change’...in people’s 
desires with or without their consent.” Irwin, trans. (1979), 236. Both 
writers, I believe, overlook the action of the dialogue and fail to note the 
interactive nature of the elenchus. What undermines the elenchus is 
either an interlocutor's deceitfulness, i.e., a failure to express a belief 
that he currently holds, or his abandonment of the argument. Barring 
these, he is engaged with Socrates in reforming or reconstructing his 
own soul. What the dramatic action confirms, however, is my claim that 
the statesman deals with the most recalcitrant material. See above.
126If we accept the paradox that no one does wrong willingly, this 
statement would more accurately describe an unwillingness to examine 
what is right. I.e., one must be a/m -intellectual to prefer corrupt ways, 
not merely ignorant.
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some form of cognitivism.127 The subject of statesmanship is 
not a passive or inanimate thing, but other beings who are 
fundamentally no different from the craftsman himself. When 
Socrates says that people need to be persuaded or forced  to  
change their desires, we have to ask what sort of force will be 
effective. The dramatic action is pointing us in two directions. 
On the one hand, Socrates is himself shown as the persuader 
throughout the dialogue. On the other hand, persuasion fails to 
achieve his objectives, begging the question of whether 
persuasion was ever a viable alternative. Ultimately, Socrates 
must fall back on a claim about the afterlife in order to avoid 
sacrificing persuasion to force. The myth of judgement 
beginning at 523a is the persuader’s last argument for choosing 
a just life. It takes the threat of force and places it beyond the 
political, leaving the statesman with the tools of persuasion.
The implication is that worldly compulsion neglects the soul by 
addressing the body. The punishment of the afterlife works 
directly on the soul.
127See also, for example, Wallace I. Matson and Adam Leite, "Socrates' 
Critique of Cognitivism", Philosophy 66 (1993), 145-167. They define 
cognitivism as a view of expert knowledge seen as context-free rules 
that can be articulated clearly by the expert. Socrates clearly did not 
adhere to a rule-based morality. In the Euthyphro he rejects that piety 
is rendering to the gods what is their due or prosecuting crimes 
regardless of one's relation to the culprit. In the Republic he rejects 
that justice is returning what is owed or helping friends and harming 
enemies. For the political craft, rule-based morality would subsume 
politics under the notion of a productive craft. I argue against this view 
in Section One.
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Conclusion
I have been arguing in this Section that there are two 
conceptions of power that Socrates seeks to refute in the 
Gorgias. The power of persuasion and the power of superior 
force are both symptoms of the political language undergoing 
change and, to refute them, Socrates attempts to redefine 
power. He tries to show that power is not control over another 
for the benefit of oneself, but for the benefit of that which is 
controlled. Moreover, what is of benefit to the subjects is of 
benefit to the ruler. So, the power of persuasion that Gorgias 
describes cannot legitimately be used to gain prestige and 
honour, but only to persuade others to accept what is truly just. 
It is proper for rhetoric to persuade others about the just and 
the unjust, as Gorgias states, but for Socrates this objective 
requires firm knowledge of the subject.
Also, the supreme despotism of the "best" man that Callicles 
describes is not happiness for man because it violates the 
agreed principle that temperance is better than intemperance. 
Throughout the dialogue, Socrates plainly relies on a denial of 
incontinence in order to get the interlocutors to stop saying the 
things they defend. If they will only say what they believe 
and if he can make them see that they believe in the same 
moral truths he holds, then they will be unable to speak 
falsely. The ideas that the interlocutors defend would no 
longer be propagated. Socrates wants to deny them the means
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of communicating these falsehoods — and those means 
effectively rely on their own ignorance.
Socrates feels that everything is at stake if he loses the debate. 
First, political speech will no longer be political, meaning it will 
no longer be something which concerns itself with the welfare 
of the polis. If the polis exists for the welfare of the citizens, 
political speech is ultimately about their concerns. But the 
political speech that the interlocutors describe is speech about 
the welfare of the speaker, the single citizen. It is his needs 
that motivate him to speak. If this is aggregated, no one is 
speaking for the interests of the political association and its 
interests cannot be served by neglect. Secondly, and following 
from the first point, the unity and stability of the polis is 
threatened. The radical separation of word and speaker that 
allows knowingly false speech becomes a radical separation 
between citizens and polis. The polis becomes an object for 
exploitation, undermining its viability. By equating the good of 
the citizens with the good of the true statesman Socrates tries 
to show that the interlocutors harm their interests the more 
they pursue their false desires. In trying to reform the 
political language, Socrates is trying to rescue them.
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POLITICAL ORDER AND COLLECTIVE 
MORALITY IN REPUBLIC I
Sum m ary
In this Section I take a more precise look at the correspondence 
between individual and collective beliefs. I argue that order in the 
political association is fundamentally natural and try to show how this 
order can be subverted. In the first part I look a t Polemarchus' playful 
threat o f force in the opening scene. In the second part I examine 
Cephalus' use of poetry, myth and anecdotes to show that a language, or 
moral vocabulary, can contribute to order. Polemarchus has a vague 
awareness of this, as I try to show in the third part, and he tries to 
defend his fa ther’s beliefs in a more sophisticated way. The final part 
of this section is an examination of Thrasymachus' views. The 
discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus shows that knowledge is 
the issue fundamentally at stake. Unlike Polemarchus, Thrasymachus 
appears to understand this, a point especially revealed by his counter­
deployment of the craft analogy. Thrasymachus also seems aware that 
language can be used as a tool by those seeking power. I look at his first 
statement about justice, which I accept as an important corollary to his 
more inclusive second statement. In it I find an awareness that 
language can be used to impose something like an orderly framework 
on the political association, but that, in Thrasymachus' view, this 
framework is designed to serve only the interests of the person who 
imposes it. Combining this with the problem of knowledge, we see that 
Thrasymachus has not furnished the means of stabilising such an 
o rd er .
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In troduc t ion
Over fifty years ago, Jaeger observed that Plato turns the 
Socrates of the Republic into an architect of the psyche. “He 
makes Socrates move the whole state with one lever, the 
education which forms the soul.”128 The implicit antecedent to 
this claim is that souls are something that can be built. Plato’s 
education system in the dialogue, like any education system, 
transforms the individual psyche into something it might not 
otherwise become. It is the fact that any education system 
performs this function which causes Plato to elaborate in such 
great detail his own preferred system. Following the building 
metaphor, if one wants to impart a particular sort of 
psychological structure, one must have a suitable 
“manufacturing process” to reach the objective. The 
authoritarian flavour of Plato’s system is legendary and there 
is no need to describe the lengths he is prepared to go in order 
to achieve his goal. Suffice it to say that nothing is left to 
chance. Nothing that could raise questions about the validity of 
Plato’s moral principles is allowed in the education system.
This strict exclusion easily leads to the view that Plato’s system 
is little more than the tyranny of moral philosophy. People are
128Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. II, trans. 
Gilbert Highet, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943), 199. References 
to the Republic are from G.M.A. Grube, Plato: Republic, revised by C.D.C. 
Reeve, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), unless otherwise 
stated.
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forced to believe that certain ideas are correct and this 
compulsion takes the form of denying individuals the means of 
making their own decisions. Neither the essence nor the means 
of education is open to discussion, debate, or examination.129
Is this view correct? Clearly, yes, in the sense that critical 
examination of anything is a minority privilege in the ideal 
city. The philosopher-rulers monopolise authority over the 
ideological and institutional structure of the city. In that 
capacity they ensure that the other members of the community 
simply live within the boundaries constructed for them. 
Nevertheless, this quite apparent feature of the dialogue is not 
sufficient to support the claim that the ideal city is held 
together by compulsion. In order to defend that claim we 
would have to show one of two things. First, it would be 
necessary to show that the members of the ideal city wish to 
reside in a fundamentally different sort of association, but are 
prevented from acting on this desire. Alternatively, it would 
be necessary to show that, while the active desire to associate 
in a different manner is not present, its absence is contrary to 
human nature or rational desire or something of the sort.130 I
129This is a typical liberal charge against Plato, driven by the 
observation that Plato has a conception of the good that is prior to the 
individual. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I 
(London: Routledge, 1966). Also, Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's 
Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), especially 79.
130Perhaps one could try to show that living under a regime that is bad, 
but allows popular criticism of and participation in institutions is better 
than even a good regime which allows neither. This bears some 
resemblance to the Liberal argument, in that it places rights above the 
good.
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think it is fairly clear that the police-state implications of the 
former alternative are false. The ideal city is obviously not 
held together simply through the philosophers’ ability to bring 
force to bear.131 The latter alternative, however, is a claim 
about the extent to which the individual psyche is manipulated 
in the ideal city. Investigating this possibility means enquiring 
into the way beliefs come to be held. If, for example, any 
education system transforms the individual psyche, the charge 
against Plato fails; his education system performs the single 
function common to all such systems.
However, the charge against Plato extends to the structure of 
his entire political community. The entire project reflects a 
rejection of open enquiry and popular contribution to political 
deliberation. In short, Plato’s ideal city works to the extent 
that those who should rule also possess the power to maintain 
their position.132 There are two implicit positions, therefore. 
Either the ideal city is the result of systematic psychological 
manipulation of the most sinister kind; or, the city is based on 
some less onerous means of instilling appropriate beliefs in the 
minds of the city’s members. The argument of this Section is 
that we can find in the dialogue a rejection of the sort of 
psychological manipulation with which Plato is charged. In
131It is equally obvious that the philosophers can bring force to bear, 
but this is not the cement holding the city together.
132Klosko sees the Republic as the marriage of philosophy and power. 
Such a marriage, he claims, is effectively Plato’s divorce from the less 
sophisticated moral psychology of Socrates. George Klosko, The 
Development of P lato’s Political Theory, (London: Methuen, 1986), 174.
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rejecting it, Plato is indicating that the stability of the ideal city 
is guaranteed only by popular convictions that are not coerced.
This Section is an examination of Republic I. I try to show in 
my analysis that we can see there how Plato carefully 
undermines the ideas that a community can be maintained 
through psychological manipulation or that it can be 
maintained through force. Book I presents interesting 
difficulties because of its structure with regard to the rest of 
the dialogue and because of the controversy surrounding some 
its arguments. Considering the extensive attention this portion 
of the dialogue has received, my aims are somewhat modest. I 
want to offer an interpretation of what the interlocutors 
represent and why it is important for Socrates to refute them. 
The dramatic context and the characters* roles within that 
context are important parts of my analysis. The main 
contention I will try to support is that the interlocutors in Book 
I present views that are fundamentally opposed to persuading 
members of a community to hold particular beliefs. To varying 
degrees, they represent or argue for compulsion-based forms 
of belief formation. Following again Jaeger’s building 
metaphor, we can say that Book I describes the construction of 
moral identity from different angles. Socrates will reject all 
proposals made, indicating that those who construct a suitable 
psychology for the ideal city will have to employ different 
techniques. While space does not allow a detailed examination 
of Plato’s techniques, I will make some brief comments about 
the remainder of the dialogue in the conclusion.
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I divide Book I into four major sections and describe what I see 
as the main point of contention between Socrates and the other 
characters. The sections correspond to each person with whom 
Socrates debates: Polemarchus in the opening scene, Cephalus, 
Polemarchus again, and Thrasymachus. I discuss each in turn, 
but give Thrasymachus the more detailed examination that his 
importance in the dialogue demands. Indeed, it is the 
alternative that Thrasymachus offers which informs the 
remainder of the dialogue. Nevertheless, Thrasymachus is part 
of the logical progression in Book I. By the time he begins to 
speak, the possibility of abstract philosophical discussion has 
become apparent, a possibility that was conspicuously absent 
when the proceedings began. Socrates' criticisms, though, 
demonstrate that genuine philosophical discussion is still more 
abstract than any of the interlocutors initially imagine.
Thus, each interlocutor represents some kind of advance on 
those who came before. Polemarchus effectively begins the 
dialogue in the opening scene when he detains Socrates and 
Glaucon as they set off for Athens. This scene emphasises the 
distinction between force and persuasion. This observation is 
often made, but the significance of this brief exchange is easily 
overlooked. In examining both the verbal exchange and the 
dramatic setting, I try to show that the opening scene says 
something obvious about force, but also says something more 
subtle about the existence of compulsive authority within a 
political association. Those who threaten force and those who 
are threatened are not strangers. They begin the dialogue as 
members of some kind (or several kinds) of association and,
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therefore, bonds exist between them. Plato has juxtaposed 
unity and compulsion. I try to show that, for Plato, this 
situation is typical of all but the ideal city.
This argument is followed by an analysis of Cephalus. 
Polemarchus is an obvious symbol of force. Cephalus, however, 
appears to be nothing but a harmless introduction to the 
dialogue’s main theme. In this section I try to show that 
Cephalus is not a symbol of benign ignorance. He simply takes 
force to a different level — something we could more 
accurately identify as psychological manipulation. His method 
is to prevent philosophical examination of moral principles by 
adhering to a kind of dogma, which he can only repeat but 
never analyse. The result is that he forsakes the heavy hand of 
physical force for the lighter touch of controlling the scope of 
discourse. The catechism on which he relies is as inimical to 
persuasion as the plain use of force.
Cephalus is replaced by Polemarchus, now given a chance to 
redeem himself somewhat. Cephalus may function in a way 
analogous to force, yet without the onerous face of violence.
The reintroduced Polemarchus shows how this can be 
improved. The improvement, though, merely relocates the 
problem. I try to show in this section that Polemarchus 
attempts to salvage his father's dogma by making it more 
"dynamic". His attempt is reflected in his willingness to seek 
the more abstract meaning of the opinions Cephalus has 
offered. Socrates' criticisms of this position may be un­
extraordinary, but they do drive Polemarchus to seek a stable
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ground for his beliefs. Polemarchus fails because he looks for 
stable grounding in something that is itself ungrounded.
This outcome informs Thrasymachus' intervention. I try to 
show that a political association modelled on his ideas 
represents a combination of the force and psychological 
manipulation we see with Polemarchus and Cephalus, 
respectively. In addition, he grounds his views more 
effectively than Polemarchus could during his second 
contribution to the debate.
This summarises my arguments about each person’s function in 
Book I. Running through this is a further discussion of the 
implications regarding the construction of moral identity, the 
building of souls to which Jaeger refers. I try to show that each 
character relies to some degree on an element of compulsion 
that is ultimately antithetical to persuasion. It is important to 
note that Socrates is not the only character who is interested in 
the construction of souls, as Jaeger’s comment implies. The 
conflict in Book I has to do with the way in which such 
construction is carried out. In concluding my analysis I will 
have something to say about what I take Plato to regard as 
genuine persuasion and the reason that the approaches he 
rejects fall short of the mark.
Political Foundation and Constitutions
I describe above what I take Plato to regard as the guarantor 
of political stability. While I believe the argument I plan to
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construct can be applied to the entire dialogue, I concentrate 
here on Book I. It seems that no one any longer seriously 
doubts that Book I is integral to the rest of the text. My 
purpose here is to draw out certain themes in Book I that have 
been neglected and that, when stated, demonstrate the power 
of the opening Book in illustrating the complex challenge 
Socrates faces.133 I will try to show that Book I moves us 
toward the act of founding a political association. It does so by 
showing the inadequacy of several attempts to describe the 
basis of such an association. Thus, Plato has constructed Book I 
to represent the dialogue’s larger theme of establishing a new 
political entity based on stable, objective moral principles. The 
interlocutors’ failed arguments lead to an investigation of what 
an association is founded upon.
It might be useful at this point to recall that the Greek title of 
the work, Politeia, captures a different emphasis than our own
133As is well known, Republic I has not always been seen as integral to 
the larger work. Vlastos gives a useful commentary on the controversy 
surrounding this part of the Republic and seems to think that, 
regardless of the date of composition, Book I stands alone as “a sterling 
example of an Elenctic Dialogue.” Vlastos (1991), 249. The controversy 
drew mainly on stylometric evidence, which, as Vlastos notes, has itself 
been inconclusive. He alludes to what I think is of central importance: 
the juxtaposition of an elenctic dialogue and a decidedly Platonic (non- 
elenctic) work. Since the break is so patent, it reduces the value of Book 
I as a tacked-on introduction and necessitates an explanation. The 
answer, I believe, has something to do with the utility of the elenchus 
in certain situations. Annas makes a point similar to Vlastos' noted 
above. She says that even if Book I was composed earlier than the rest 
of the dialogue, "it forms an entirely suitable introduction to the main 
discussion." Annas (1981), 17.
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Republic . 134 Our title, deriving from the Latin “res publica”, 
refers to politics as a public thing. This can be a problematic 
interpretation. “Public” things can be opposed to “private” 
things on some readings (typically liberal), indicating that there 
is an aspect of the comnlunity that is technically not political in 
any way. In this sense Plato would be talking about the “public 
sphere” where people step out of their private lives to engage 
in some activity that affects all members of the community.135 
On this liberal interpretation, because Plato is assumed to be 
writing about the public realm, it is easy to claim that the just 
polis violates the public/private divide and, thus, sacrifices 
much (if not all) of what a liberal regards as human 
freedom .136 The just polis* authoritarianism is legendary.
Plato takes the public into the private, it is claimed, thereby 
abolishing “negative liberty.”
13 4 it is, of course, practically necessary to adhere to the traditional title 
when referring to the text. Cf. Rex Martin, “The Ideal State in Plato’s 
Republic”, History of Political Thought 2 (1981) 1-30.
135While certainly not a classical liberal, Hannah Arendt’s description 
of the classical polis not only makes the public private distinction, but 
treats the public realm as the only arena where one is fully human. See 
Arendt (1958).
136Fortunately, for the history of political thought, it is no longer 
considered acceptable to claim that a past thinker was “wrong” as some 
sort of definitive conclusion. Karl Popper has probably taken the most 
celebrated shot at Plato and, in so doing, commits precisely this error. A 
more sensitive, while still Liberal reading can be found in Annas 
(1981). See Popper (1966). For some criticisms of the liberal 
interpretation o f Plato see Nicholas Dent, “Moral Autonomy in the 
R epublic”, Polis 9 (1990) 52-77; Laszlo G. Versenyi, “Plato and His Liberal 
Opponents”, Philosophy 46 (1971) 222-36; C.C.W. Taylor, “Plato’s 
Totalitarianism”, Polis 5 (1986) 4-29; Robert W. Hall, “Plato and 
Totalitarianism”, Polis 7 (1988) 105-14.
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However, Socrates and the other members of the dialogue set 
out to found a polis and we should ask, if this liberal 
interpretation is the best way to understand what is 
happening. Is this a conception of the political that can inform 
our reading of Plato? Such an examination will reinforce my 
argument later concerning the relationship between popular 
moral beliefs, political institutions and political order. The first 
thing to do is to refer again to the title of the work and note 
that Plato did not make a reference to “public things”, but to 
the politeia, or constitution. In a modern sense, “constitution” 
usually defines the institutional structure of a given political 
association. This, however, is a thin understanding of the idea. 
We can say that the word is shorthand for what it is that 
constitutes the political association. In other words, the Greek 
title of the work is a reference to every aspect that lends a 
political association its particular character.
We can then enquire what it is that allows Plato to distinguish 
his new, just polis. The answer can certainly include the polis’ 
institutional structure, but it implies that beliefs, traditions, 
and self-understanding are also somehow important. That is, 
the constitution of a political association is the conglomeration 
of all that its members take themselves to be as members of 
the association. The constitution is effectively a self-identity 
manifest in institutions, which themselves promote the
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acceptance of that identity by this and future generations.137 
In this sense it is practically coextensive with the idea of 
nomos. In effect, the institutions reflect who or what the 
members take themselves to be and, through their normal 
operation, the institutions inculcate a system of values and 
beliefs. An illustration of this point occurs later in the dialogue 
(543a ff.) where Socrates describes corrupt constitutions: 
timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. He tells us there both 
about the institutional features of these regimes and the 
psychological make-up of those who live by their rules. The 
two are self-reinforcing; the institutions and the psychology 
feed off of one another. Furthermore, political change occurs 
when the correspondence between psyche and institutions is 
broken.
What we see taking place in the dialogue is the foundation of 
both an institutional structure and, more importantly, the self­
belief that corresponds to, supports and is supported by that 
structure. The beliefs make the institutions that remake the 
belief in future generations.138 Political foundation becomes 
the definitive moment of self-identification. The founder, or 
lawgiver, establishes what it means to be a member of this 
particular association. He gives to the members a way of
13 th rou gh out this paper I will use phrases such as self-belief, self- 
understanding, and self-definition as rough synonyms. By these I mean 
how the individual conceptualises who and what sort of agent he is.
138Later I will discuss situations where self-belief becomes uncoupled 
from the institutions. As I say above, self-belief can change causing a 
breakdown in the correspondence between how people view themselves 
and the manner in which they live together in the political association.
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talking about who they are and thereby the means of acting 
together with a shared understanding of themselves. In short, 
the founder gives content to the idea of “us”. He establishes the 
political association by giving to its members an identity, a 
language through which to express it and institutions in which 
to actualise it.
Foundation, as I have described it, seems to presuppose some 
prior situation that the new political entity supersedes. 
Throughout this section I will refer to that situation as the 
“pre-political.” I should immediately make clear that this is not 
meant to imply what we would call a state of nature, such as 
those found in the works of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau. Plato 
nowhere posits abstract, asocial individuals.139 Viewed from 
Plato’s perspective there is one true political association: the 
just polis. All others are frauds. The pre-political refers to 
these false associations, each of which might mimic aspects of 
the just polis (may, in the short term, provide a plausible 
facade of order), but none of which ultimately rests on 
rationally argued moral principles inculcated in a way 
acceptable to Plato. Pre-political associations, I will try to 
show, rest on physical or psychological force. I will be treating 
pre-political associations as quasi-political, in Plato’s terms, but 
lacking the stable basis of the just polis. They imperfectly 
manifest a natural human sense of justice without exhibiting an 
understanding of what justice is. I want to show that other 
poleis are associations that actually institutionalise and refine a
139Even Protagoras' "Great Speech" contains the trappings o f social 
b e in g s .
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straightforward kind of physical force, turning it into a new 
form of compulsion that prevents the subject’s mind from 
developing a grounding for his beliefs. Plato would see these 
poleis as unstable because they are based on indefensible 
principles.
The situation before political foundation, then, lacks critical 
defining aspects of a political association. There is no shared 
identity based on logically defensible principles or a 
complimentary language through which to express it, i.e., there 
is no way for individuals to describe coherently what their 
community is predicated upon. Members of pre-political 
associations may have a shared identity and language, but it is 
the lack of rational arguments to justify them that is crucial.
My aim is to reconstruct Book I as a story about the pre­
political and the psychological foundation of a political 
association. I also want to try to show how the pre-political, 
and its emphasis on compulsion, is never fully abandoned until 
the foundation of the just polis. I identify four stages through 
which Socrates passes before Book II begins the actual journey 
to the foundation of the just polis. The first stage is brief and 
occurs in the opening scene of the dialogue. I describe this 
scene as the rule of force because we see most clearly there the 
use of force in an ostensibly deliberative context. Civic 
discourse becomes a fiction. The second stage, represented by 
Cephalus, is different in that there is something like genuine 
civic discourse. There is a mode of expression that does not fall 
back on the use of force to win support. This discourse I call
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mytho-poetry because it originates in the popular literature 
used to educate and to provide moral and practical guidance. 
However, I will try to argue that mytho-poetic beliefs about 
the self, the language used to express them, and, thus, the 
foundation of the association itself become a kind of dogma 
that can only be repeated, not defended. I try to argue that 
dogmatism is itself a type of compulsion because it is 
impervious to reason or persuasion — thereby undermining its 
status as genuine civic discourse. In addition, I begin to show 
in this part the risks inherent in disconnecting belief and 
institutions.
The third stage sees Polemarchus re-enter the dialogue as the 
heir to Cephalus’ argument. I claim that he tries to establish 
what amounts to a “dynamic” dogmatism that can be more than 
mere assertion and something approaching true civic discourse. 
If successful, it would also provide a stable ground for the 
political association, since the mytho-poetry that Polemarchus 
inherits can function as the basis of civic discourse under 
certain circumstances. However, these circumstances are 
fragile, relying on unquestioned and unreflective adherence to 
mytho-poetry as an authoritative source of wisdom. Thus, he 
tries to ground the mytho-poetic inheritance and definitively 
break with the pre-political. His failure indicates that the pre­
political cannot be reconstituted into something more benign.
If dogma is somehow an expression of force, then its presence 
confirms that compulsion is effectively incorporated into the 
political association. The final stage of Book I is Thrasymachus’ 
intervention. Polemarchus’ failure, I claim, invites sceptical
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rejection of the mytho-poetic inheritance. This sceptical 
rejection reflects the way in which the mytho-poetic 
inheritance operates in argument, underscoring my claim that 
it reduces to unquestioned dogma. However, scepticism does 
not clearly establish what could replace the beliefs it rejects. 
Thrasymachus’ argument is an attempt to revert to force, 
which he sees as an empirically defensible understanding of 
how any political association operates. My argument is that 
when the existing mode of civic discourse, the mytho-poetic 
inheritance, is shown to be both inadequate in itself and 
indefensible, the most obvious route to take is back to an 
association ruled by strength, not convictions shared by the 
members. In other words, when the bond provided by mytho- 
poetry is shown to be merely a convention, it becomes easy to 
assume that there is no natural bond, or natural mode of 
bonding, between members of the association. Nevertheless, I 
argue that Thrasymachus represents an advance by 
emphasising the role of belief formation in a political 
association.
The foundation of the just polis will set out to do a number of 
things related to these four stages. It will first be an attempt 
to find a stable mode of civic discourse that can function as the 
mytho-poetic inheritance once did.140 Second, it will establish 
a necessary bond between the members of an association by 
showing that the association is a constituent of human
140The function I see as grounding the association and as providing a 
vehicle for communicating group identity to this and future 
g en era tio n s .
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flourishing.141 Finally, in accomplishing these things, the just 
polis will be the definitive rejection of force in either its pre­
political form or in the pseudo-rationalised Thrasymachan 
form. Thus, each character whom Socrates confronts in Book I 
stands for an obstacle that must be overcome in founding the 
just polis. Thrasymachus, in particular, becomes the Socratic 
nemesis because he represents a superficially plausible 
alternative that can realistically compete with the foundation 
of the just polis.
My discussion of Book I is divided into the four stages that I 
describe above, which I call the rule of force, the rule of dogma, 
the mytho-poetic inheritance, and the flight from association.
The Rule o f Force
The opening scene starkly presents the conflict between 
persuasion and force. This brief exchange between Socrates, 
Glaucon, and Polemarchus lasts just one page, but gives several 
important clues about the rest of Book I. Perhaps the first
141This is the significance of Socrates’ desire to prove that the just man 
is happier than the unjust. Rather than talking in terms o f happiness, 
however, I prefer to use the idea of flourishing, which, I think, better 
captures the idea of living and doing well. Richard Kraut discusses the 
importance Plato attaches to happiness, rather than rewards, in 
defending justice over injustice. Richard Kraut, “The Defence of Justice 
in Plato’s Republic, ” in Richard Kraut, ed. (1992). See also Cooper 
(1977) 151-7; Rudolph H. Weingartner, “Vulgar Justice and Platonic 
Justice”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (1964) 248-52; 
Jerome Schiller, “Just Men and Just Acts”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 6 (1968) 1-13.
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thing we should note is the opening line. I said earlier that the 
Republic is a story and that we should ask what happens in 
that story. The reason I call it a story is because Socrates is 
relating to an unnamed companion an event that occurred the 
day before. While the event is in the past, however, it is not in 
the distant past. Thus, it is remembered and retold by 
someone who was actually present. Socrates’ story, then, is not 
secondhand information, but is a genuine account of something 
that happened to him. The interesting aspect is that this 
opening is found in a dialogue that will have much to say about 
myths and poetry. Socrates may be indicating that an account 
is itself a kind of story and that there should not be a firm line 
between muthos and logos. 142
Nevertheless, the main concern of the opening scene is to give 
us a description of the conflict that Plato finds inherent in the 
pre-political. Polemarchus has seen Socrates and Glaucon 
ahead of him on the road to Athens and has sent his slave on to 
get them to wait. When he catches up, he tells them that either 
they must prove themselves stronger than Polemarchus and 
those who are with him or return to the Piraeus with them 
(where Socrates and Glaucon had been attending the festival of 
Bendis). Socrates asks if they can be persuaded rather than 
forced and Polemarchus famously retorts that men who will 
not listen cannot be persuaded (327c). The emphasis on force
142For useful discussions of this and related topics see Janet E. Smith, 
“Plato’s Myths as ‘Likely Accounts’, Worthy of B elief’, Apeiron 19  
(1985) 24-42; Janet E. Smith, “Plato’s Use of Myth in the Education of 
Philosophic Man”, Phoenix 40 (1986), 20-34.
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is obvious and it has not escaped the attention of commentators 
that this scene is more than stage-setting. Klosko finds here 
intimations of the need for a philosopher-king. He argues that 
this opening scene demonstrates Plato's rejection of the idea 
that rational persuasion alone is sufficient for political reform. 
He claims that we begin to see how Plato appreciated the need 
to join philosophy with political power in order to bring 
political change about.143 Similarly, Sesonske sees a conflict 
between persuasion and force that makes the philosopher's 
position untenable: "Superior strength, if exerted, will 
prevail....Persuasion, or reason, can be effective only if all 
parties are reasonable, or agree to listen to reason.''144
Finally, Bloom’s interpretation discovers in this scene the 
irresolvable conflict between philosophy and politics: "As in the 
Apology the city compels Socrates to speak and defend himself, 
so in the Republic a group of men compels Socrates to remain 
with them and finally give an account of himself. Apparently 
he does not wish to do so...but these men who accost him have 
power, and Socrates must adjust to them....He will only give as 
much of himself as is required to regain his freedom. This 
situation is a paradigm of the relation of the philosopher to the
143Klosko (1986), 52. Klosko's interpretation is driven by his belief that 
Plato was concerned primarily with political reform and that the just 
polis outlined in the Republic is not intended as an unrealisable utopia.
144Alexander Sesonske, "Plato's Apology: Republic I" in Plato's R epublic: 
Interpretation and Criticism (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
1966), 44-5.
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city ."145 Klosko and Bloom appear to offer an interpretation of 
Plato’s intended meaning that is decidedly un-Platonic. Both 
see political power as ultimately the power to compel. For 
Klosko, the philosopher-king forces men to be virtuous. For 
Bloom, the power to compel has no relation to the philosopher 
qua philosopher. Both ignore the possibility that Plato is trying 
to find a mode of political activity that precludes compulsion 
and that, at some level, persuades each person to accept the 
rule of the philosopher. At issue is the function and operation 
of persuasion.
For some commentators, however, the exchange with 
Polemarchus is either treated lightly or largely ignored. The 
opening scene is just the necessary dramatic vehicle to 
transport Socrates back to Polemarchus' house. Annas, for 
example, notes that Glaucon and Socrates are "jokingly forced"
145Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968),
310. Bloom, of course, is offering a well known Straussian 
interpretation that reads the just polis as a safe haven for philosophers 
in order to combat as much as possible the continuous threat that 
politics poses to philosophy. A highly unusual interpretation coming 
from, as 1 see it, a similar direction is that of John Sallis. His peculiar 
interpretation sees the Republic as the enactment of the descent into 
Hades described in the Myth of Er. Book I begins the descent with 
Socrates' failed ascent from the Piraeus — failed because Polemarchus, 
as a shade, compels him to stay. I have some sympathy with this sort of 
attention to the dramatic action and language used in the dialogue, but it 
comes close to over-burdening every line with deep significance (the 
Straussian “logographic necessity”) — without giving us textual 
evidence that the significance is there. John Sallis, Being and Logos:
The Way of Platonic Dialogue (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1975).
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back to the Piraeus and then moves on to discuss Cephalus.146 
This is certainly one of its functions (along with the importance 
of illustrating an obvious logical conflict between force and 
persuasion). There is, however, more than this. We need to 
examine why force should immediately make an appearance in 
the dialogue when the purpose of the coming discussion is to 
found a just polis. Even if one argued that the dialogue is not 
about politics at all, but about justice in the human soul, the 
abrupt introduction of force is incongruous.
We should begin by noting some dramatic details that make 
the conflict significant. First, the confrontation takes place on 
the road between the two main urban regions of Attica: Athens 
and the Piraeus. In other words, the meeting happens beyond 
any human settlements, a symbol of communal membership. 
Furthermore, we can find some significance in the two urban 
centres themselves. On the one hand, Athens represents the 
seat of government, of political association itself. On the other 
hand, the Piraeus, a port town and Athens’ economic lifeline, 
represents commerce and merchant interests. Furthermore, 
the importance of the Piraeus in the restoration of democracy 
in 403 makes the venue interesting from the perspective of
146Annas (1981), 18. Cross and Woozley are anxious to evaluate the 
central philosophical doctrines of Book I and, thus, ignore the opening 
exchange, take a cursory glance at Cephalus, and begin to discuss 
Polemarchus' claim about justice. R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, P lato's  
Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: MacMillan, 1964), 2-3. 
Except for his greater attention to Cephalus, shared with Annas, Reeve 
mirrors this approach. C.D.C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument
of Plato's Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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Plato’s psychology. In being compelled to return to the centre 
of Athenian democratic sentiments, Socrates is returning to the 
rule of the appetites, which accords with his characterisation of 
democracy at 555b ff. Thus, the Piraeus has political and 
commercial significance from the perspective of the dialogue 
itself. It might appear, then, that Socrates is being dragged 
away from  politics and back toward the narrow self-interests 
of commerce. However, the power of this dramatic detail lies 
in the choice of directions. Socrates can return to Athens 
where he engages in his characteristic philosophical activity.
Or he can engage with the democrats, represented by the 
Piraeus itself. Polemarchus’ statement that a good conversation 
is in store with the young men who will gather at his house 
indicates that the Socratic mode of rational argumentation need 
not be abandoned if one returns to the Piraeus. Socrates is not 
being called back to rule, but to participate. His return to the 
Piraeus, given its symbolic significance, is a statement about 
the possibility of political reform.
Finally, we should note the actual characters themselves. 
Polemarchus we know came to a violent death himself during 
the oligarchic revolt of 404. His threat of force is at least a 
little ironic. However, this same man who declares that those 
who will not listen cannot be persuaded is brother to one who 
is to become one of the most accomplished rhetoricians in 
Athens. Lysias, who is present at Polemarchus’ house, does not 
speak in the dialogue.147 However, just as there is a
147Lysias’ first speech, “Against Eratosthenes”, was his attempt to 
prosecute his brother’s murderer.
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relationship between the brothers, we will see later that there 
is a relationship between certain kinds of speech and force. 
Another set of brothers also becomes significant. Socrates, who
wishes to persuade, is accompanied by Glaucon. Polemarchus, 
who wishes to force, is accompanied by Glaucon’s brother, 
Adeimantus. Politics may provide a communal framework for 
human interaction, but the basic unit of human association is 
familial. The force that is threatened is simultaneously a threat 
to pit brother against brother and, thus, to subvert a 
fundamental natural bond. It is the natural harmony of the 
familial relationship that informs the institutions of the just 
polis. Nevertheless, the opening scene emphasises the inherent 
conflicts present in the pre-political, which violate natural 
harm ony.
Now Polemarchus' threat is entirely playful; we have no reason 
to believe that he would actually harm Socrates and Glaucon 
(and we cannot reasonably expect that Adeimantus would 
harm his own brother. Cf. 362d). We are firmly in the pre­
political, but dramatically there is some basic connection 
between the parties to the exchange, which they recognise and 
accept. This is not the absence of society. The community, 
membership in a community, is natural and Socrates will be 
extrapolating from this natural unity in constructing the just 
polis. We cannot understand the scene unless we already 
understand what is missing from it, namely the association that 
is implicitly indicated by the fraternal relations. Plato is trying 
to bring out the conflict embedded within all imperfect 
manifestations of the one true political association.
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The playfulness also implies the sense of community. We could 
not treat as human a character that was entirely divorced from 
any kind of association. It is the juxtaposition of playfulness, 
friendship and brotherhood, and the threat of force that 
establishes both the possibility of association and the 
possibility of disharmony. The playfulness is especially 
important because the conflict between Polemarchus and 
Socrates is subsumed, but not eliminated, by the lack of 
seriousness. The playfulness masks the fact that there is a 
conflict, leading us to see the exchange as cheerful banter 
before the real philosophical work begins. Because we know 
that there are conventional bonds that cross between the two 
groups of men (friendship, citizenship, brotherhood), we can 
see how these apparently overriding concerns can mask 
fundamental conflicts and antagonisms.148 The image Socrates 
starts constructing at 588c of the animal that is part man, part 
“varied and many-headed” beast, and part lion illustrates the 
point. The observer cannot see these parts because they are 
encased in a human "shell".149 If the parts are in conflict, the 
exterior casing keeps it out of sight. Similarly, when Socrates 
describes the forms of corrupt constitutions his emphasis is on 
the internal strife inherent in each. We can note particularly 
democracy (562 ff.). While the democratic city is
148Polemarchus, of course, is not a citizen of Athens, but he is bound to 
Socrates as a friend.
149Cf. the Phaedrus chariot/soul myth. The movement o f the chariot is 
the outcome of an internal struggle between the pilot and the "good" 
horse on one side, and the "appetitive” horse on the other. This is 
discussed in Section Four.
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institutionally united, the subversion of “natural” bonds 
(father-son, alien-foreigner, teacher-student, slave-freeman) 
denies the facade of unity (562e-563b). In the pre-political, 
force is never entirely eliminated; it merely changes its face.
The playfulness is double-edged. It highlights the camaraderie 
of association, but it also masks the conflict that is present. The 
familial relations function differently. Fraternal bonds are 
based on the unity of origins, indicating sameness through 
blood relations. To harm a brother is to harm that which is 
one’s own. It becomes the basis that allows the playfulness to 
“work” because it assumes a shared understanding, allowing 
one to distinguish threat from harmless teasing. Similarly, 
persuasion indicates a kind of sameness. It indicates similar 
values and a shared language. The possibility of interpersonal 
communication arises from this sharing. Civic discourse itself 
presupposes a civil bond that has its basis in associated living.
Thus, we see in this opening scene a “two-tiered” pre-political 
association. At the higher level all the parties in the opening 
exchange are united through the veneer of camaraderie that 
gives the scene its playful tone. At the lower level we see that 
this camaraderie is betrayed by conflict. Central to this conflict 
is the idea of difference masked by sameness. The pre-political 
association is stratified within itself, though it appears from the 
outside simply as a unitary, “flat” association. This 
stratification produces a tendency to “fictionalise” members. 
Socrates' position that the just city must share in pleasures and 
pains, just as the whole body suffers when one part is injured
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(464b), is a response to this. The exterior of the association 
must hide nothing about the internal composition of the whole. 
In other words, the facade of unity must be a reflection of the 
reality below.
In summary, the opening scene is a brief synopsis of the 
problem that Socrates faces in the rest of the dialogue. But it is 
not merely, as many have pointed out, that the man who uses 
words will always succumb to the man who uses might.
Rather, the situation is that the exercise of might can be hidden 
beneath a smooth fa?ade of words. Polemarchus* threat, both 
as threat and as playfulness, shows us the coexistence of unity 
and disunity, and, thus, instability, in the pre-political 
association.
The Rule o f Dogma
As should be clear, the opening lines of the dialogue are crucial 
to what follows. We are shown men in a community that is 
based simply on the superior ability of one member to control 
the others. However, the main difficulty to untangle is the 
encounter with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. In 
characterising Book I as a story about pre-political associations, 
we need to discern the degree of sophistication such 
associations allow — how their status as pre-political 
associations may be obscured. The rule of force, in its most 
obvious manifestation, is not purely about force as, say, the 
Hobbesian state of war. Plato shows us a scene that tells us 
something about force in order to illustrate the fundamental
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incoherence of all pre-political associations. In other words, 
remove the exterior “playfulness”, i.e., camaraderie, and one 
will discover simply power.150
There is an interesting parallel between Book I and the Gorgias. 
In the latter, as I discussed in that section, Socrates confronts 
three interlocutors who form a progression in argument.
Gorgias defends the power of persuasive speech and 
conventional morality, Polus represents a transition that draws 
on Gorgias while foreshadowing Callicles, and Callicles defends 
the power of superior force. In Book I, Socrates also confronts 
three interlocutors who offer something similar. Cephalus will 
defend the sort of conventionalism that I associated with 
Gorgias. Polemarchus will be a somewhat ambiguous 
transitional figure, like Polus. Thrasymachus will mimic 
Callicles’ attempted replacement of conventional morality.151 
In addition, we can see a similarity in that in both dialogues we 
find a Platonic concern with the use of language and the 
manipulation of shared symbols.
150Implicit in Klosko’s analysis is that even the just polis ultimately 
rests on power. Annas, as well, in more condemnatory fashion, sees 
compulsion as the primary means of holding the Platonic enterprise 
together. Klosko (1986), especially 79.
15 C a llic le s  and Thrasymachus may function in similar ways within 
their respective dialogues, but they may not necessarily have identical 
ideas. Thrasymachus offers a somewhat sophisticated sociological 
analysis. Callicles, from the start, more directly addresses how best to 
live one’s life. In terms of the nomos-physis antithesis, Thrasymachus, 
at least at the beginning, is offering a description of what is “naturally” 
so. Callicles immediately begins by defending physis  as providing 
moral guidance.
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The latter in particular is significant in the encounter with 
Cephalus. Polemarchus’ father as shown here is much older 
than Socrates and, therefore, the remark that he is at the 
“threshold” of old age (328e) is clearly a reference to Cephalus* 
impending death. He is a fairly transparent character. He has 
virtually no philosophical skills, yet he maintains that at his 
time of life “philosophy”, in the sense of intelligent or serious 
conversation, is a pleasing pastime (328d). This reminds us of 
Socrates* characterisation of democratic man, who is constantly 
in pursuit of some new desire and even occasionally puts his 
mind to what he thinks is philosophy (561c-d). As Cephalus 
says, when the pull of more physical desires is weakened by 
age (or when the ability to gratify those desires is lost through 
age) the tug of more cerebral pursuits becomes stronger. What
will become apparent, though, is that these latter pursuits 
reduce to the recitation of a kind of catechism. What I will try 
to show in this section is that Cephalus’ moral complacency152 
is not simply a demonstration of his lack of philosophical 
sophistication. The key point is the object of his complacency 
and how this is actualised in speech and action. We need, then, 
to examine the political significance of Cephalus’ speech.
152Moral complacency is the traditional charge made against Cephalus. 
See especially Annas (1981), 19. On the one hand we want to praise 
Socrates for exposing the unreflective manner with which certain 
beliefs are held, and for criticising this lack of reflection. On the other 
hand, we cannot let ourselves forget that the majority of those who will 
reside in the just polis are at least as complacent as Cephalus. Plato has 
no reason for an instinctive distrust of complacency as such, so long as 
the right sort of person is not complacent. The important difference, as 
I say, is the object of the majority’s complacency.
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Socrates begins the discussion by asking if old age is a difficult 
burden to bear. The charge that Cephalus is morally 
complacent stems largely from his age, I believe. He is 
portrayed as a man gently gliding through “retirement” on his 
way to a peaceful death. He has lived a life free from the sort 
of vice Socrates will later condemn and clearly has no regrets 
(and a fair amount of self-satisfaction).153 The charge is a 
statement about both age and attitude. Cephalus first says that 
many of his acquaintances long for their youth. When they 
were young, goes the complaint, they had revelry, drink, feasts, 
sex, and so on — all the things of which old age has deprived 
them .
Cephalus does not experience this sense of longing and ennui 
himself. He is reminded of something Sophocles once said 
about how old age meant freedom from the tyrannical rule of 
his passions and that he welcomed his old age as a time of
153Reeve sees in Cephalus an important point related to the efficacy of 
the elenchus. He says that “ the elenctically examined life is not 
guaranteed to be any better or more virtuous than the life of a 
traditionally brought up gentleman of means.” Thus, the elenchus is 
not appropriate for Cephalus and this is why, Reeve claims, Plato has 
him depart so early. There is some merit in this interpretation, but I 
will try to show that it is more complex than this. Reeve (1988), 7 .,
Annas’ reading is more sensitive to the historical period, I think. She 
says, “Plato was writing for an audience that knew that the security 
based on wealth which Cephalus had spent his life building up, and 
which is so much stressed here, was wholly illusory....” Annas (1981), 18. 
She notes that the family was ruined during the rule of the Thirty, 
Polemarchus was put to death and Lysias (hardly mentioned in this 
dialogue, but present) was exiled.
171
peace. The lesson Cephalus derives from this is that a man who 
is immoderate will find both youth and old age unbearable. If 
a man lives temperately, his old age will not be a burden. In 
other words, the problem is not that sex, drink, and parties are 
bad, but that living a life dedicated to such pleasures is a 
certain recipe for an unhappy old age. An intemperate youth 
will inevitably miss the opportunity and ability to be 
intemperate as he grows older. Cephalus* self-satisfaction is a 
product of his belief that he has lived a life of moderation.
Socrates goes on to raise a likely objection to what Cephalus has 
just said. Some would claim that it is not his lifestyle, but his 
wealth that allows Cephalus to bear old age gracefully. In 
typical fashion for Cephalus, he does not respond to this 
criticism directly with an argument, but finds another story 
that provides a convenient analogy: “When someone from
Seriphus insulted [Themistocles] by saying that his high 
reputation was due to his city and not to himself, he replied 
that, had he been a Seriphian, he wouldn’t be famous, but 
neither would the other even if he had been an Athenian” 
(329e-330a). Cephalus draws from this the conclusion that 
poverty makes old age hard even for a good man, but wealth 
will not lessen the bad man’s burden.
Socrates continues with the subject of wealth and asks 
Cephalus whether he made or inherited his fortune. Cephalus 
recounts how he is somewhere between his father and 
grandfather in this regard. His grandfather left to his heir 
roughly the amount that Cephalus has now, his father
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diminished it to less than Cephalus’ current fortune, and 
Cephalus built it back up to its current level (330b). Socrates 
says that Cephalus does not seem overly fond of money and 
this prompted his question (330c). Usually people who have 
inherited a great fortune are less money-loving than those who 
have created a fortune. Those who make themselves rich, on 
the other hand, love their money as something that they have 
made themselves. They identify with it as a result of their own 
efforts. As a result, they cannot say anything good unless it is 
about money.
Since Cephalus does not value money for its own sake, Socrates 
asks what is the greatest good that he has acquired from his 
wealth. Cephalus responds by noting that as one gets older all 
those stories about the afterlife become somewhat more 
plausible (or, at least, not so safe to disregard). He concludes 
by saying that the greatest benefit of wealth is that it allows us 
to make sacrifices to the gods, to appease them for any 
wrongdoing we may have committed, and allows us to pay 
back any debts we owe to men — and that this is just (331b).
Moral complacency, indeed. Cephalus has discussed four topics 
with Socrates (the quality of life in old age, the value of 
temperate living , the source of his own wealth, and the 
benefits of riches). In each case, he has included in his account 
some story meant to illustrate a greater truth. Sophocles* 
remark shows that old age is not necessarily hard to bear; the 
story of Themistocles shows that wealth will not by itself bring 
peace to a man; the story of his inheritance is meant to
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illustrate his own moderation; and the quotation from Pindar at 
331a is meant to illustrate the peace of mind that wealth 
provides. His final remark about the prudence of believing the 
stories about the afterlife is simply an endorsement of his own 
mode of argumentation. More than just being morally 
complacent, Cephalus as a character illustrates the prevalent 
use of allegorical stories to convey a moral truth. Should we 
criticise Cephalus for his complacency? His views, after all, are 
not onerous to Socrates, who also thinks that we will be 
happier if we live a temperate life and that moderation is 
something we should strive for and that how we bear our 
circumstances depends in large measure on the type of 
character we have.
Cephalus functions in several ways in this section of the 
dialogue. First, we should bear in mind the importance in 
Greek education of the sorts of stories on which he draws. The 
poets especially provided the “textbooks” for Greek cultural 
values and the transmission of these values was through the 
memorisation of their works. While Cephalus is more inclined 
to use anecdotes than specific works of poetry to state his 
views, this is itself significant. Anecdotal evidence presupposes 
the existence of a shared moral framework which gives the 
anecdote its force. In other words, for anecdotal evidence to 
work it must be interpreted correctly by those who hear it 
because an anecdote leaves unstated the conclusion it is meant 
to prove. Cephalus relates stories that he knows will be 
meaningful to Socrates (and the others).
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More importantly, and following on the first point, is the 
importance of the repeating of these stories. Cephalus has such 
a ready supply of anecdotal evidence that we can guess he has 
been reciting the same stories for some time (possibly when 
talking to his friends who miss the pleasures of youth). What 
conveniently functions as evidence when answering Socrates is 
simply dogma. It is not that Cephalus has a coherent set of 
beliefs that he illustrates with these anecdotes, but that these 
anecdotes are his beliefs. Their importance is almost reduced 
to their literal value as a collection of words and phrases. 
Cephalus can repeat the stories, but cannot defend their
meaning. He fails to defend himself from Socrates’ scrutinising
questions because all dogma is impervious to cross- 
examination. Cephalus’ stories do contain an allegorical 
meaning for him, but, first, he cannot articulate this cogently 
and, second, he collapses when his adherence to the literal 
word is exposed. Thus, when Socrates counters that returning 
what is owed to a madman who loaned us weapons is not just, 
Cephalus has to move away from the assumed shared
understanding that allows him to cling to the literal story. But
his need to move away psychologically is unrealisable because 
he lacks the intellectual power to argue more abstractly. The 
result is that he does move away, but away from the challenge 
— he leaves the room.
Another aspect of this exchange we should note is what has 
been accomplished in driving Cephalus away from the 
discussion. As I have said, the anecdotes he delivers are 
hardly representative of something he believes, but are his
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actual beliefs; he cannot articulate what they mean. When 
meaning becomes so self-evident to the person holding the 
beliefs, the anecdotal evidence becomes dogma. Once it 
becomes dogma it also becomes impervious to criticism, 
discussion, and analysis. Earlier I said that in the pre-political, 
regardless of the external appearance of unified association, 
what lies beneath is simply force. Dogma is simply force 
through language. It functions similarly to compulsion. Just as 
force is beyond reasoning, dogma is beyond rational defence. 
And, ultimately, a dogmatist cannot reside where belief is 
subject to critical scrutiny, hence Cephalus* departure. The 
time and place in which his dogma is appropriate are gone, and 
without the willingness or ability to force his case, the 
dogmatist must exit.
Yet Cephalus* dogma has a more complex role. Force is merely 
instrumental. A person exercises force in order to achieve 
something that he values, and at some level recognises as his 
value. The value is, therefore, necessary to establish the idea 
of his having an intention in acting forcefully (as opposed to an 
irrational striking out against another person). However, 
dogma expresses a value or system of values. Cephalus is 
making an assertion about what he believes. But this dogmatic 
assertion behaves just as force does; it allows for no enquiry or 
investigation or dissent. Like force it systematically excludes 
alternatives.
Thus, Cephalus’ self-belief, his understanding of himself as a 
moral agent, is wrapped up in his dogmatic assertions; but the
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very dogmatism he adheres to links him to the display of force 
we saw in the opening scene. It is important to recognise, 
though, that it is the way the belief is held and expressed, and 
not the actual content of belief that is identical to the rule of 
force. After all, Cephalus’ moral beliefs actually point towards 
the ethical life Socrates will later defend. Dogma represents an 
improvement on the straightforward use of force and clarifies 
the implicit bonds between men we saw in the opening scene. 
The political superiority of dogma rests on its suitability as a 
shared language that conveys between the members of the 
association what they believe as members. It expresses who 
they are. Moreover, Cephalus’ dogmatism is a transmittable 
language -- it can be taught to future generations. In this 
regard, too, it is at a higher stage than the rule of force itself. 
Dogmatic beliefs appear in the institutions that contribute to 
the self-formation of future generations. Thus, we see that 
Cephalus has memorised various stories that he can now use, 
not merely to assist him in understanding and expressing 
himself, but in ensuring that his sons come to understand 
themselves in the same way.
Given that the security of wealth was shown to be unstable just 
a few years later for Cephalus’ heirs, we can go on to say that 
the security of a particular dogma can prove equally unstable. 
If the certainty of the dogmatist can be challenged, the system 
has already fallen. That is, the way in which Cephalus holds 
beliefs about himself is only appropriate to a particular time 
and place: an age of widespread dogmatic belief. Even if his 
beliefs must compete with other dogmas, i.e., in the event of
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some ideological struggle, each system can be defended in the 
same way. The “rules of engagement” are dictated by the 
nature of dogmatism and these rules are that opposing dogmas 
live and die according to the power available to defend them. 
Dogmatic adversaries agree to disagree or simply fight. Thus, 
the sword defends the word, rather than the word defending 
itself through argumentation.
This has significance beyond Cephalus’ section. Socrates’ 
challenge about the nature of justice indicates that the rules of 
engagement have changed. Cephalus’ departure from the room 
is a concession that he cannot adapt himself to these new rules. 
If argumentation meant finding new ways to express the same 
dogma, he could carry on with the discussion. Socrates, 
however, demands more than that. Socrates represents a mode 
of interpersonal communication that is not merely the 
manipulation and rearrangement of familiar and accepted 
symbols. This, he will say later, is the plight of those who are 
chained in the cave. The symbols manipulated are shadows on 
the wall in front of them. Because they can only talk about 
what they see, their language is reduced to a vocalised 
manipulation of the same symbols (515b). Thus, when 
confronted by Socrates, Cephalus cannot do what he would 
normally do as a dogmatist, i.e., re-assert his position until the 
other party acquiesces. As Reeve says, Cephalus is an 
inappropriate subject for the elenchus, but for reasons other 
than Cephalus’ already moral life.154 His dogma has become his
154Reeve (1988), 7. Reeve’s position on Book I is that Plato is trying to 
show the inadequacy of the Socratic method. Cephalus raises the
1 78
self-identity and in order to discuss his belief abstractly he 
would simultaneously have to see himself abstractly. He would 
have to see himself as other, which itself presupposes freedom 
from dogma.
In summary, we can read Cephalus as a progression from the 
rule of force that I identify in the opening scene. He has a set 
of beliefs that are coextensive with his belief about himself as a 
moral agent. His only way of expressing these beliefs, and thus 
of expressing himself, is through assertion. This, I claim, is 
identical in character and function to the direct use of force 
that Polemarchus playfully threatens. What I am calling the 
rule of dogma is the rule of force with a shared language that 
the opening scene only implies. In this sense, dogma attempts 
to describe what is of value in an objective sense, rather than 
in a personal sense. In other words, Cephalus dogmatically 
holds beliefs about what is of value when considering how one 
should live his life. Cephalus, then, offers us a way of talking 
about the human self that Polemarchus initially cannot match.
The Mytho-Poetic Inheritance
Cephalus leaves the room when it becomes clear that he cannot 
defend himself against Socrates’ examination.155 His departure 
is also interesting in the respect that, had he stayed, he would 
have ultimately been humiliated by the cross-examination. His
problem of why Socrates should cross-examine those who already live
p rop erly .
155It is actually his departure itself that makes this clear.
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humiliation would have implicitly been a loss of face, a 
reduction of his personal worth and self-respect, since his 
dogma represents an absolute certainty in his own beliefs. Had 
he been so humiliated, though, he would have necessarily 
changed his perception of himself and this would mean 
acquiring a more abstract understanding of himself. Because 
he cannot win he must leave. The immediate event that gives 
him an opportunity to leave is Polemarchus’ rush to his 
defence. When the former insists that his father is correct 
about what is just, Cephalus retreats to finish the sacrifice 
(33Id). Clearly, this is just a convenient excuse, since he
appears to have just finished the sacrifice when the party
arrived (328c).156 On leaving, Cephalus leaves the argument to 
Polemarchus, who, as the eldest son is also the heir to Cephalus’ 
estate. There is a hint of doom in this exchange, since 
Polemarchus was later killed by the Tyrants.
But the doom is relevant to the entire world in which Cephalus 
has lived his life. The security of wealth may be unstable, but 
as I say above, the security of dogma is equally unsound. The 
security of belief, certainty about what is true, that 
underpinned Athens was soon to be shattered by the most 
devastating conflict prior to the dissolution of the democracy in 
332. Polemarchus inherits this dogma that is his father’s self­
belief and with it, as we shall see, the instability. Cephalus has
156In his note to this passage Waterfield makes the, apparently 
unsupported, claim that Cephalus “was probably a priest with a role to
play in the day’s proceedings”. I am not aware o f any evidence for this.
Robin Waterfield, Plato: Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
381.
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been successful in reproducing himself in his son. But his 
success is not complete. In this section, I want to look at what 
I will call the mytho-poetic inheritance. The phrase is meant to 
emphasise the dogma we see in Cephalus as a specifically 
transmitted artefact. In doing so I hope to show that the 
foundation of a stable political association must include 
stability over time and this necessitates the stability of the 
members’ psychological make-up. We need in this section to 
discover the cause of psychic instability, which will lead us to 
the instability of what has been transmitted from previous 
generations.
We should note, first, how Polemarchus functions in this part of 
Book I. Cephalus has described himself as somewhere between 
his father and grandfather. The latter earned great wealth, the 
former lost a significant portion of it, and Cephalus has 
recouped a certain amount of the loss. There is a parallel here 
between Cephalus’ father and grandfather and Cephalus and 
his heir. Like his father, Cephalus has inherited something 
that, at its appropriate time, was of great value. Not only is 
that time now past, but what was a living belief for his 
ancestors is dogma for Cephalus. What he loses is the 
persuasive force and credibility that his beliefs had because he 
is not capable of defending them appropriately. It is not so 
much that he has actually lost something; the currency has 
merely been debased. The ancestors who put their beliefs into 
the mytho-poetic framework that Cephalus reduces to dogma 
held that framework to be an expression of what they had no 
other means of articulating. But the belief was in something
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beyond the specific articulation. The use of allegorical stories 
serves to express the inexpressible. When Cephalus gets hold 
of it, the inexpressible disappears altogether to be replaced by 
the literal interpretation of the allegorical stories. The meaning 
is hardly intimated. The time may still be right for his 
particular beliefs, but the time has passed for the way in which 
they are held. This is why Cephalus is shown as collapsing 
under a fairly unsophisticated challenge from Socrates. The 
latter merely gives a likely example of a situation where 
Cephalus’ views of justice would be inappropriate. Argument 
must take the place of dogma because, when allegory becomes 
dogma, it obscures what it originally set out to explain.
Like Cephalus, Polemarchus will take his father’s inheritance 
and try to rebuild what has been lost. He seems to have an 
intuitive sense that what his father believes is not the core of 
the problem, but the way in which he holds the beliefs. We 
will see in Polemarchus a new interest in engaging in debate 
over beliefs. In this regard, Polemarchus is like his father who 
worked to rebuild what his own father had lost. Overall, we 
can see a progression in Book I away from force and towards 
an awareness of the need for rational argumentation. When I 
turn to examine Thrasymachus in the next section, I will try to 
show how this progression gets twisted and turned back on 
itself. For now, though, we need to look at Polemarchus and 
what he does with the mytho-poetic inheritance.
Before discussing this inheritance I want to go through 
Polemarchus’ section in Book I to see why Socrates rejects the
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views that grow out of the quotation from Simonides. Then I 
will turn to examine why this section is included between 
Cephalus and Thrasymachus.
The discussion with Polemarchus reminds us of the dangers of 
reducing allegory to dogma. As I said, the stories we have 
heard are supposed to be meaningful. Simonides is employed 
as a theorist of justice, but Socrates says that he does not know 
what Simonides means by the idea of giving what is owed 
(33le). If the stories are meaningful, one cannot assume that 
the meaning is self-evident. He concludes that Simonides was 
speaking in riddles because what he meant was that one should 
help friends and harm enemies, but he couched this in the 
language of paying what is owed. The point of this 
introductory clarification of Polemarchus* position is to revive 
the allegorical content of the beliefs Cephalus has passed on to 
his son. Giving what is owed, then, becomes a way of talking 
about appropriateness or desert (332b). But this 
understanding of desert assumes or fails to explain what its 
recipient should receive, i.e., it leaves unexplained the objective 
human needs of the Platonic system.
To show the emptiness of Simonides* words, Socrates 
introduces the craft analogy.157 Medicine is the craft that
157 it is important to note that the craft analogy used at this point is 
strictly an analogy with technical crafts. This sort of analogy will 
resurface in the discussion with Thrasymachus with the implicit 
warning that technical crafts are subject to misuse by the unscrupulous 
practitioner (see below). Reeve tells us that this warning is intentional, 
which he sees as the reason that the craft analogy is not used again
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treats the body. Cookery is the craft that seasons food to taste. 
Justice becomes the craft that helps friends and harms 
enemies. So, doctors are useful to the sick, a ship’s captain is 
useful for ensuring safety at sea, and justice, to follow the 
analogy, must have a sphere of activity in which it is uniquely 
useful. Polemarchus says that justice is useful in wars and 
alliances. Socrates has not yet attempted to show that 
Polemarchus is looking for justice in behaviour and ignoring 
character. Instead, he has taken the specific defence that 
Polemarchus offers and works out its inconsistencies.
The emphasis that Polemarchus places on behaviour over 
character is the crux of the weakness in his argument. But the 
weakness does not stem simply from some inherent superiority 
in thinking about justice as an internal disposition. It stems, 
rather, from the failure of Polemarchus’ account to explain 
adequately the motivation for acting in the manner that he 
thinks is just. Polemarchus starts from a pre-given set of 
conditions that determine how one should act. Thus, one 
should help friends and harm enemies and the content of these 
two categories is taken for granted. We simply have duties 
towards particular sorts of people, but we cannot say anything 
more about these people than that they exist as categories of 
persons. Within the context of political foundation,
Polemarchus neglects the psychology of membership and 
apparently assumes the prior existence of a stable community 
where agreement is already present.
throughout the work. Reeve (1988), 19. I discuss the craft-analogy in 
Section One.
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The possibility of being mistaken about who are our friends 
(334b-c) directs us to examine the role of knowledge in 
establishing the content of our duties toward others. Because 
knowledge is a question about a person’s internal condition, 
looking at the role of knowledge in defining duties is also 
related to the issue of motivation. Both are essentially about 
the connection between an individual’s cognitive state and the 
world in which he acts. On Polemarchus* account all just 
behaviour is successful actualisation of intentions (we help our 
friends who are really our friends and harm enemies who are 
really enemies), but we cannot ask how these intentions come 
about or at whom they should be directed.
Comparisons can be made with Polemarchus* initial appearance 
in the dialogue. My argument about the rule of force maintains 
that force is instrumental in achieving a pre-existing desire 
which, indeed, makes sense of the force employed. This places 
the desire beyond the reach of analysis and argumentation.
Now we see that Polemarchus is talking about something other 
than the satisfaction of desires -- he is talking about fulfilling 
one’s obligations. But just like his desires, these too are beyond 
exam ination.
Basically, then, Polemarchus has taken his father’s dogmatism 
to a new level. He exhibits a methodological superiority 
because he can argue in a quasi-abstract manner about the 
same beliefs that his father holds. But this does not free him 
from dogmatically holding a set of unexamined assumptions,
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which support his entire thesis. That is, he relocates the 
dogmatism from the way the beliefs are held to the actual 
content of the beliefs, because within his actual beliefs is a 
critical centre that is impervious to examination. We can see 
that the dogmatism remains and, in fact, that Polemarchus does 
not really argue his case at all. His superior method of 
defending himself is simply the citation of an authority, 
Simonides, as the final word on the matter. The invocation of 
Simonides substitutes for making an argument. Socrates’ 
disagreement with Polemarchus is essentially no different from 
that with Cephalus. In both cases beliefs are held 
unreflectively, even though Polemarchus can give a reason for 
holding his belief (the authority of Simonides). More 
importantly, however, neither can address the psychology of 
justice that will connect the individual psyche in the just polis 
to its institutional structure. In Cephalus the psyche comes to 
match a certain set of institutions through rote memorisation of 
a certain body of beliefs. This process excludes investigation 
and enquiry. In Polemarchus’ case a similar situation occurs. 
The individual has duties towards people about whom he must 
have knowledge as representatives of particular categories of 
persons. However, the necessary knowledge is assumed. The 
individual just is a particular person and just has a particular 
set of external relations.
We need to look at the reason Plato might have for giving 
Polemarchus a second opportunity to speak in Book I (given his 
silence throughout the remainder of the dialogue ~  even 
Thrasymachus is allowed one more line after Book I at 450a).
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It seems that he is necessary to complete the movement away 
from the rule of force and towards the founding of the just 
polis. If we think of Cephalus* dogmatic beliefs as a kind of 
faith, Polemarchus becomes the necessary immediate response 
that challenges to that faith inspire. When first confronted 
with a challenge to the faith, the most attractive response is to 
invoke authority of some sort for one’s views.
Socrates, however, reveals that Simonides makes a curious 
authority. Polemarchus quotes him as having a particular 
statement about what is just. When this is clarified to the idea 
that justice is helping friends and harming enemies, Socrates 
accuses him (Simonides) of speaking in riddles. The poet has 
used allegory to say what he could have said more clearly in 
everyday language. If the mytho-poetic inheritance is 
supposed to be the remnants of what was once a particular 
articulation of an inexpressible belief, Polemarchus* use of 
Simonides denies that the belief is inexpressible at all. That is, 
the ancestors who bequeathed the mytho-poetic inheritance 
simply left their heirs a cumbersome vehicle for verbalising a 
straightforward idea. It is to replace one way of talking about 
a virtue with another, less effective way. The result, as we see 
with Polemarchus, is confusion.
More should be said about the role of knowledge in 
Polemarchus’ argument. He concedes that we may be mistaken 
about who are our friends and enemies, which creates 
problems for a theory of justice that necessitates correct 
judgement (such as his own). Thus, our friends can become
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enemies if our judgement changes or our information becomes 
more reliable.158 When Polemarchus refines his definition to 
exclude the possibility of error, he has done three things. First, 
and most obviously, he has made explicit the connection 
between correct judgement and just action. This foreshadows 
Socrates’ own arguments later that justice and cognitive 
disposition are connected, which he amply illustrates with the 
corrupt constitutions (543a ff.). Secondly, he has accepted that 
harm and benefit have to do with the excellence of a being or 
thing qua that being or thing (335b-c). This effectively 
eliminates the concentration on behaviour that has 
characterised Polemarchus’ and Cephalus’ treatment of justice. 
Instead, Socrates has shifted the emphasis to character state. 
This means that we can now begin to talk about the formation 
of character as a serious function of the beliefs transmitted 
from one generation to the next. Looked at another way, we 
have lost the idea of an individual as someone who simply has 
desires and duties before becoming a subject for “theorising”. 
What we say and do to others has some bearing on their 
quality as moral agents. At this stage, however, we have not 
yet reached the point of saying that psyche is malleable and
158This overlooks the possibility that friendship is itself an 
“institution” and has little directly to do with judgement or information. 
By friends, Polemarchus could mean something as broad as fellow  
members of deme, tribe, or phratrie — indicating that he has no choice 
in the selection of friends. This, however, reinforces what I am 
arguing above. If Polemarchus does mean this, he is simply saying that 
he has a certain set of relations with other people which he cannot 
question — they just are the basic framework for action. For a 
discussion of friendship in the Greek polis see Horst Hutter, Politics as 
Friendship (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978).
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affected by external conditions. Socrates has been using the 
language of function (ergon)in talking about excellence (arete). 
Thus, the “character” that is formed (or deformed) is still a 
functional identity.159
Finally, Polemarchus’ concession reveals a necessary 
correspondence between institutions and the agents who are 
subject to those institutions. The critical aspect of friendship is 
that it defines an individual’s relations to another person and 
in this we can see an analogy with institutions, or structures 
that mediate between individuals. False friendship joins 
together those who should be institutionally separated. 
According to the argument that Polemarchus develops out of 
the saying of Simonides, a friend is owed benefits and an 
enemy is owed harm. Thus, prior to the distribution of harm
159Reeve notes that the appeal to function (ergon)  only works if  
Socrates can successfully show that justice is a craft. Socrates’ “proof’ 
of this is that the craftsman never attempts to “outdo” other craftsmen. 
The unjust man, however, does try to outdo both just and unjust.
Therefore, injustice is not a craft and not a virtue. Reeve (1988), 20-1. 
Reeve is not clear in his use of the craft analogy, I believe. He does not 
explore what Plato might be trying to convey with this device. On the 
translation of techne as craft see David L. Roochnik, “Socrates’ Use of 
the Techne-Analogy” in Hugh H. Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy 
of Socrates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Nevertheless, we can 
still talk about character in functional terms throughout the dialogue. 
Socrates will define justice as each part of the soul doing its own work 
and we can understand from this that a deformed soul is one in which 
functional boundaries are violated. What distinguishes this later 
definition from the current idea of function is that the functional view  
Polemarchus seems to accept is more closely related to a technical or 
productive craft. It is more difficult to talk of the psychic elements in 
these terms.
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and benefit is the existence of those whom we call friends and 
enemies. Indeed, the distribution is defined by the existence of 
these two categories. This leaves us, however, unsure what is 
exactly meant by the term friend. The things distributed 
(harm and benefit) and those to whom they are distributed 
(enemies and friends) are self-referencing. A friend is one to 
whom we owe benefits and benefits are those things that are 
owed to friends. Socrates draws on the craft analogy at 332d 
to begin the argument that a just man does no harm (because 
to harm is to make something less excellent with respect to 
what it is). Therefore, if Polemarchus were to adhere to the 
distributional rule of harm and benefit, the just man would 
have no enemies, since he never harms (335d). We can say, 
then, that the structure that mediates between the just man 
and other men is friendship, with its distribution of benefit.
The result is that friendship as an institution or structure 
requires a particular sort of character, that of the just man.160 
In order for the institution to operate properly, friends must be 
real friends and this necessitates justice. Without just 
character, the institution of friendship is either subverted or 
becomes meaningless.
To summarise what I have been arguing about Polemarchus, 
we can say that he is an advance on his father because he takes 
seriously the need to defend the system of beliefs that 
undergirds his self-conception. He ultimately fails to ground
160xhe benefit that the just man bestows obviously has to do with the 
excellence of the soul. To the extent that a doctor, say, benefits his 
friends is the extent to which he is just.
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that system in anything less unsure than his father’s mytho- 
poetry. Mainly, this is due to Polemarchus* initial reliance on 
the same dogma and his subsequent attempt to defend this 
through what he thinks is rational argument. As I try to show, 
all he does is relocate the weakness in his method to Simonides. 
Nevertheless, Polemarchus is a necessary stage before reaching 
Thrasymachus, who breaks with the method. We can draw an 
initial parallel with the arguments heard thus far and Socrates* 
construction of the divided line. As we move from Cephalus to 
Polemarchus we effectively move from the lower half of the 
line to the upper. That is, Cephalus shows us what it means to 
be in the lower realm of the visible and Polemarchus, though 
he fails in the ascent, shows us what it means to be in the 
upper section of the visible.
The weakness in Polemarchus’ position emerges when we 
consider political foundation and self-formation. It becomes 
clear that the unexamined assumptions that support his ideas 
become a new dogma that is transmitted to future generations 
as a collection of ideas to memorise and accept (Simonides is 
authoritative, therefore, follow Simonides). Polemarchus is 
himself an indication of how unstable this form of transmission 
is. The faith that Cephalus exhibits has already been rejected 
and Polemarchus is open to the challenges that Cephalus cannot 
abide. What is dogmatically accepted today is subject to 
challenge tomorrow. Consequently, what is dogmatically held 
must ultimately rest on an understanding of its veracity. As 
we have seen, an intuitive understanding (Cephalus) is 
inadequate because explicit challenges call for explicit defence.
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Also, appeals to authority (Polemarchus) cannot replace 
understanding because such appeals are simply an 
abandonment of the argument (not to mention that appeals to 
authority do not themselves explain why a particular authority 
is legitimate). What distinguishes Thrasymachus is his 
rejection of intuition and any authority outside his own 
intellectual powers. The argument that he advances is very 
much, then, an argument arising from his own character.
The Flight from Association
Thrasymachus is widely recognised as the philosophical core of 
Book I. In this section I want to treat him as both a spokesman 
for a particular understanding of justice and as the intellectual 
height of the pre-political. I will be describing Thrasymachus 
as a nominal advance on Cephalus and Polemarchus, but also as 
a throwback to the rule of force that we witness in the opening 
scene. Therefore, he represents what I am calling the flight 
from association because he attempts to undermine the bond 
between men that the mytho-poetic view takes for granted and 
re-describe it as an expression of power. Apparently seeing 
that the mytho-poetic bond between men cannot be grounded 
with arguments, Thrasymachus concludes that any bond 
between men ultimately rests on the commands of a stronger 
party. His anger at the way the discussion has proceeded thus 
far (336b-c) is a rejection of attempts to understand justice 
through the poets. His new approach is to see how justice 
operates and to derive from this what it must be. The result is 
a new way of actualising an innate sense of justice and
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community that reverses the assumptions of the mytho-poetic 
inheritance. He leaves the natural bonds between men, 
revealed in the opening scene, but institutionalises these 
bonds to favour one party over another. The 
institutionalisation takes the form of a new language of justice, 
a new understanding of what it means to be just. For 
Thrasymachus, what most people take to be just action is 
simply action that benefits the party with power. To translate 
this crudely into Marxist language, we can say that most people 
live under false consciousness, according to Thrasymachus. In 
this section, I want to begin by rehearsing the various 
interpretations of Thrasymachus’ apparently shifting position. 
The purpose in doing so is to challenge these interpretations for 
failing to connect Thrasymachus sufficiently with the rest of 
Book I or the remainder of the dialogue. It is my view that 
Thrasymachus is the next logical stage after Cephalus and 
Polemarchus and establishes the fundamental challenge to the 
founder of the just polis. That challenge I see as the need to 
establish a polis that is desirable in itself for all its members.
It is not easy to make sense of Thrasymachus or make sense of 
his inclusion in the dialogue. The dialogue is generally scathing 
towards sophists, but the evidence we have on Thrasymachus 
indicates that his main profession was in rhetoric.161 I 
commented when writing about Gorgias that perhaps the 
distinction between rhetorician and sophist was more fluid for 
the Greeks (or, at least, for Plato) than might be assumed. 
Possibly, we are meant to understand that sophistry is a way of
161Translations of surviving fragments can be found in Freeman, 141-2.
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talking about philosophical issues that is persuasive through its 
seemingly logical proofs. This would correspond to our own 
understanding of sophistry as apparently logical argument.
This is the Thrasymachus that appears in Book I. He has 
seemingly logical arguments about justice and its relation to 
self-identity and civic discourse. He will say that the stronger 
define the word, actualise a sense of justice, in accordance with 
their own interests, thereby, creating a discursive framework 
for talking about ethical conduct that is grounded in their own 
needs and desires. Thus, I will be looking at various 
treatments of Thrasymachus from the perspective of this 
discursive framework.
White’s account is the briefest and offers a suitable starting 
p o in t.162 He begins by noting that Thrasymachus is not 
included in order to provide us with information about the real 
person as such. “It is Plato’s main interest here to present two 
opposing lines of thought in an illustrative manner,” he 
w rites.163 We need, then, to discover what Plato means to 
illustrate. White’s position sometimes sounds as if Plato wants 
us to conclude that people like Thrasymachus are not very 
good at stating their case. Thrasymachus would illustrate the 
unphilosophic mind attempting to reach beyond its station.
In his summary of 337d-339b White says, “He [Thrasymachus] 
maintains that governments always set up laws and practices
162Nicholas P. White, A Companion to Plato’s Republic, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1979), 65-73.
163White (1979), 65.
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to benefit those who govern, and apply the term ‘just’ to those 
laws and customs to persuade others to abide by them.”164 
White goes on to say that “the prescriptions labelled by the 
term ‘justice’ are in some important sense arbitrary, that they 
are set up by the rulers to accommodate what happens to be 
their interests, and that they exhibit no significant common 
feature but this.”165 White’s treatment is fairly 
straightforward and introduces what I see as the crux of the 
argument: those who rule have in some way established a set 
of prescriptions that they call just and that others abide by 
these prescriptions for reasons that go beyond the mere threat 
of punishment. Similarly, Reeve writes, “What [Thrasymachus’ 
first statement] means, in effect, is that control of behaviour 
includes control of linguistic behaviour, and with it, a kind of 
thought control. The guardian controls the way in which the 
children will use the term ‘just’, how they will conceive of 
justice itself, how they will think about and evaluate both 
themselves and the world around them....The rulers, through 
their power to reward and punish, and through their control of 
education and the flow of information generally, have trained 
[the subjects] to praise as just the very behaviour that is to 
their — the rulers’ -- advantage.166 Reeve is fundamentally 
correct. We can add that the rulers have succeeded in 
actualising the amorphous sense of justice that all men are 
assumed to possess. The signal ability required for ruling is 
persuasiveness. One must be able to persuade others that
164White (1979), 65.
165White (1979), 66.
166Reeve (1988), 7.
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particular actions or categories of actions accurately embody 
the general sense of justice one has.
In other words, people believe that what the rulers say is just 
actually is just and act “justly” because they see it as morally 
correct. The ensuing modification that finds Thrasymachus 
propounding a view of the expert ruler (340d-e), therefore, 
means that the Thrasymachan ruler-craftsman must expertly 
persuade others that the just principles are objectively so and 
are unrelated to his own selfish interests. We cannot, at least 
at this point, find more than a Thrasymachan description of 
what “naturally” occurs in politics.
The Thrasymachan ruler has the ability to establish a cognitive 
and discursive framework for understanding justice. What 
Thrasymachus describes is a situation analogous to the 
activities of the poets: the ruler establishes the bounds of 
morality in action by appealing to intuitions the subjects 
already possess. The difference, and it is crucial, is that 
Thrasymachus describes a ruler who is consciously aware that 
the bounds he establishes serve him alone. Unlike Homer, who 
presumably did not set out to establish a moral framework for 
the Greek world, Thrasymachus’ expert does so. Even if Homer 
did do so, it was not for his own benefit. This in itself is 
significant because the act of founding a polis is at the forefront 
of the dialogue. This is a sign showing how the founder creates 
a new set of institutions and corresponding beliefs — how 
people think and talk about moral and ethical conduct. The 
founder founds a mind or human character that corresponds to
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the institutions he creates. It emerges, though, that the 
correspondence is false under Thrasymachus’ regime because 
the cognitive and discursive framework is expressly designed 
to harm the person who employs it (harm understood as a 
violation of a person’s interests). That is, the more a person 
acts “justly”, as Thrasymachus* ruler would have us do, the 
more that individual suffers at the hands of the leader. This is 
why self-interest becomes an important component of Socrates’ 
later argument. The alternative, as he sees it, is a set of 
institutions that creates stability by undermining the well­
being of those who live within them. White, as I note above, 
says that Plato wants to show two opposing lines of argument 
in an illustrative manner. The lines, we can now say, are 
Thrasymachus’ justice, which incorporates the idea of self- 
harm and Socrates’ justice, which will incorporate self-benefit. 
Between them they emphasise political foundation as the 
creation of men and institutions that complement, support, and 
promote the stability and well-being of each other — and 
political foundation that does the opposite. The former,
Socrates feels is the foundation of the just polis.
The comments I have made above assume away the basic 
controversy surrounding Thrasymachus, namely the extent to 
which he has a single, coherent doctrine of justice. The 
remarks thus far should indicate that I believe he does. 
Numerous attempts have been made to reconcile 
Thrasymachus’ apparently contradictory assertions. He makes 
three statements that can be construed as theories of justice:
197
Justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c)
Justice is obedience to the laws (339b)
Justice is the advantage of another (343c)
We can begin by dispensing with the second statement and 
treating the first and last as the only possible options for 
Thrasymachus* true meaning. Only Hourani accepts the second 
statement as Thrasymachus’ intended meaning.167 Kerferd’s 
reply to Hourani is conclusive, I believe, and it will, therefore, 
be unnecessary to examine Hourani* s case.168 A point worth 
mentioning, though, is a particular difficulty that Hourani’s 
argument makes. Thrasymachus rejects Cleitephon’s 
suggestion (340c) that the strong enact laws that they believe, 
perhaps mistakenly, to be in their interests. If Thrasymachus 
means that justice is obedience to the laws he could reasonably 
be expected to accept Cleitephon’s idea. While I follow Kerferd 
and Nicholson in my reading of the text, finding Thrasymachus’ 
true theory of justice does not tell us what that theory means. 
In order to examine his views, I want to look at an important 
and comprehensive treatment of Book I, the one found in 
Annas’ introduction to the dialogue.169 Julia Annas’ position is
167G.F. Hourani, “Thrasymachus’ Definition of Justice in Plato’s 
R ep u b lic”, Phronesis 7 (1962).
168See G.B. Kerferd, “The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s 
R ep u b lic”, Durham University Journal 19 (1947-8); G.B. Kerferd,
“Thrasymachus and Justice: A Reply”, Phronesis 9 (1964). Kerferd’s 
position is that the last statement Thrasymachus makes is more 
inclusive, i.e., represents a general rule about justice. Nicholson lends 
further support to Kerferd’s position. Peter Nicholson, “Unravelling 
Thrasymachus’ Argument in the R ep u b lic”, Phronesis 19 (1974).
169Annas (1981).
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that Thrasymachus is initially incoherent and is made to refine 
a bad argument to arrive at what she says is his real opinion. 
Thus, he does not shift on the essential elements of his 
argument, even though she admits that, as stated, his 
statements about justice do not add up to a unified view.170 
She begins by setting up a framework in which Thrasymachus 
may be doing one of two things. First, he may be making an 
argument for conventionalism (or legalism), which is the belief 
that justice is nothing more than obeying the laws. Second he 
may be making an argument for what she calls immoralism, 
meaning that Thrasymachus believes in some objective 
understanding of justice and injustice and favours injustice.171 
She writes, “The conventionalist tells us that justice is not what 
we think it is. The immoralist tells us that it is exactly what we 
think it is , but that we are wrong to think it is a virtue; there 
is nothing admirable about it.”172 She says that Thrasymachus’ 
position is actually the immoralist one, but his initial 
statements appear to lead to conventionalism.
Looking first at Thrasymachus’ initial statement that justice is 
nothing more than what is in the interests of the stronger 
(338c) we see what Annas means by conventionalism. Justice 
is not dependent on some essential attribute, but on the 
interests that rulers happen to have. Justice is doing what they 
prescribe in laws, which are the expression of their interests, or 
what Thrasymachus takes interests to mean. As she says,
170Annas (1981) 37.
171 Annas (1981), 36.
172Annas (1981), 37.
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justice here is “analysed in terms of the relationship of 
government to governed.”173 Now it is not clear that Socrates 
understands Thrasymachus’ first statement as reducing 
precisely to conventionalism. She translates 339b7-8 as, “You 
say it’s just to obey the rulers?” This, however, may impose a 
particular interpretation on the line. It could mean that 
Socrates is seeking a clarification or confirmation of something 
that has already been said or implied. Others have translated 
and treated this line as an additional point Thrasymachus 
concedes.174 The result in the latter case is that Socrates may 
not have understood Thrasymachus to be making a 
conventionalist argument, but may be inducing him to make 
further specifications that will establish the conventionalist 
position. Once this is made explicit, Thrasymachus can reject it 
and a more sophisticated argument can develop. Thus, 
Thrasymachus’ position does not terminate at justice as 
obeying the laws. This is something in addition to what he has 
already claimed about justice.
This may or may not be central to Annas’ argument, but we 
should be aware that it is problematic to conclude decisively 
that Thrasymachus is understood to be making a 
conventionalist argument at first. Until Thrasymachus 
explicitly rejects the offer of conventionalism that Cleitephon 
makes at 340b, we cannot be certain that anyone (other than 
Cleitephon) understands him to agree with the conventionalist
173Annas (1981). 40.
174Grube/Reeve write, “...don’t you also say that it is just to obey the 
r u le r s? ” .
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position .175 Nevertheless, Cleitephon’s offer does indicate that 
conventionalism is one conclusion we could derive from 
Thrasymachus’ first statement.
Annas continues by showing that Thrasymachus assumes, until 
Socrates effectively challenges him, that the ruler and the 
stronger are synonyms. Socrates’ observation that the ruler 
may be mistaken about his interests and, thus, obeying the law 
may mean doing what is not in the interests of the stronger 
forces Thrasymachus to see “ruler” and “stronger” as, at least, 
potentially separate entities. It turns out that Thrasymachus is 
only interested in the stronger — and in the ruler only insofar 
as he is also the stronger.176
It will turn out that he is interested in the stronger only to the 
extent that this person correctly determines his own interests. 
The thrust of Thrasymachus’ rejection at 340c is that 
conventionalism is the wrong conclusion to derive from the 
first statement and this means we must go on looking for what 
Thrasymachus does mean. Annas goes on to examine
175lt is important to note that Cleitephon’s interpretation is in response 
to Socrates’ obvious criticism that the stronger may promulgate laws 
that are accidentally against their interests. Cleitephon is allowing 
Thrasymachus to add a corollary about cognitive state by saying that it 
is just to obey the laws that the strong believe are in their interests. 
Thus, their actual interests are irrelevant, but their beliefs become 
central. This introduces the value of knowledge over belief.
176Annas (1981), 40-1. Annas accepts that as a practical observation 
there is nothing wrong with assuming the identity of ruler and 
stronger, since those who rule typically have command o f the resources 
of power that can be used to secure their own position.
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Thrasymachus’ claim that the ruler qua ruler does not make 
mistakes, which is the gist of Thrasymachus’ rejection of 
Cleitephon. Her treatment misses an opportunity to add depth 
to the craft analogy that plays a role in Book I. She says of 
Thrasymachus’ argument against error, “He is thinking of the 
obviously true point that the man who has the upper hand 
cannot afford to make mistakes, or he will soon cease to have 
the upper hand.”177 I read this point differently.
Thrasymachus is making a point about the grounds for calling a 
person an expert. He is saying at 340d that our calling a 
person a particular kind of expert is in accordance with a 
narrow criteria that precludes doing what anyone without th a t 
expertise could do. Anyone can mis-diagnose a patient, so 
misdiagnosis cannot be part of medical expertise. When a 
doctor makes a mistake, therefore, he is simply doing what 
anyone could have done and not what a doctor uniquely could 
have done.178 This is an extension of according a superior 
position to knowledge (over belief) which the rejection of 
conventionalism entails.
A final point we should note about Annas’ statement about the 
man who has the upper hand is that it does sound something 
like what Plato will say about the tyrant. Because he cannot 
afford to make mistakes (every mistake automatically works 
against his power, since he is the only one with power179) he is
177Annas (1981), 43.
178For simplicity I ignore the possibility o f laymen making lucky 
gu esses.
179It is useful to think of the tyrant’s mistake as an action that works to 
someone e lse’s interests.
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ultimately the most miserable and least secure person in the 
community (578e-579b). However, given his false perception 
that his ultimate power and injustice are desirable to keep, he 
cannot, from his own perspective, afford to err. From Plato’s 
perspective, every tyrannical action he commits is a mistake.
Annas continues with a discussion of Thrasymachus’ second 
statement that justice is another’s good. This statement follows 
343a where he counter-employs the craft analogy with the 
example of the exploitative shepherd. Thrasymachus points 
out that the shepherd is a craftsman who does not care about 
the subject of his craft, because he appears to promote the 
interests of the sheep only to ensure their usefulness to 
h im self.180 Annas correctly says that Thrasymachus treats the 
unjust man as the one who successfully forwards his own 
in terests .181 She also correctly says that Thrasymachus 
assumes that most people’s interests will inevitably conflict, 
necessitating conflict between the unjust man (who forwards 
his own interests above all else) and others.182 We can derive
180I note above the rejection of the craft analogy Reeve believes Plato 
is offering. It should be noted that Reeve believes the craft analogy is 
decisively undermined by the introduction of the wage-earning craft 
because craftsmanship is no longer a completely other-regarding 
psychological condition. Reeve (1988), 19. Reeve appears to neglect 
how Socrates has also introduced with this implausible craft the idea of 
self-benefit, which in Book II he sets out to show is a result of justice in 
the soul.
181Annas (1981), 44.
182For a discussion of conflict in politics and a defence of 
Thrasymachus point in this regard see Ralf Dahrendorf, “In Praise of 
Thrasymachus” in Essays in the Theory of Society (London: Routledge
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from this what must be Thrasymachus* views on the weak 
members of society. They effectively become a kind of object 
that must be manipulated in order to satisfy the ruler’s wants. 
This follows directly from Thrasymachus’ shepherd analogy.
Having delivered his second substantive statement about 
justice, we can see that it is initially inconsistent with his first. 
Annas writes:
This conflict need not worry us too much, however. For we can 
see ‘justice is another’s good’ as an expansion of the original 
claim that justice is in the interest of the stronger, made by 
someone who has seen that the original claim was made in too 
limited a context....Under pressure Thrasymachus comes up with 
another formulation which applies to rulers as well as their 
su b jects.183
The point, then, is that it does not pay to be just. Furthermore, 
we can see how radical his statement is; justice does not pay 
under any circumstances. Justice always results in self- 
harm .184 On the other hand, if it is correct that Thrasymachus 
views the weak as akin to objects worthy only of manipulation 
by the strong, justice entails extending equal value to others.
and Kegan Paul, 1968). In response see Robert W. Hall, “In Praise of 
Thrasymachus?”, Polis 10 (1991), 22-39.
18^Annas (1981), 45-6. I see this as a reworking of the 
K erferd/Nicholson thesis.
184Returning to the shepherd analogy, we can see that short-term 
sacrifices, i.e., giving the sheep something they desire, are acceptable 
as long as the long-term gains are greater than the loss.
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This seems anathema to him. In reconciling Thrasymachus* 
two statements, we should not simply conclude, with Annas, 
that Thrasymachus is an over-hasty arguer who “needs lessons 
in rigour from Socrates.”185 Thrasymachus represents a way of 
conceptualising oneself within the community. His is a 
community of conflict.
Annas’ characterisation of Thrasymachus’ positions 
(conventionalist vs. immoralist) appears fundamentally 
correct.186 Thrasymachus clearly wants to say something 
about the value of justice. Additionally he wants to say 
something about the cognitive capacities of those who are just. 
Throughout, however, his view seems to be that the just are 
somehow irrational; they are not genuinely worthy of respect. 
They become the tools of desire satisfaction.
Thus, Thrasymachus’ counter-use of the craft analogy is telling. 
As to his over-arching theory, Thrasymachus’ belief is that 
justice is the advantage of another. That justice is the 
advantage of the stronger, the ruler, becomes a particular
185Annas (1981), 46 .
186Annas offers three proofs that her account is correct. First, 
Thrasymachus says at 344c that his second statement is equivalent to 
what he originally said about justice. Second, Socrates says at 345b that 
he understands now what Thrasymachus meant by his original 
statement, indicating that the second statement is a clarification and not 
a change o f argument. Third, Socrates’ argument about craftsman not 
practising their craft for their own interests is a simple attempt to 
refute the idea that justice is in the interests of the stronger, before 
moving on to the more important point about whether or not justice 
pays. Annas (1981), 46-47 .
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instance of that theory. His first statement, then, is important 
for any analysis of the political association. Similarly, the craft 
analogy as he employs it, becomes the paradigm of 
Thrasymachan politics. The craft analogy has to do with the 
amount of respect a ruler-craftsman should afford his subjects. 
The result of Socrates’ argument is that the craftsman must 
acknowledge and respect the interests of his subjects. 
Thrasymachus is agreeing that subjects have interests, but 
violation of those interests is necessary for the rulers to get 
what they want. The subjects’ interests are marginally 
acknowledged and not respected at all. Thrasymachus’ 
concern seems to be that Socrates’ craftsman does not pursue 
his own interests. Socrates counters with the self-serving craft 
of wage earning, which serves to strike a balance between 
subject and ruler. The Socratic craftsman can help himself and 
others simultaneously (cf. Section One). Annas’ argument is 
persuasive and it has clear affinities with the 
Kerferd/Nicholson position.
I conclude, with these three interpreters, that Thrasymachus' 
second statement is his definitive view of justice. In arriving 
at this conclusion, though, we run the risk of ignoring his first 
statement and, for a political theory, that statement is 
significant. As a moral theory his second statement is more 
inclusive than the first could be. However, I want to argue that 
the political implications of justice as the advantage of the 
stronger corresponds in tone to the arguments of Cephalus and 
Polem archus.
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I identify these two above as the representatives of an 
unstable mode of political discourse. Socrates is successful in 
showing the flawed content of their arguments. This success 
functions as a demonstration that a new mode of discourse is 
needed. Mytho-poetry is neither suitable as a tool for 
philosophical investigation nor is it redeemable. Socrates 
shows that a system of belief expressed through Cephalus' 
mytho-poetry collapses when challenged. That failure 
nevertheless reveals a success. For Cephalus, in particular, 
mytho-poetry provides a way of thinking about and conveying 
moral beliefs. Socrates may reject the specifics, but he 
recognises the necessity of the mytho-poetic function. Indeed, 
the analysis and reconstruction of the poetry used in education 
(377b ff.) transplants the function into a more coherent and 
stable vessel. In a way, then, mytho-poetry is redeemed by 
re-writing the entire traditional corpus that Cephalus tries to 
bequeath .
Socrates' efforts at redemption occur after the flaws are 
revealed. In between the revelation and redemption, we find 
Thrasymachus making a different attempt at constructing a 
moral language. In other words, the political argument of the 
dialogue draws on ideas first raised in Thrasymachus’ initial 
statement about justice. As Socrates progresses through the 
construction of the just polis, it becomes clear that in addition 
to founding a set of institutions, he is also founding a 
complementary human psyche, which is logically prior to those 
institutions. The just polis succeeds because it contains citizens 
who are either just themselves (the Guardians) or are cognisant
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of some advantage to be derived from deferring to the just (the 
Auxiliaries and producers).
Justice as the advantage of the stronger shares something with 
this Socratic construction. Thrasymachus says to Socrates:
Don’t you know that some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a 
democracy, and some by an aristocracy?... And in each city this 
element is stronger, namely, the ruler?... And each makes laws to 
its own advantage. Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny 
makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others. And they 
declare what they have made -- what is to their own advantage — 
to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone who goes 
against this as lawless and unjust (338d-e).
The point at which Socrates’ just polis and Thrasymachus’ 
interpretation of politics coincide is that the rulers in both 
provide the moral framework within which actions are judged. 
The divergence, evident in the quotation, is that Thrasymachus 
appears to treat justice as entirely conventional. The things 
declared to be just are arbitrary, having no connection to either 
an objective moral truth, as in the Platonic system, or to any 
intuitive sense of justice that individuals may have. As a 
contribution to the nomos-physis debate, Thrasymachus 
appears to come down on the side of nomos. In addition, this 
would turn the strong, the rulers, into mere power-holders who 
are in a position to force their will upon others. This 
interpretation reduces all cities to master-slave communities.
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This view is unlikely for a number of reasons. First, in 
defending his original statement and, thereby, generalising 
from it to derive his second statement, Thrasymachus makes 
the following points:
A just man always gets less than an unjust one. First, in their 
contracts with one another, you’ll never find, when the 
partnership ends, that a just partner has got more than an unjust 
one, but less. Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes 
are to be paid, a just man pays more on the same property, an 
unjust one less, but when the city is giving out refunds, a just 
man gets nothing, while an unjust one makes a large profit. 
Finally, when each of them holds a ruling position in some public 
office, a just person, even if he isn’t penalised in other ways, 
finds that his private affairs deteriorate because he has to 
neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse 
because of his justice, and that he’s hated by his relatives and 
acquaintances when he’s unwilling to do them an unjust favour 
(343d-e).
Therefore, according to Thrasymachus, in both public and 
private affairs injustice is the more profitable course (it is 
simply a Thrasymachan “fact” that injustice pays). But in none 
of the instances mentioned do we perceive anything like force 
or overwhelming power being employed. The unjust gain an 
advantage, apparently, by outwitting other people or by 
exercising a devious cunning that allows them to avoid costs 
that others incur. Thus, an important reason that the master- 
slave interpretation is wrong has to do with an assumed
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communal relationship between the just and the unjust. 
Thrasymachus is saying that in the normal interactions 
between members of a pre-existing, and on-going, community 
those members who violate either the letter or the spirit of the 
rules that exist between the members will always come off 
better than those who don’t do so. The sense of his argument 
here has to do with the avoidance of disadvantage and the 
exploitation of opportunities — presented by the honesty of 
others.
After making these points, Thrasymachus tries to illustrate the 
superiority of injustice with the example of the tyrant. In this 
case it seems clear that Thrasymachus does have 
overwhelming force in mind. If the tyrant is the paradigm of 
injustice, then the master-slave metaphor becomes more apt. 
The tyrant Thrasymachus describes is entirely removed from 
the community that he exploits. Unlike the previous instances, 
the tyrant is not violating rules that legitimately apply to him
because no rules apply to him.
The tyrant may be Thrasymachus’ ideal man, but the passages 
in which this ideal are introduced do not support the master- 
slave interpretation. The introduction of the tyrant is a 
rhetorical device operating within the context of a longer
speech in defence of injustice. Thrasymachus is presenting an
extreme case to further illustrate the greater happiness one can 
derive from wrongdoing. The historical Thrasymachus was a 
professional rhetorician. His method of argument reflects this, 
as does his initial intervention at 336c, where he appears to
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criticise the question and answer method Socrates had been 
using with Polemarchus. Thrasymachus wants to deliver a 
different kind of answer and, thus, a different kind of 
answering. Therefore, the example of the tyrant is not 
intended to describe Thrasymachus* view of all political 
associations. He is not saying that all ruling bodies behave in 
the openly exploitative way attributed to the tyrant. He is 
saying, however, that the truth of his position is revealed in its 
extreme manifestation. If his assertion holds for the most 
extreme case, it will also hold for the less extreme cases he 
identifies earlier (partnerships, tax payments, public office).
If we return to Thrasymachus* first statement about justice, we 
can begin to understand more precisely his view of politics. In 
cases where obedience is not forced, those with power must 
utilise other means of ensuring compliance with their self- 
serving laws. He says in his first statement that those who 
break the laws are declared to be unjust and are punished as 
lawless. The implication of this is that the strong are engaged 
in an effort to make people believe that the self-serving laws 
are objectively just. Through their declarations about 
disobedient conduct and the use of punishment, the strong 
attempt to bring about a general acceptance of the rules.
People come to obey because they believe it is right to obey. 
Rather than forcing compliance, the strong have persuaded the 
weak to hold particular beliefs.
Within the framework of the political community, we can say 
that the strong, as Thrasymachus envisages them, attempt to
2 1 1
actualise in the form of rules a sense of justice that all men are 
assumed to have. The persuasive technique of declaring 
something to be unjust can work because there is a belief in 
justice at some level that all men possess. Thus, the strong are 
particularly adept at transforming inchoate sensations into 
principles for guiding action.
In essence, then, the strong occupy the same space as the 
mytho-poetry that Cephalus draws upon. They provide an 
ethical vocabulary and cognitive framework for understanding 
actions in moral terms. Where they differ lies in 
Thrasymachus’ assumptions about the nature of the political 
association. Within such an association, he sees conflict. The 
nature of this conflict is an assumption about one’s interests.
In the Thrasymachan political association, the unjust 
individual, in both his public and private roles, imagines 
himself possessing interests that are violated by adherence to 
the rules of the community (or private transaction). The 
association becomes a formal mechanism for the unjust person. 
He sees that he can employ its conventions to further his own 
ends, but he does not see that adherence to those conventions 
can provide any benefit to him. The rules are effectively at 
odds with the unjust person’s desires.
The implication is that the institutions of the political 
association are not complemented by a corresponding 
psychological makeup of the entire citizen body.
Thrasymachus treats the unjust as a pocket of resisters, who 
feed off the others. These others, furthermore, do have a
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psychological make-up that corresponds to the institutions. 
Thus, within the single political association, there are at least 
two psychological types, one of which consistently falls to the 
predatory instincts of the other. Added to this is the fact that 
the just rules which the strong declare are believed to be just 
only by the weak. The ethical vocabulary and cognitive 
framework are not a characteristic of the association because 
they are not shared by all members. The association is not 
defined by its beliefs because there is not a single set of beliefs.
Again, we can see similarities with the earlier mytho-poetry.
In the present case, there is no single set of beliefs because the 
moral language does not reflect a set of shared assumptions 
about justice. With mytho-poetry, as Socrates* refutation 
shows, there is no coherent set of beliefs than can be derived. 
The moral language is confused and self-contradictory, thus, it 
is impossible to say that the community shares a single set of 
beliefs. In both cases, conflict is implicit.
The argument with Thrasymachus is clearly the most 
important aspect of Book I and I have, therefore, thought it 
necessary to go through some standard textbook approaches to 
this section. White, Annas, and Cross and Woozley are not 
exhaustive in their arguments. They were chosen to represent 
a particular way of reading Thrasymachus, as much as for their 
specific content. It should be somewhat clear that I see 
Thrasymachus as making an important statement about the 
self and political foundation. The critical moment in 
Thrasymachus’ argument occurs when he tries to explain his
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first definition of justice. He observes that every regime makes 
laws that are advantageous to those who rule within that 
regime (338d-339a). Anyone who violates the rules that the 
strong set down is punished. We see here that there is a two­
pronged approach that the strong follow. First, they declare 
that certain things are just and unjust. By categorising actions 
they establish a language with which to talk about those 
actions. Without the categorisation, the actions have no moral 
character. Secondly, the strong use their strength to harm 
those who commit the wrong sorts of actions. This they call 
punishment. The effect of this approach is to establish what I 
have called a cognitive and discursive framework for justice. 
Thrasymachus is saying that the strong impart ways of 
thinking and talking about morality. And the strong succeed 
because humans naturally respond to the existence of right and 
wrong; they are appropriate recipients of a moral framework.
This in itself may not be an extraordinary statement to make. 
However, Thrasymachus the rhetorician leaves a massive gap 
in our understanding because of his ambiguous treatment of 
the concept of strength. The gap is simply the unexplained 
mechanism that transforms law from arbitrary declaration into 
popular belief. His assumption seems to be that, through 
punishment, the weak are conditioned to accept that certain 
things are just and unjust, given that they are already in a 
position to accept the possibility of any particular action having 
one or the other character. Either by experiencing punishment 
or through the force of example they do accept that some 
actions are wrong. The wrongness, though, is simply an
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extension of one’s natural aversion to self-harm. There is no 
moral sense that supports the understanding of justice with 
regard to particular acts that the strong establish.
The conclusion that follows is that the basis of the 
Thrasymachan association is a shared system of rewards and 
punishments; people are united around their aversion to pain. 
The only thing that maintains the association is, of course, the 
continuing ability of the strong to inflict pain through their 
system of punishment. It is precisely this assumption that 
allows Thrasymachus to argue that injustice is more profitable 
than justice. The strong are not motivated continually by an 
aversion to pain because qua strong the possibility of 
experiencing pain is somewhat remote. The strong inflict pain, 
but it is their immunity to the efforts of others to harm them 
that defines them as the stronger.
This brings me to what I see as the critical aspect of 
Thrasymachus’ argument for the idea of political foundation.
In describing the actions of the strong he is, in fact, talking 
about the foundation of communities. The laws and customs 
are founded to promote the interests of those who found them. 
There is no other basis and that is why he says justice is the 
same everywhere. But, just as we saw with Cephalus and 
Polemarchus, the association rests ultimately on force. The 
strong are successful in creating a new dogma and this is 
effectively forced on the subjects through negative 
reinforcement. Because only the subjects are so conditioned, 
the association consists of two categories: the free and the un-
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free. This is an association in only the most formal sense of the 
word, but it is politically no more than an arbitrary collection 
of individuals.
It is important, then, to see Thrasymachus as representing a 
flight from association. The power of the arguments we hear 
from Cephalus and Polemarchus is the emphasis on shared 
moral beliefs. These beliefs serve as a cognitive and discursive 
framework for talking about human conduct, but the 
framework has deep significance for the individual who 
employs it. In fact, the individual does not see himself as 
employing a framework, but as living in accordance with 
objective norms. Polemarchus is confused by Socrates* style of 
argumentation. The greater risk, however, lies in the fact that 
he cannot confidently determine how to live if Socrates 
successfully refutes him. He loses some of what it means to be 
Polemarchus if he loses the argument. That Cephalus and 
Polemarchus vanish from the dialogue after Book I indicates 
that their loss of identity is complete.
Thrasymachus avoids this trauma by rejecting that moral 
beliefs are deeply held as such. Moral beliefs are beliefs about 
self-harm and it is an aversion to the latter that is ingrained in 
the human psyche. In other words, moral beliefs can be 
reduced to fears or expectations regarding pleasure and pain. 
However, while Thrasymachus thinks moral beliefs can be 
reduced to such fears and expectations, all but the strong 
understand, or interpret, their moral beliefs as expressions of 
right and wrong. For the subjects, this aversion to pain is the
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motivation behind all action, even though they do not recognise 
it. For the strong, an appreciation of this motivation allows 
them to develop moral prescriptions that are acceptable to the 
subjects. The flight from association, then, has to do with the a 
struggle to maintain a dominant position over the subjects by 
playing on their understanding of human motivation. The 
individual, according to the strong, is neither formed nor 
supported in his self-understanding through membership in 
the association. The question of who one is becomes detached 
from the question of membership. It falls to Socrates in the 
coming arguments to establish a stable foundation between the 
individual self and the community of which he is a member. 
Political foundation is about forming an identity and the 
association is held together by its belief about this identity.
This is Socrates’ mission in defining the education system and 
the institutional structure of the just polis.
Conclusion
Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus each contribute to 
the discussion of moral identity that dominates the 
development of the just polis. I have tried to show that the 
otherwise insignificant threat of force found in the opening 
scene actually sets the tone for the remainder of Book I. The 
movement in the opening scene towards increasingly 
substantive debate provides an increasingly sophisticated 
treatment of force. In the first instance, the opening scene 
shows force in its most basic form: a device for controlling 
behaviour. Later, force becomes a means for producing a
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particular type of person ~  albeit a person who is defined by 
certain modes of action. The result of this increased 
sophistication is that force is called upon to perform a 
psychological function which is more within the realm of 
persuasion. While the use of force becomes more sophisticated, 
it also becomes more difficult to recognise. We must remind 
ourselves that force is the closing off of alternatives, the 
prevention of choice. However, we see that these functions are 
performed to a significant extent by Cephalus* mytho-poetic 
stories, Polemarchus* appeal to authority, and Thrasymachus* 
theory of justice. In each case, a system of rules is promoted 
by the exclusion of any competing rules. Cephalus’ tales work 
so long as there is no alternative mode of argumentation; 
Polemarchus* appeal to authority works so long as authority is 
not questioned; Thrasymachus* theory of justice works so long 
as the threat of punishment remains. Each of these closes off 
discussion about what particular beliefs should be held 
(Cephalus takes this for granted), how one is persuaded to hold 
particular beliefs (Polemarchus takes this for granted), and 
how man’s innate moral sense is to be understood 
(Thrasymachus takes this for granted).
Given the legendary authoritarianism of Plato’s just polis, it 
would be fair to ask if he too follows this pattern. My 
conclusion is that the remainder of the dialogue encourages us 
to conclude otherwise. Particularly regarding his belief in the 
existence of innate ideas, Plato is more readily able to explain 
why persuasion works. The persuader appeals to some 
intuitive sense that the individual already possess. The ruler
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activates a sense of justice that simply needs coherent 
principles to give it voice. As his theory of education clearly 
states, enlightenment is turning the soul in a new direction, not 
imparting new information (518d). Similarly, we can say that 
the ideal rulers Plato constructs do not force a particular view 
on the members of the association; they bring forth an 
awareness of a particular view that is naturally possessed by 
all. Granted, the hierarchical system of the just polis reflects a 
belief that this awareness can be held to a greater or lesser 
extent.
Thus, Jaeger’s characterisation of Socrates in this dialogue is 
correct, but perhaps misleading. Socrates is an architect with a 
preordained structure which the “psychological material” must 
be made to fit. Nonetheless, the conclusion remains: none of 
the other characters in Book I can explain how a system of 
rules moves from expression to belief. They must explain the 
construction or redirection of moral identity as behaviour 
control. Plato recognises that a coherent psychological model is 
required to move beyond this stage and in so doing can posit 
an ideal of human justice that encompasses more than just acts.
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Order and Self-Revelation in the P h a e d r u s
Sum m ary
In this section of the thesis I look at the Phaedrus and the connection 
between order in the polis and order in the psyche. As I have argued 
throughout the thesis, language can potentially be misused and in this
section I try to show how Plato envisages that it should be used. Here we
see a more complete Platonic statement of what it means fo r  the human 
mind to grasp the basic order o f the universe. In Socrates' descriptions 
of love and beauty we see that the rational element must transcend its 
human casing and recreate within the entire soul a harmonisation o f  
parts. We see finally that the order of the universe must penetrate to
the deepest level of human life, the individual psyche, if  there is to be
order in the political association.
In troduction
A recent commentator has said that the Phaedrus “is about 
madness, or m ania.”1*1 This is half right. The dialogue is about 
madness, but madness is about the self. The Phaedrus is about 
what it means to be one’s self.
187Nussbaum (1986) 203.
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The Phaedrus is Plato’s second excursion into the theory and 
practice of rhetoric. The first excursion, the Gorgias, contains 
some of Plato’s most memorable denunciations of Athenian 
politicians and their methods. Read on its own, the Gorgias 
seals the fate of rhetoric as conventionally practiced. Socrates 
makes it out to be beyond redemption and its adherents to be 
incorrigibly dishonest.188 Redemption may be an apt notion; 
the central moral doctrine of the Gorgias (it is better to suffer 
than to commit injustice) rings of an attempt to redirect the 
energies of the interlocutors towards a concern for their souls.
It is the dialogue most often cited to demonstrate Plato’s 
impatience, anger, and distrust of the whole enterprise of 
persuasive speech.189 This is an oversimplification, since 
Socrates is made to present his own speeches and not simply to 
ridicule the rhetoricians. Nevertheless, rhetoric is given little 
credit as a skill and in my view this lends something of a 
dogmatic tone to the dialogue.
If not strictly dogmatic, then certainly one-sided. By the time 
we reach the Phaedrus Plato has clearly undergone some sort 
of conversion.190 Rhetoric the nemesis has become rhetoric the
188This is perhaps too strong, as I try to show in Section Two, but 
accurately captures a typical reading of the Gorgias. See below.
189See especially Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988) Ch. 2.
190The Gorgias is certainly earlier than the Phaedrus. Adhering to the 
common, if  somewhat misleading, dating that places the Republic at the 
centre of Plato’s literary career the Gorgias is decidedly pxe-R epublic  
and the Phaedrus is post-Republic. I find this dating scheme misleading 
because it encourages us to think that all pre-Republic dialogues are 
inexorably moving toward the comprehensive philosophy of that work.
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companion of dialectic. Rhetoric has an explicitly legitimate 
role now. The Phaedrus is more sophisticated than the Gorgias 
in this respect. Moreover, it is necessarily a more complicated 
dialogue. Socrates’ objective is less critical (of rhetoric as a 
theoretical practice, techne) and more constructive. Building 
always entails more complications than tearing down. To 
belittle rhetoric in the Gorgias Socrates never has to do more 
than refute the interlocutors’ positions. To create a true 
rhetoric he must establish an irrefutable position of his own.191 
His theoretical enterprise must decisively replace the image of 
rhetoric as an intoxicating mixture of eloquent speech — an 
image that implicitly condones the rhetorician’s power to drug 
his listeners by bestowing on it a quasi-medical status. This 
enterprise will carry Socrates into discussions of his dialectical 
method, language, the written word, and the power of emotion.
Similarly, post-Republic dialogues can all too easily be seen as 
milestones on the road to the Laws (particularly the works of the “later” 
p eriod).
191 Any good salesman knows that the customer should start the bidding 
when discussing price. When the customer states a price he is willing 
to pay, the salesman knows that he does not have to go lower than that 
value. Likewise, once the interlocutors state their positions, Socrates 
never has to examine or refute any principles other than those offered. 
It is sufficient to show the incoherence of the positions explicitly put 
forth. This does, though, tell us something about the function of the 
dialogue form. The dialogue form demonstrates how one should 
philosophise, but does not set out to answer every possible objection. In 
other words, the interlocutors are not supposed to represent “every 
man”, but the particular men whom they are. See Steven Rendall, 
“Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example of Plato’s G o rg ia s”, 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 10 (1977), 165-179.
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But not least, as I indicate at the beginning, it will carry him 
into a discussion of the self.
The dialogue does not have an explicitly political theme. The 
speeches that Socrates and Phaedrus share concern the nature 
of love and of lovers. But these are not fortuitous details. In 
progressing from a criticism of rhetoric as a sham science or 
verbal snake oil, Plato remains conscious of his own stringent 
definition of techne. The subjects of love and lovers are 
poignant indicators that techne is not merely rule-following. 
Rhetoric will not qualify as a skill just because certain 
procedures tend to yield certain results. The craftsman’s 
motive and temperament are equally significant.
The Phaedrus is Plato’s double testimony that any craft is 
necessarily practiced for the improvement of the craft’s subject 
matter (cf. Republic 346e) and, secondly, that this entails an 
other-regarding concern for that subject matter. What is true 
for other crafts is most true for the political craft. The skilled 
statesman, according to my argument, has a unique emotional 
attachment to the objects of his craft — the citizens. His other- 
regarding concern is for other human beings, like himself. That 
emotional attachment he experiences we may characterise as 
love and it explains the significance of this subject in the 
Phaedrus. It also allows the reformulation of the dialogue as a 
more explicitly political statement. In my argument I will 
assign political roles to the characters described in each of the 
speeches on love. The purpose is to show that Lysias’ speech 
advocates a sham science that promotes instability, harms the
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citizens, and injures the supposed craftsman. In other words, 
he achieves the exact opposite of Socrates’ conditions for a true 
art of politics.
In conflict are two opposing bases for political association. 
Lysias’ speech states that love is dangerous (lovers are insane) 
and seeks to replace this emotion with rational calculation in an 
almost Benthamite sense (which is equated with sanity). He 
replaces the lover with the non-lover. His idea is that the non­
lover has more to offer than the lover in terms of moral 
improvement and social respectability. Granting his premises 
about the nature of love, the conclusion seems to follow easily. 
Examples of mad political leaders come too readily to mind.
Socrates will shift his ground in the dialogue. First, he will echo 
the Lysian ideas in his initial speech to Phaedrus. Second, he 
will repent his offence against the god and express a conception 
of true love. In his first speech he accepts both the Lysian 
description and judgement of love. In his second speech he 
accepts only the description and reverses the judgement. Love 
is indeed a kind of mania — Lysias* description — but a divine 
mania and, therefore, a blessed state. The description Lysias 
offers is more like a mad craving or irrational desiring. We 
could easily modernise the description by re-characterising this 
lover as a “wanton”, to use Harry Frankfurt’s terminology.192
192Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person” in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982). Frankfurt is, o f course, a liberal theorist and is used here to 
illustrate a point. However, the higher and lower order division desires 
is not anathema to the Platonic scheme. Frankfurt seems merely to
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In Frankfurt’s scheme a person can have first order desires, 
which is simply desiring as we commonly understand it. A 
person can further have second-order desires, which are 
desires about what desires to have. Finally, a person (and for 
Frankfurt this is what defines a person) can have second-order 
volitions, which occur when a person wants a particular desire 
to be his will. A being who lacks this last attribute Frankfurt 
calls a “wanton”.
Such “wantonness” is not unheard of in Plato’s dialogues. 
Hippocrates in the Protagoras perhaps exhibits the key trait (cf. 
Section One). He has numerous desires, but he blindly pursues 
each as it arises, completely without reflection. Callicles in the 
Gorgias borders, as well, on such “wantonness” by expressing 
his rather extreme hedonism. Interestingly (and 
problematically for Frankfurt) Callicles' second-order volition is 
to have all his desires as his will (cf. Section Two). He is the 
sum of Hippocrates plus the self-awareness of a wanton in this 
sense. Nevertheless, we can informally use the concept of a 
“wanton” when describing the Lysian lover. The man in love is 
out of his mind, almost literally, and when he returns to his 
“true” self the beloved finds that he is now rejected and 
despised. The lover’s offers that he valued most, social 
respectability and moral tutelage, will never be his. These 
were promises made by someone other than the now- 
recovered lover. One’s self is something that can be either 
abandoned or lost and this is called madness.
have purged them of their moral overtones (which would be anathema 
to Plato).
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Socrates has a difficult task. He must defend the value of 
“madness” against “common sense”. The utilitarian argument 
that Lysias' speech puts forth has prima facie  appeal, especially 
if placed beside some form of emotivism. But this is to restrict 
the dialogue to its literal statements and ignore the political
ramifications. Socrates is not saying that all we need is love or
that we should let our feelings rule. He never sacrifices the 
conception of knowledge that informs the other dialogues, 
though the same epistemology is couched in highly poetical 
language. So, Socrates is not making an argument for 
emotivism over utilitarian rationalism (to distinguish it from 
his own rationalism). The second Socratic description of love 
and lovers, along with the analysis of rhetoric, more directly 
establishes that Plato has a political objective in view. While 
Socrates is shown to defend divine madness, I will try to show 
that this can be harnessed to his argument for politics as a 
craft.
The true statesman needs a touch of this madness to propel
him beyond techne conceived of as a set of rules. Furthermore,
he must have more than pride in craftsmanship, which is the 
core emotion accompanying the productive arts (there does not 
appear to be any other convenient term to describe the feelings 
of expert shoemakers, shipbuilders, and so on) and he must 
have more than a desire to relieve suffering, which might 
characterise the medical art. The political craftsman wants to 
make the object of his craft a better example of human nature. 
The divergence from the harsh criticism of rhetoric in the
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Gorgias becomes most apparent when we approach the 
Phaedrus in this way. The latter dialogue’s concentration on 
the power of words continues the Gorgian belief that speech 
can sway men’s souls. In the Gorgias that power to sway 
becomes almost exclusively a power to corrupt.193 In this 
respect Plato seems to have adopted a more sophisticated 
psychology than the cleanly divided tripartite soul in the 
Republic.
There is some difficulty in maintaining rigid boundaries 
between reason, spirit, and appetite, though there is a tendency 
to read Plato as establishing such boundaries. Even if we grant 
that reason, spirit, and appetite operate independently we have 
a problem in accounting for certain desires that Plato identifies 
as belonging to each part of the soul. For example, at Republic  
440b a man called Leontius is described as having an “appetite” 
to look at some corpses beside the road and he is compelled by 
this appetite to do so. It is not immediately clear how this can 
be treated as an appetite, but it is equally unclear whether it 
should rightly be a desire of either spirit or reason. Even more 
confusing is Plato’s treatment of democratic man who is 
characterised as giving free and equal scope to his desires.
Some of his desires are for political activity and what he takes 
to be philosophy — hardly the desires that spring to mind 
when discussing one’s appetite.
193! say almost exclusively because we glimpse a “proto-Phaedran” 
argument at 503a-b where Socrates talks about the possibility o f a 
morally correct rhetoric.
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It is no doubt possible to accommodate these difficulties if we 
wish to keep the three parts of the soul within separate 
spheres. Philosophy and political activity may give a kind of 
pleasure that is not exclusively intellectual. But perhaps a 
more rewarding treatment would treat the soul as a unity and 
see each action as containing the simultaneous movement of 
each “soul-part”. This would yield, I think, something like what 
we see in the Simile of the Cave. The process of education is 
not imparting new information, but turning the soul’s gaze.
Thus, as the soul turns to see the Form of the Good a harmony 
is established within the soul such that each component does 
operate in unison. Prior to that harmonisation, however, the 
language of the divided soul is appropriate.194 The prisoner 
who is released is simultaneously pulled away from the pain- 
causing light, showing that the soul-parts propel the 
individual's internal disposition in different directions. It may
194Richard Norman takes the view that there are rigid boundaries 
between the three components of the soul: “[Plato] believes that, for the 
proper inner harmony to be achieved, reason, in alliance with spirit, 
must exercise a strict control over the desires, inhibiting some, and 
eliminating others.” Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers: An 
Introduction to Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 27. A 
similar perspective can be found in James Petrik, “Incontinence and 
Desire in Plato’s Tripartite Psychology”, Dialogos 60 (1992), 43-57. An 
examination of the various problems associated with specifying the 
diverse desires of appetite can be found in John M. Cooper, “Plato’s 
Theory of Human Motivation,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1 (1984), 
3-21. Charles Taylor has recently argued that the direction o f the soul’s 
gaze is critical to understanding Plato’s view of the self. Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cam bridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), Ch. 6.
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be useful to see in the Phaedrus an interest in breathing life 
into the extreme rationalism of the philosopher-king.
Earlier I noted that the dialogue addresses a number of issues 
that complicate the discussion of rhetoric — and love — 
including language and the written word. These factors, I 
believe, contribute to the dialogue’s political statement. Lysias’ 
speech is supposed to be the words of a non-loving older man 
directed to a youth. He is trying to persuade the youth that a 
non-lover is less risky than a lover, if one were to choose on 
correct criteria. The young man must make a decision and 
presumably wants what will be genuinely best for himself.
The central issue, therefore, is choosing between exclusive 
options, both of which promise genuine benefits. Politically 
speaking, we have speakers who are offering us proposals for 
action. In a deliberative assembly each speaker would be 
attempting to establish himself as the “wise one” who can 
effectively lead the people to true benefits. Plato is asking us 
to choose what sort of person we would have lead us.195 The 
non-lover promises genuine rewards with low risk. The 
Socratic lover promises us genuine rewards, but first wants us 
to understand what genuine rewards would look like. Both 
speakers are necessarily using the language to convey a 
message (and both say that we will be amply rewarded by 
their respective policies). But the meaning of these messages is 
more than the definition of words. Interpretation of meaning
l^ B o th  the Lysian and the Socratic lover are basically promising good 
leadership to someone who is young, inexperienced, and in need of 
gu id an ce.
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will entail discovering the speaker’s cognitive state and 
intentions, bringing us in the dialogue to the discussion of the 
spoken and written word.
Lysias’ speech is a written text. Socrates speaks 
extemporaneously. Lysias’ words are codified; once written 
they are immune to any wish he might have to amend them. 
Socrates speaks, rejects his own words, and speaks again. He 
may also be spoken to, unlike the text. He has reserved for 
himself the opportunity to clarify his meaning. Phaedrus’ wish 
to possess Lysias’ speech in writing reflects an assumption that 
meaning is transparent, that by knowing the words we know 
their meaning. The dialogue contains Plato’s most explicit 
treatment of the written word and complements his treatment 
of language in the Cratylus. His criticisms should come as no 
surprise and represent a somewhat common, if undefined, 
theme in his work. We often hear Socrates dismiss the value of 
debating the meaning of the written word (or the remembered 
tale — see below), e.g., in the Protagoras where he calls this the 
pastime of ignorant men (Protagoras 347c-d). Similar 
intimations can be found, for example, in Socrates' discussion 
with Polemarchus in Republic Book I. There we see the 
authoritative poet, Simonides, reduced to a double-speaking 
riddler, casting doubt on the whole enterprise of poetic 
in terp reta tion .
The criticism of the written word has important implications 
for the analysis of political discourse. There are also certain 
implications for our understanding of Greek society. As Eric
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Havelock has argued, the "preface to Plato" is precisely a shift 
from an oral to a literate society.196 The idea of a text 
operating as a vehicle to convey meaning, replacing the central 
importance of the actual expounder of that meaning, creates a 
raft of philosophical problems. Not least among these is the 
problem of reconciling word and meaning. The ambiguity of a 
word, codified in a text, blossoms into the need for an 
interpretative art.197 Writing necessitates a science of 
understanding and this is part of Plato's discussion of writing in 
the dialogue.
This will, in turn, complement the overall discussion of techne  
in the dialogue. An art of rhetoric (now that Plato is willing to 
contemplate such a possibility) contains within it the 
craftsman's desire to convey true meaning, or simply the truth. 
If this is Plato’s conception of rhetoric as a genuine craft, then
196Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1963). On a similar theme see Tony M. Lentz, 
Orality and Literacy in Hellenic Greece (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1989).
197Perhaps a modern echo of this can be found in the works of such 
theorists as J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Pocock writes, “The 
historian’s first problem, then, is to identify the ‘language’ or 
‘vocabulary’ with and within which the author operated, and to show 
how it functioned paradigmatically to prescribe what he might say and 
how he might say it.” J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays 
on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1989), 25. Skinner writes, criticising Pocock to some degree “I am 
suggesting that what is needed...is not merely to indicate the tradition of 
discourse to which a given writer may be appealing, but also to ask what 
he may be doing when he appeals to the language of these particular 
traditions”. James Tully, ed., Meaning and context: Quentin Skinner and 
His Critics (London: Polity, 1988), 107.
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the rhetorician’s objective is the improvement of the listening 
audience. The meaning of the rhetorician's words is the truth 
and that truth will improve all those who take it into their 
souls. Plato's suspicions about the written word become 
readily apparent. A text is more susceptible to 
misinterpretation because of the necessary distance between 
the meaning intended and the reader's interpretative act. The 
author does not control how the text is read and can only hope 
that his intended meaning is conveyed.198
This is symbolically represented in the dramatic action of the 
Phaedrus. The first speech we hear is read out loud because 
Phaedrus has a written copy.199 He does not deny Socrates' 
charge that he made Lysias repeat the speech again and again 
in order to capture the exact wording. Literacy was probably 
restricted somewhat and we should not exaggerate the 
availability of written material, but the possibility of making 
another’s thoughts your own property became more possible 
with the spread of literacy.200 The written word was becoming
198More Pocockian echoes can be heard: “But if the author of a political 
utterance cannot wholly control the levels on which his utterance may 
be taken to have meaning, or...the levels of abstraction on which it may 
be discussed, it follows, first, that...he is not fully in command of the 
‘meaning’ of his own utterance....” Pocock (1989), 24.
199This may seem paradoxical (the speech being both written and 
spoken), but the Greeks did not read silently. Besides, Phaedrus’ 
intention was to practice delivering the speech himself.
200A basic literacy was probably fairly widespread by the end of the 
fourth century. Of course, the dialogue is set in the fifth century. See, 
for example R. K. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 194. Note also Socrates'
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or had become a serious alternative to the spoken word for 
mass communication, though it was far from achieving its full 
political potential.
For Plato the relevance is epistemological. Meaning for him is 
pre-lingual. Language is the conventional rule-system that 
points towards a meaning, but words do not directly 
correspond to things. This is the circuitous argument of the 
Cratylus where Hermogenes argues that language is pure 
convention. His claim is that words are labels that we have 
arbitrarily attached to things and ideas in the phenomenal 
world. There is no transcendent significance to the words 
themselves. This might seem like an intuitively appealing 
proposition. If we consider material objects of any kind the 
names we attach to them seem to have no significance other 
than as convenient labels to distinguish the from other objects. 
Even if we work out complex etymologies we will never come 
across a reason why something is called by one name and not 
another. Other sorts of examples present more fundamental 
problems. An obvious example comes from the Republic. In 
Book 2 Adeimantus and Glaucon re-engage Socrates over the 
basic treatment of justice he offered to refute Thrasymachus.
In a more cogent manner they are allowed to repeat the gist of 
the Thrasymachan argument, which is that justice is a 
particular sort of interpersonal relationship where one party 
seeks to gain predominant power over another party.
reference to the sale of Anaxagoras’ works in the marketplace at 
Apology 26d-e.
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Glaucon and Adeimantus rework this to show that “justice” 
originates in the control of the undesirable consequences (being 
the loser in the struggle) of that interpersonal relationship. 
Justice is obedience to conventional rules and these rules 
promote one form of behaviour over another. This is 
effectively what Hermogenes means by his theory of language 
in the Cratylus. Empirically we can identify a thing, a temporal 
reality or event, which becomes the origin of the concept of 
justice. Another example can be taken from the Euthyphro  
where Socrates is seeking a definition of piety. At one point 
Euthyphro wants to maintain that piety is what the gods love. 
Socrates asks if the gods love what is pious or if what they love 
becomes pious by virtue of their loving it (Euthyphro lOd).
The argument reflects the conventionalist argument 
Hermogenes offers. If the gods love things that are pious then 
piety clearly refers to something separate from the gods* 
existence or attitudes. If the act of loving something makes it 
pious, on the other hand, then once again the word refers to a 
temporal reality and not to something fundamentally beyond 
both the language and the phenomenal world.
The opposing extreme of such a position would be a reference 
theory of language and this is Cratylus’ argument. He 
maintains that words refer directly to things (which is why he 
denies that "Hermogenes" is the other interlocutor's name, since 
he is not the son of Hermes — the direct referent of the name, 
onamata). Given the theory of the forms we might expect to 
find Plato agreeing with this, at least in a general outline. He 
does argue that there is Justice, Beauty, and Piety behind our
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language as it were, giving it meaning. In the Cratylus, 
however, Socrates strikes a middle course. His position is that 
our words refer to a higher reality, but only to point towards 
that reality, not to name it directly. The word itself is a 
conventional label, but not of some temporal phenomenon. The
“things” to which words refer are beyond spatio-temporal
categories. Socrates’ detailed etymologies in the Cratylus are 
his argument that the meanings of words represent true being 
and are themselves pre-lingual.201
This framework will have some bearing on the Phaedrus. W ith
the Platonic “third way” between conventionalism and realism 
we can make a more sophisticated distinction between an 
utterance and the meaning of that utterance (more 
sophisticated, that is, than the theories of Cratylus and 
Hermogenes). The meaning of the utterance now has no 
linguistic base and comprehension of meaning takes the 
listener out of the framework of the immediate communicative 
act. In other words, there is an almost imperceptible moment 
between word and meaning and that moment is filled by the 
listener’s interpretation of the word. Given this situation, we 
can further distinguish between meaning intended and
201 This position creates problems of its own, of course. If meaning is 
pre-lingual then any definition relying on language will be imprecise 
at best. Meaning cannot be spoken (or written) because the very 
language is already at a distance from the meanings it can be used to 
convey. Language, by its nature, can mislead. In its broadest sense, the 
problem becomes one with the need to specify the manner in which the 
world o f becoming “participates” in the world of being.
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meaning received.202 Just as a side note at this point, observe 
that the possibility of interpreting language, i.e., having a 
degree of awareness that something is meant by the words we 
hear, may contribute to Plato’s beliefs in an immortal soul and 
education as recollection.
The relationship between medium and message connects the 
Platonic theory with the Phaedrus. The dialogue’s central 
question becomes, can there be a method of communication 
that somehow gets the correct meaning across given the 
various media available for its transmission? What conveys 
meaning — how is it “taken into the soul” if meaning is pre- 
lingual? The layer of sophistication that Plato adds to his 
criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias has to do with the 
interlocutors’ inability to address the substance of this issue. 
The Gorgias assumes, however, that all communication is oral 
and Socrates is concerned to defend a particular form of 
speech. At least, there is no acknowledgement that the written 
word presents any special problem by its very nature.
Socrates wants oral communication to involve a joint pursuit of 
truth through an honest exchange of questions and answers.
The Phaedrus makes no such assumption. Long passages are 
devoted to the nature of the written word as a rival means of 
communication. The written word increases the gap between 
meaning intended and meaning received by virtue of the 
increased physical gap between the participants in the
2All of this is now common to the study of language. My concern, 
though, is to examine how this becomes especially a political problem in 
the P h a ed ru s .
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communicative enterprise. A text written now may be read 
later, often much later, and not in the presence of the author. 
The reader’s interpretative skills turn from an examination of 
the person communicating to an examination of the codified 
product of communication. In short, a written text creates the 
problem of recovering the author’s intentions, a problem that 
does not arise with the same urgency in the assumed 
framework of the Gorgias.203
The quest for truth necessitates the recovery of the author’s 
intended meaning. On the premise that interlocutors do, in 
fact, want to discover the truth of the matter under discussion, 
Socrates tries to get behind the language used to uncover the 
person who holds the thoughts that have been formalised into 
text (or speech). The premise is not unequivocally true. 
Whether ironically or naively, Socrates does not acknowledge 
alternative purposes of communication. He almost entirely 
disallows the possibility that an interlocutor could legitimately  
want simply to win an argument or simply produce some 
reaction in an audience rather than discover the truth.204 Both 
of these objectives are overridden by the need to promote 
knowledge or morally sound behaviour. Recall that he 
attempts to manoeuvre Gorgias into admitting, first, that he
2°3The problem is not allowed to arise by Socrates' conscious 
unwillingness to hear long prepared speeches, which can be analogues 
to the written text.
204Of course, for Plato convincing someone of the truth is to produce a 
certain reaction in that person’s soul and this is precisely his desire. 
The question becomes, as I note earlier, how is the truth taken into the 
soul?
2 3 7
will teach virtue to any student who lacks such knowledge and, 
second, that such knowledge is sufficient for producing 
virtuous behaviour. Once the latter point is conceded the 
motive to deceive is disallowed because Gorgias' alleged 
knowledge of virtue precludes him from doing so.
The first concession ensures that students will not accidentally 
deceive through ignorance. An example of Plato’s desire to 
produce a particular reaction can be found in the preamble to 
the laws that the Athenian stranger recites beginning at L aw s  
726a. Plato only allows the Athenian Stranger to speak from 
what appears to be a position of knowledge, which represents a 
major advance on interlocutors’ speeches in early and middle 
dialogues. On the other side of the equation we see in the 
Euthydemus  a sustained instance of Socrates allowing a sophist 
full rein. Though technically not an example of rhetorical 
displays, it is a case of an interlocutor not seeking the truth. 
Perhaps more to the point is Protagoras’ first major speech at 
Protagoras 316c-317c. Socrates readily acknowledges here 
that Protagoras wishes to show off. The central issue 
surrounding these examples is that desires to show off, win 
arguments, and so on are illegitimate motives. They are 
illegitimate precisely because they allow the speaker to escape 
from having to defend his viewpoint. This is the visible side of 
the issue. Motives for Plato have to do with character or, more 
correctly, cognitive state. Trying to recover what a 
person/author intended is trying to recover who the 
person/author is (or was). Interpreting meaning involves 
excavating the “meaner”. Socrates will implicitly argue in the
2 3 8
Phaedrus that if we can assess the correctness of one's motives, 
we can assess the intrinsic value of one's speech.
Thus, these issues come together in the Phaedrus. T he 
discovery of meaning involves us in the extra-lingual character 
of Platonic understanding — a discovery of intended meaning 
-- as well as the diversity of motivations giving rise to 
communication — a discovery of character. The political 
implications of the dialogue emerge through an examination of 
these points. The speeches presented are each speaker’s 
invitation to follow him along a certain path. Like all 
persuasive speech they promote one course over another. But
the subject of these speeches is literally an invitation to 
acquiesce to the leadership of the speaker. I will be recalling 
my treatment of the statesman’s craft to show how the subject 
of love is significant within this context.
The recovery of authorial intentions and character becomes a 
pronounced problem as the dialogue moves forward. The 
written word implies spatial and temporal distance between 
writer and reader. But the Phaedrus compounds the difficulty 
when we see that the written text can acquire a new owner 
who puts on the mask of the author and poses as the person 
with the character and intentions we wish to explore.
Phaedrus reads a speech that is not his own; Socrates 
extemporises a speech that does not belong to his true self. 
Identity and persona become part of the equation: who we are, 
who we think we are, and who we pretend to be.
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The remainder of this section will be an analysis of the 
dialogue in some detail to develop the themes I have been 
discussing thus far.
The Dramatic Setting (227a-230e)
The Phaedrus is unique in its dramatic setting. Socrates is 
shown walking beyond the walls of the city and the overall 
atmosphere is calm, keeping with the still heat of the summer 
day. The Phaedrus appears so un-hurried and non­
confrontation al that the mood compliments the subject matter. 
No Platonic dialogue is about one thing (nor is any dialogue 
about everything), but the transition between the various 
subjects discussed here is virtually seamless. Compared with, 
for example, the Gorgias, the Phaedrus moves with quiet self 
assurance. In the former dialogue each interlocutor moves the 
dramatic action forward with a violent thrust — though, the 
symbolism of this is significant205 — while the Phaedrus m ore 
nearly resembles a naturally progressing conversation. Like 
any such conversation there is a superficial lack of unity. The 
dialogue ranges over the topics of love, lovers, madness, 
writing, rhetoric, “current affairs”, and the human soul. In 
comparison even to the much longer Republic, the dialogue 
covers an extraordinary range of topics.
2 °5The purpose of the abrupt shifts in the Gorgias have to do with the 
gradual movement away from persuasion towards violent force. Each 
interlocutor moves the action forward with a shove and then defends 
the art of shoving.
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Despite a superficial disunity, the Phaedrus is a coherent 
w hole.206 The diverse topics are ordered under the treatment 
of intentions and the nature of the self. The subject of 
intentions follows from the treatment of media and message. 
The subject of the self follows from the treatment of motivation 
and love. Phaedrus has been to hear a speech. The speech has 
been heard, is committed to “paper”, and is in his possession. 
This establishes the central tension of the dialogue. Phaedrus 
is on his way outside the walls of the city for a walk. Socrates 
meets him and asks where he has been and Phaedrus says that 
he has been listening to Lysias’ eloquence. He does not yet 
admit to having a written transcript of the speech. When he 
offers to relate what Lysias has been saying Socrates responds 
in mock exclamation that he would rather do nothing else and 
that listening to such an account takes precedence over 
business. This is heavy irony judging from the common picture 
of Socrates in other dialogues of the early and middle period. 
Listening to accounts is his business and what other people call 
“business” is no such thing. All Socrates ever does is engage in 
conversation (cf. Apology 23b). White comments:
The subtle presence of opposition should be noted, since
exploring the boundaries of opposition as a metaphysical notion
206This is not widely contested. Indeed, it has become almost a scholarly 
trend to demonstrate how unified and self-referencing the Phaedrus is . 
But the limit is reached, I think, when a commentator senses the 
presence o f Plato himself at the riverside setting, “The word for ‘shade 
tree’ in Greek is platanos, practically a homonym for Plato!” John C. 
Koritansky, “Socratic Rhetoric and Socratic Wisdom in Plato’s 
P h a ed ru s”, Interpretation, 15 (1987), 34.
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will become one of the controlling concerns in the dialogue. In 
this case, however, business (a sc o lia s ) is not an opposite to 
leisure (s c o lia ), although it may appear to Athenian business 
people that Socrates’ business was leisure, since all he did was 
talk about matters of scant practicality. If Socrates temporarily 
gives up his business to hear a report of a discussion between 
Lysias and Phaedrus, then this report promises to be serious 
business. 207
But what Socrates is never willing to do is listen to speeches 
without claiming the right to cross-examine the speaker. He 
will gladly hear an account, but will not submit that the 
account is perfectly adequate as related. Phaedrus says that 
the subject of the speech was love, adding the qualifying 
phrase “after a fashion”. We can anticipate that there will be 
some space for a Socratic inquisition. Lysias’ speech is some 
innovative twist on an otherwise well-known subject. It will 
turn out that the speech is not so much about love as about 
“prudent acquiescence” to the wishes of a seducer.
Prudence is critical to understanding the nature of the proposal 
in Lysias’ speech. Unlike the Aristotelian idea of moral insight, 
Lysias is putting forward a pseudo-utilitarian argument for 
maximising happiness and minimising pain.208 And unlike
207David A. White, Rhetoric and Reality in P lato’s Phaedrus (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1993), 12.
208I have already referred to the Benthamite leanings of Lysias’ 
speech. I do not, however, wish to overstate the similarity. I use the 
concept of utilitarianism more as an economist would than a 
philosopher. Lysias assumes a framework where agents want to
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Aristotelian ethics where appropriate feeling is part of the 
equation, the message here is that feeling heightens the risk of 
making the wrong choice. The rational criteria, according to the 
argument, concern, first, immediate material gains and, second, 
others’ perceptions of the choice made. Certain cultural factors 
may have made this sort of argument persuasive to a Greek 
audience. Homosexual relationships between young and old 
were not merely sexual in nature. An aspiring young man 
would be concerned to ensure that the older man with whom 
he associated could provide him with certain “social goods.” To 
some extent, the older man would be expected to initiate the 
young man into the mainstream world of politics.209 As much 
mentor as sexual partner, the older man offered coat-tails on 
which the young man could ride. Nussbaum tries to capture 
the mood of this convention when she sketches the analogous 
situation of a young woman entering a male-dominated 
profession in our own society. Such a woman, she says, will be 
“more or less surrounded by potential ‘suitors’ who are more 
powerful and more established” and she “would want to live a 
full personal life; but she would be seriously concerned, at the 
same time, to protect her clarity and autonomy....”210 The
maximise their “satisfaction” (utility), and various “market decisions” 
are measured against this criteria. This preserves the idea that the 
young man to whom the speech is addressed is choosing between 
options. We could say he is shopping for a suitor.
209Hutter (1978), 72 ff. Hutter discusses the educational purposes 
behind paidikon eros. See also K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality 
(London: Duckworth, 1978).
210Nussbaum (1986), 207. Nussbaum’s reading of this dialogue is 
unusual in places. See especially 212-3. While I feel she fails to capture
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language of the Symposium gives some idea of the calculative 
aspect of these inter-generational relationships. Alcibiades’ 
speech in that dialogue (or his recounted humiliation at the 
hands of Socrates) describes the night that he chose to give 
himself to Socrates. He says, “Believing [Socrates] was 
earnestly pursuing my youthful beauty, I thought it was a 
stroke of luck and my wonderful good fortune, because by 
gratifying Socrates I could learn everything he knew...”
(Symposium 217a)211
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to divorce this from 
feelings of love or passion. When Socrates glances under the 
cloak of the handsome youth Charmides we see that he is 
overcome with passion (Charmides 155d). Above all others, 
Socrates would be the ideal mentor for this young man. But 
even this man we consider to be of high ethical standing felt 
himself almost overpowered by physical beauty.212 Glaucon is
the mood in the dialogue here, it is important to note a fundamental 
cultural difference: the young man under examination in the dialogue 
is searching for a partner as part of his education. He is not trying to 
protect his “autonomy” or “clarity”, as these are, to some extent, the 
objects of his desire. Presumably, a young woman entering a male 
dominated profession is not there for such a purpose or, at least, does 
not set out to achieve it by the same means.
21JR. E. Allen, Plato: The Symposium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1991).
212Actually, Socrates would be a disastrous mentor for a young man 
with conventional ambitions, since he offered such unconventional 
guidance. But Athenian democracy could have benefited if this 
particular conventional young man had been kept out of politics, since 
both he and Critias, the other interlocutor, were members o f the Thirty
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characterised as a lover of young men who rationalises even 
physical defects into some aspect of perfect beauty. We would 
expect, therefore, that an older man with such feelings would 
express them in order to induce reciprocal feelings in the 
youth. Affection would be the seducer’s bait.
Lysias turns the conventional seduction scene on its head in 
this respect. The Lysian seducer has no affection and confesses  
as much to the young man he hopes to seduce. In fact, his lack 
of feeling is supposed to give him an edge over the competition.
As Phaedrus says, “Lysias has written a speech designed to win
the favour of a handsome boy for someone who is not in love 
with him. That is the clever thing about it; he claims that an 
admirer who is not in love is to be preferred to one who is”
(227c). The absence of either passion or affection is not
extraordinary in itself, but indicates something about the issue 
of identity and what I will refer to as persona. The speaker 
(call him the non-lover) admits to what should be a 
disadvantage. This is brazen honesty. The non-lover reveals 
himself, refusing to adopt any sort of mask to win the affection 
of the young man. Instead of treating his non-love as a 
liability, however, he defends it as the best that could be 
offered to the youth whom he wishes to seduce.
This picture is more complicated than it first seems. The 
unmasking of passion to reveal utilitarian calculation leaves the 
writer still securely masked. Phaedrus as speaker is the mask
Tyrants (and Plato’s relatives). It is hardly subtle irony that the 
Charmides is about sophrosune, usually translated as “temperance”.
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for Lysias the writer and the words uttered cannot thus stand 
as an expression of true identity. The words may be possessed, 
but the ownership of the sentiments contained in them remains 
undefined. We can find some parallels in the life of the 
historical Lysias. As a metic, a resident alien, he occupied an 
ambiguous position between citizen and foreigner. He could 
reside in the city at the pleasure of the citizens, but could 
never claim the privileges of a citizen himself. The 
precariousness of this position is revealed in the destruction of 
his family’s fortunes during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants in 
304.213 Not that citizens necessarily escaped brutal treatment, 
but it is hard to separate Lysias’ family’s treatment from their 
status as successful foreign “entrepreneurs.”
So, Lysias historically had a shadowy political identity within 
Athens and his new profession as a speech-writer (Phaedrus 
calls Lysias the best writer living at 228a) paralleled and 
institutionalised the vague status he occupied as a metic.214 He 
has (or had) wealth without security; he has domicile without 
rights. As a writer he is also both there and not there. The 
speech that Phaedrus clutches contain Lysias’ words. The 
speech is discussed as the work of Lysias. Nevertheless, Lysias 
is little more than a hypothetical reality because his physical 
absence means that he appears to be no more than the words
213The conversation of the Republic takes place in Lysias’ family home. 
Present are his brother Polemarchus, put to death by the Thirty, and his 
father Cephalus. The family fortune had been built on arms 
m an u fa ctu r in g .
214Lysias’ first public address was to charge his brother’s murderer, 
Eratosthenes, after the restoration of the democracy.
2 4 6
Phaedrus has in his possession. His intentions, beliefs, and self- 
understanding are unrecoverable. His text is an artefact from 
which only hypotheses can be derived. Socrates wants 
certainty.
The written speech was a relatively new phenomenon.
Typically, teachers of rhetoric would require their students to 
memorise set speeches containing examples of various 
techniques.215 Gorgias* Defence of Palamedes is such a speech, 
for example, and was meant to give general guidance in 
constructing courtroom pieces. As the democracy “matured” 
professional speech-writing became less unusual and speeches 
more frequently custom-written for a particular occasion. As 
the law courts became the arena where inter-class rivalries 
were carried out, those who could afford it commissioned 
defence speeches.216
215George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London:
Routledge, 1963), 52. Thomas Cole, The Origins o f Rhetoric in Ancient 
Greece (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 74 ff. on 
“demonstration texts” used by professional rhetoricians.
216Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age o f  
Demosthenes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 194-5. In a paper delivered at 
the London School of Economics James Fishkin developed a notion of a 
“self-reflective” society, which he claimed was best exhibited in the 
Athenian democratic institutions. There is a tendency to impose on 
Athenian institutions a kind of Aristotelian revisionism that sees the 
democracy as simultaneously tolerant and educative because of its 
apparent emphasis on deliberation. While we are free to develop all the 
theories about Athenian democracy that we wish, it is important to note 
that the Athenians themselves did not have a “political theory” to 
support their institutions. M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1985), 28. Even the alleged “defence of 
democracy” in the Protagoras has been shown to be neither such a
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Phaedrus is using the text for the purposes just outlined. 
Socrates gets him to admit that he was not really just taking a 
walk. He was in fact going outside the city walls so he could 
practice reciting the speech for himself. The independent 
identity of Lysias is becoming further removed from the words  
of Lysias. The text has been reclaimed by another speaker who 
lacks the intentions, beliefs, and understanding of the writer. 
Phaedrus has made the words his own, but in doing so he has 
only grafted them on to himself, as it were. Instead of a 
speaker he is a character reading from a script. He too loses an 
identity and replaces it with a fictitious persona.
The speech itself has gained some sort of status as an object 
through Phaedrus’ actions. It has shed any traces of the 
subjectivity we associate with the expression of personal belief 
or sentiment. It no longer has an adherent in the sense that 
someone somewhere is known to believe what it says.217 It 
has become a piece of text that can fulfil any number of self- 
serving motives that a speaker may have. Within this 
framework we can understand why Socrates rejects Phaedrus’ 
offer to summarise the speech as best as he can remember it.
defence nor the common theoretical framework. See Section One.
James Fishkin, “The Dialogue of Justice”, paper delivered at the London 
School of Economics, 11 March 1993. The paper draws on James Fishkin 
The Dialogue of Justice: Towards a Self-Reflective Society (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993).
2170 f course, the situation that the speech describes is fictitious from 
the start. There is no such non-lover making the speech, but Lysias the 
speech-writer. Even if Lysias spoke in the dialogue, Socrates would 
surely reject examining the text when the author is present.
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Socrates will not let him rehearse and insists that Phaedrus 
read the speech out loud. As Socrates says, “I have no 
intention of letting you use me to rehearse on when I might 
have Lysias himself (228c-d).” Initially, then, Socrates wants 
to reconstruct the identity of the author. We will see later that 
he moves away from the text and its writer and on to the 
subject matter of the speech. The text is ultimately sterile and 
cannot be interrogated to yield the truth.
The rejection of textual analysis is reflected at 229c-e and 
Socrates gives a brief sample of what he intends to argue in the 
coming sections. The river along which they walk has 
mythological significance. Phaedrus asks Socrates if he 
believes the tale about the abduction of Oreithyia from the 
banks of the Ilissus, the event for which the dramatic location 
is famous. Socrates says that if he did reject it he would be in 
good company. Many “pundits” think it is false. But he does 
not reject it because of what the pundits say. As we know 
from the Crito truth is not simply what the majority of people 
believe to be true (Crito 48a). Agreement is never an adequate 
substitute for a reasoned account. Even if one could devise a 
perfectly logical explanation of how the tale arose, we would be 
no nearer the truth. We would still be working with 
hypothesis. Even if the story of the abduction was fabricated 
out of some perfectly natural event this is not the point. What 
of value can be learned from such inquiries? The stories are 
like texts and in themselves are, at best, neutral with regard to 
the truth and, at worst, misleading. Socrates says the man who 
has sufficient leisure to construct explanations of the myths
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will never be free from the need to continue his efforts and 
explain such things as centaurs (half man, half horse), the 
Chimaera (head of a lion, body of a goat, and the tail of a 
snake), and a host of other such creatures. The sceptic who 
tackles these problems has no end of labours ahead of him.218 
White makes a crucial point in this regard:
The supposed explanation of the Boreas myth replaced a 
supernatural tale with a clear (although rare) instance of 
natural cause and effect. If the requisite explanations run 
parallel in principle, then the accounts of the living things 
should also identify their origins in nature....But the Centaur is 
half-man half-horse. How then will it be possible to explain this 
polymorphous being in terms of its natural origin?2 19
Socrates insists that such efforts are a waste of time. The 
Delphic Oracle has instructed each man to know himself. The 
symbolism of this command is important to the argument of 
the dialogue. As White’s question implies, are the myth- 
logoists searching in the right place for answers? To know 
oneself is to achieve understanding of one’s true identity. It 
means refusing to treat the scripted character as the actual 
man. And, as Socrates says, until he has succeeded in fulfilling 
this command it seems absurd to consider the problems of 
other beings. This unwillingness to speculate about the truth of
218Socrates specifically addresses himself to debunkers of myths who 
seek natural explanations to replace mythical accounts. We can also 
read this passage as a rejection of seeking truth in the material world.
219White (1993), 19.
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such myths complements Socrates' normal unwillingness to 
spend time analysing written texts. Just as the writer is 
unavailable for cross-examination, leaving us trapped amid 
competing interpretations, the "myth-maker" does not reveal 
the meaning of the myth. The myth becomes a story about 
which men may debate, while they allow truth to elude them 
forever. This is a fascinating and perplexing rejection by a man 
(Plato at least) who was only too willing to employ symbolic 
myths. It may be the symbolic meaning that Socrates is 
rejecting here. Lysias’ speech is about the prudence of 
acquiescing to a seducer. The myth is about abduction and 
rape of a young girl. This may be a subtle reference to the 
implicit power of Lysias’ speech to “remove” us from ourselves 
and the violence implied by this theft of one’s identity.220
Socrates’ poetic description of the countryside through which 
they are walking shows that he has not dedicated himself to 
interpreting myths. Phaedrus says that he sounds more like a 
tourist coming upon the scene for the first time, rather than a 
native of the city. There is some significance in this. Coming to 
know oneself immediately implies self-reflection and a degree 
of self-abstraction. But in coming to know himself, Socrates has 
not isolated himself from the other citizens (he does not live a 
private life). Self-knowledge is not a lonely road, but requires 
the presence and assistance of others. It is acquired through 
and connected to the community. One reason is that knowing 
oneself means knowing oneself as a human being for Plato. To
220Cf. Republic 413a-b where Socrates says that taking a true belief 
away from someone is similar to committing an act of violence.
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know your psyche is to know human psyche. Self knowledge 
has less to do with declaring or willing oneself and more to do 
with discovery of human essence. Once this self is known it 
can be revealed in a way that Lysias* “honest” non-lover can 
only imitate or point us toward. Thus, Socrates says that his 
quest for knowledge can only be carried out amongst the
citizens of Athens, not out in the country by himself.
Socrates' approach to self-knowledge offers an interesting 
contrast to Phaedrus, who intended to wander outside the walls 
so that he could practice the speech. Insofar as he sought to 
master the written speech of someone else, Phaedrus has not 
only left the environment where he could acquire self- 
knowledge, but has not even come into the countryside with
his own identity. He has left the city under the guise of the
anonymous non-lover of the speech. He is not Phaedrus so long 
as he does not speak what he believes. In fact, he is brought to 
the level of a rhapsode, reading a text and embellishing it with 
his own dramatic skills. This is why he is initially uninterested 
in reading the speech to Socrates. Phaedrus wants Socrates to 
sit passively and listen to the recitation while Phaedrus 
contorts himself into the guise of the speaker. This is the only 
kind of audience a speech-maker can tolerate. Interactive 
examination of a subject defeats the purpose of a persuasive 
speech. The sceptic is an unwelcome listener, just as a heckling 
and jeering audience undermines a rhapsode’s performance (cf. 
Ion 535e).
2 5 2
The speech’s “performance value” seems to interest Socrates at 
first, but he will not allow Phaedrus to adopt the speaker’s 
mantle in the speech. Socrates will not converse with him if 
Phaedrus plans to hide behind someone else. The discussion 
must take place with the person behind whom he hides. But, 
as we will see, it cannot. The person is the absent author of the 
speech. Socrates will have to move away from what is actually 
said in the text towards its essential subject matter. Phaedrus 
will have to move away from persona to identity and, 
ultimately, genuine “selfhood”, where he is revealed as neither 
the scripted character nor the conventional person called 
Phaedrus. He must become a self-knowing, self-revealing 
human essence.
Lysias ' Speech
The speech sets out to defend the non-lover’s position and 
undermine the lover’s. I refer to seduction earlier in this 
section because it is not clear that the speech is about love. Nor 
is it clearly about lust, though we must assume that the non­
lover is simply after sexual gratification. He has base motives 
that he promises will produce honourable gains for the youth.
A number of rationales are offered to discredit the lover and 
strengthen the non-lover’s case. The most significant of these 
is the characterisation of love as a kind of mania. Love is 
m adness.
To appreciate the force of this argument we need to return to 
some points I raised in the discussion of the Gorgias in Section
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Two. In that section I noted that speech can act like a drug 
that drives men out of their normal reasonable state. As I 
noted earlier, Gorgias explicitly states as much in the Helen. 
Considering this with regard to the Phaedrus we can see that 
Lysias is saying something similar. The man in love is like the 
man who has been intoxicated by speech; he does not act as his 
reason dictates. Love inspires mad pursuit of its object. The 
man in love will offer any gift and make any promise to the 
beloved. But this madness is transitory and when the fog lifts 
from the lover’s mind, he will regret his rash behaviour, the 
gifts he has given, and, ultimately, the young man himself. 
Meanwhile the youth will have lost any honourable reputation 
he may have had and his prospects in respectable society will 
be ruined.
Men who are not in love never regret the kindnesses they 
bestow because they never bestow more than an appropriate 
amount (being rational and in control from the start). Because 
they have no intense, but dissipating, passion their perception 
of the young man and of their own actions does not alter. They 
give what their means allow, acquire what they set out to gain, 
and protect the youth from humiliation. There is a 
correspondence between the characterisations in the speech 
and the idea of discovering identity. The non-lover represents 
the man who believes he has discovered his own identity; he 
knows himself and his own best interests. The lover has only a 
persona and this he cannot even control. The irrationality of 
love is like an affliction and one can neither consciously acquire 
it nor will it away. The mask takes control of its wearer.
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It may be useful to examine the identity that the non-lover 
claims as his true self. In form, the non-lover resembles what 
Socrates urges us to be, namely concerned to promote our 
genuine best interests. In content the non-lover is as deceived 
as other interlocutors tend to be. His calculation of self-interest 
does not fundamentally differ from that of Polus, Callicles, or 
Thrasym achus.
The speech echoes some Platonic sentiments, namely that a 
man should act in accordance with his true interests. The 
message Lysias delivers tells us not to be deceived about what 
we genuinely need. This, of course, is an aspect of the conflict 
in the Republic. Book I of that work revolves around differing 
conceptions of self-interest. The remaining nine books are 
Socrates’ attempt to prove that justice is the sum total of our 
interests. Similarly, the claim is also made in the Gorgias.
There is an ostensible concern in Lysias’ speech with the 
interests of others. The young man is supposed to derive 
greater benefit from a non-lover than from a lover and this is 
the defining difference between the two character types. The 
non-lover never states, but we may assume, the benefits he 
will derive from the relationship.221
221 It is important for the political element of the dialogue that we 
notice the public nature of the goods in store for the youth. What we 
consider as a private relationship was overwhelmingly public in 
character for the Greeks.
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As I said earlier, love is called insanity and lovers even admit 
that they are mad. They will do anything for their beloved. 
Lysias is not inventing this view for the purposes of his speech. 
The power of Eros to drive a man out of his mind was part of 
the Greeks* stock of cultural goods.222 Like the intoxicating 
words of a persuasive speaker, Eros is a force outside the self 
that temporarily resides in a man’s soul, driving him onto 
previously uncontemplated actions. Thus, eros is not within 
the man, but something that reason keeps in check. It is 
literally a force that attacks his reason from without.223 
Associating with such a person is dangerous even for those 
experienced in such matters. The main point for my discussion 
here is the idea that the madness of love represents an “un- 
selfness”. It is a temporary loss of who one is. A man in love 
effectively becomes a “wanton”.
When Eros lifts the siege on a man’s psyche the youth will no 
longer be desired. In fact, he will be resented and despised 
because he now represents unwanted obligations. When 
blinded by love, the man made all sorts of promises that, if he 
keeps, will ruin him or, if he breaks, humiliate him. While the 
love lasts the lover will undermine the youth’s interests. The 
lover will brag widely about his sexual exploits and the youth’s 
reputation will be ruined. Everytime people see the lover and 
his beloved together, they will assume that they are about to
222See, for example, Dodds (1951), 41.
223Cf. Republic 572b where Socrates says that all men have evil 
im pulses.
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gratify their passion. The non-lover claims that he provides 
security against these dangers.
As Hackforth comments, Lysias’ speech is a “tedious piece of 
rheto ric .”224 Its attractiveness for Phaedrus has to do with the 
unusual theme. Nevertheless, Lysias’ speech is an interesting 
argument as a foil to Socrates’ views. Lysias argues that a man 
who has no feeling for a youth will be of greater benefit to him 
than someone who does have feeling for him. Part of this flows 
from the common treatment of love as madness (and it would 
be hard to understand madness as beneficial, though Socrates 
will describe such a madness in his second speech). Another 
aspect has to do with a particular conception of interests, which 
has political implications. The non-lover is supposedly only 
interested in true interests and will make the young man 
better. Politics, by analogy, was also seen as having an 
educative affect. The laws, Meletus tells us at Apology 24e, 
make the young better, as do the other citizens. The non-lover 
is the disinterested law-giver who wants to promote harmony 
and order. The proposed relationship, then, is a microcosm of a 
political ideal and the youth is in a position to choose a leader.
In examining the content of the speeches in the dialogue it is 
easy to overlook the central importance of persuasive speech in 
Athenian public life. A persuasive speaker would be seen as a 
leader of the people, a demagogue. Originally, the word did not
224R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1952), trans., 31. All references are from this translation unless 
otherwise stated.
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have the negative connotations that it has come to have for us 
(though Plato seems to give it a negative twist and the current 
meaning of the word is equally unflattering225). The older man 
in the speech is presenting himself as such a leader. We can 
imagine him addressing himself to an audience of fellow 
citizens rather than an individual young man. He would in that 
case be saying that he will be a better political leader. The true 
interests of the city will be better looked after under his care 
than under the control of someone else. The reason — and this 
especially emphasises the peculiarity of Lysias* speech — is 
that he is completely motivated by concern for himself. T he 
non-lover* s characterisation of the lover as someone who acts 
against his own best interests inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that the non-lover is supremely motivated by self-awareness. 
The non-lover confesses that he has no genuine affection for 
the young man. In a political context the confession is more 
radical than this. He admits that he sees his own interests as 
fundamentally distinct from the interests of the city. The other 
citizens are a separate entity from himself even though he is 
technically united with them in citizenship. As a law-giver he 
is both citizen and higher authority. Furthermore, in seeing 
this separation of interests, he claims that as a result of his own 
self-interest (i.e. desires distinct from the citizens*) the city will 
benefit. Thus, their interests basically diverge, but coincide at 
the point of acquiescence to the non-lover. This is the point to 
which both parties are guided by rational calculation of their 
true needs. If private vice does not lead to public virtue, it can 
at least lead to mutual advantage on a more modest scale.
225See Finley (1985), 38-75.
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The counterpoint to the non-loving politician at first seems a 
bit more shadowy. Who in political life corresponds to a man 
driven mad with love? Socrates has already provided an 
answer in at least two other places. In the Republic we read 
that a sophist is no more than someone who has calculated 
what will please the demos, sets it down as an art or science, 
and teaches it to others (493a ff.). In the Gorgias we are shown 
Callicles who is accused of being madly in love with the demos 
— so much so that he shifts his ground from moment to 
moment so as not to anger the crowd with his speech (481a 
ff.).226 Both of these characters, sophist and rhetorician, m irror  
the passions and desire of the crowd. The lover will give to the 
people whatever they think they need. This is the law-giver 
bestowing anarchy. Such a person can have no political status 
-- he becomes the truly apolitical man, becoming the voice of 
the crowd and sacrificing his status as leader and improver of 
the people.
The non-loving politician is keenly aware of his own interests. 
The loving politician, on the other hand, fails on two points. 
First, he either has no interests of his own or is unaware of 
them and cannot act in accordance with them. Second, he is 
incapable of assessing the interests of others and determining 
what is or is not appropriate for them. He cannot make the
22interestingly, Socrates describes Callicles’ love for a boy named 
Demos and the Athenian demos. The pun captures the sort o f political 
implications that I am trying to describe in this dialogue.
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citizens better, which is exactly what the non-loving politician 
promises, because he cannot make them anything at all.
The lover has no self about which he can be deceived, 
according to the non-lover. His chief failure is precisely his 
inability to abstract himself from the citizens and see himself 
separately. The non-lover has an identity that he values 
before the citizens’ needs and this, he claims, is his strength. 
Lysias’ speech draws the lines for the political message of the 
dialogue. The remainder becomes Socrates* attempt to salvage 
some argument for a kind of madness that will both improve 
the citizens through the statesman and reunite the leader with 
the subjects. In other words, he will try to close the gap Lysias 
has opened between leader and people, while preserving the 
concern for one’s best interests.
The First Interlude (234c-237b)
There is a short interlude in the dialogue before Socrates 
begins his first speech, introduced by Phaedrus asking Socrates’ 
opinion of the foregoing presentation. Phaedrus is asking for 
Socrates’ true feelings -- an expression of the genuine Socrates. 
In effect it is a plea for an un-ironic response (one whose 
meaning is uncontested). He implores Socrates “in the name of 
friendship” (Hamilton), as “one friend to another” (Hackforth). 
Friendship is a significant clue to what Plato is attempting to 
describe. Friendship is that special bond between people that 
precludes any form of deception. It is not merely that friends 
do not keep secrets from one another. Nor is it that friends do
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not withhold their assistance when a friend requires something 
of them. What friends never withhold is themselves .
Friendship is social intercourse without masks. It is the model 
for interpersonal relations and is based on honesty and 
forthrightness. Thus, this brief exchange after Lysias* speech 
tells us that a correlate to knowing oneself is revealing oneself. 
We have seen already that there is a theme of disclosed versus  
undisclosed identity running through the Lysian speech. This 
will become more explicit as the dialogue progresses, 
specifically in Socrates’ restatement of Lysias’ main premise 
about love.
Phaedrus* request for an honest opinion is rebuffed. Socrates 
wants to make a statement about rhetoric in general at this 
point. The invitation to comment gives him the opportunity to 
parody the intoxicating effects of persuasive speech. As I 
noted when discussing the Gorgias, words and speech become 
the magic potion exercising a quasi-physiological force over the 
psyche. Gorgias claims that rhetoric will make a person 
powerful and we can find similarities between the words Plato 
puts in the character’s mouth and the words the historical 
Gorgias has left us. Specifically, as I quote in Section Two, 
Gorgias* Helen shows just how seriously he took the 
physiological model. Socrates has the same idea in mind at 
242d-e where Socrates asks Phaedrus if he holds Love to be a 
god. The latter concurs and Socrates says, “But not according to 
Lysias, and not according to that discourse of yours which you 
caused my lips to utter by putting a spell on them”. This is 
more than a passing reference to the power of speech and more
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than Socratic playfulness. The very concept of intoxication, of 
being somehow drugged by words, carries with it implicitly the 
notion that we become who or what we are not.227 Return to 
Gorgias* words. He says that rhetoric will turn a whole host of 
otherwise powerful men into the slaves of the clever speaker 
(Gorgias 542d-e. See above for commentary). Socrates’ playful 
response indicates that he has been reduced to that level. If 
Phaedrus wants the real Socrates he should not have shared 
this powerful potion with him. We shall see how Socrates 
releases himself from the false bondage of the insincere 
speaker.
Though Socrates initially refuses, or claims to be unable, to take 
the lead, he does actually begin the commentary on the speech. 
This is the introduction to his own pronouncement on the 
virtues of the non-lover. He says that Lysias* speech is 
repetitive and unimaginative (234e-235a). The line of 
argument is obvious and the essential point is simply restated 
several times in different words.
The interlude is, I think, beautifully conversational. Phaedrus 
and Socrates playfully interact, contributing to the relaxed 
setting beside the river. It turns out, though, that Socrates is 
the playful one; Phaedrus is eager and serious. He has a 
passion for speeches like Glaucon has for young men or like
227The words that drug in this case are Phaedrus’ threat to withhold a 
particular form of pleasure that Socrates pursues in a, albeit facetiously, 
pathological way. It is as if Socrates is a “word addict” and needs his 
drug in regular doses.
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any lover of beautiful things has for such objects (cf. Republic  
474d ff.). He cannot stand to have any example of his love- 
object mocked or treated lightly. At least one commentator has 
found in Phaedrus a model of erotic madness and sees the 
playful banter with Socrates as a self-referencing dramatic 
p loy .228 Socrates and Phaedrus are the older and younger man, 
respectively. There is something to this interpretation, but it is 
not the core of the dialogue. It complements what I have just 
described regarding friendship and its demand to remove all 
masks and reveal the person beneath.
Phaedrus seems wounded by the irony and is only calmed by 
the half-jesting offer to deliver a better speech on the same 
topic. Phaedrus seizes on this excitedly at 236b. He uses the 
carrot and the stick to get Socrates to deliver a speech. The 
carrot, a promise to erect a life-sized gold statue of Socrates at 
Olympia (236b), has no effect. The stick is what ultimately 
succeeds. Phaedrus vows never to share another speech with 
him unless he delivers his own. “How clever of you to discover 
the means of compelling a lover of discourse to do your 
bidding,” Socrates exclaims (236e). Socrates is more than a 
victim of the drug of speech; he is an addict. Dramatically, this 
statement reflects the love-madness theme of the dialogue. 
Phaedrus is, in fact, the discourse-mad participant and Socrates 
the more sober analyst of meaning. Note, however, the further 
point that Socrates has still not dropped his mask. He has 
actually put on his “Phaedrus disguise” and is now 
masquerading as the young man himself. This technique of
228I have Nussbaum specifically in mind.
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imitating the interlocutor emphasises two things. First, we 
ourselves have to try to find the real Socrates beneath a multi­
layered ironic structure that both conceals and reveals through 
self-reference. Second, the technique tells us something about 
Phaedrus himself. Socrates* imitation holds a mirror up to 
Phaedrus, but the latter seems wholly unaware that he is 
gazing at his own outward appearance. In order for Phaedrus 
to progress towards a revelation of his true self he must first 
recognise that what he takes as himself is merely a persona.
He cannot yet do this.
Self-knowledge is a precondition for self-revelation because 
Plato has ensured that self-revelation is not merely honesty or 
sincerity (the Lysias non-lover is “honest** and “sincere**). It is 
not sufficient that a person speak what he thinks is the truth or 
act in accordance with a moral code. Interpersonal deception 
stems from self-deception, for Plato, and any statement made 
or action performed in the absence of self-knowledge cannot be 
called self-revelation. Fundamentally, what is revealed is one’s 
self-knowledge and Phaedrus can thus be said to have 
completely deceived himself.
This might help explain Socrates’ apparent unwillingness to 
assess Lysias’ speech. Even the cursory assessment that is 
made largely misses the mark, focusing on the speech’s 
technical qualities. Moral evaluation has not yet been touched 
upon in speech because Phaedrus — the absent, un-self- 
recognized Phaedrus — is not ready for it. Not until the second 
interlude dividing Socrates’ first and second speeches will we
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even begin to see that there may be serious problems with the 
non-lover’s self-defence. Socrates’ claim that the god has been 
insulted is the first intimation that a moral crisis has been 
underway since Lysias’ speech was read.
This first interlude is a convenient method for momentarily 
ignoring the implications of the non-lover’s speech. It 
reinforces the fundamental separation between author and text 
and leaves Socrates and Phaedrus to comment on those aspects 
of the speech that can be analysed in the absence of the actual 
speaker. These aspects are ultimately trivial, further 
reinforcing that the discovery of meaning demands the 
presence of the person who intends a particular meaning (as 
well as the interpreter of that meaning). Similarly, knowing 
oneself is not a solitary task. Socrates is not interested in 
analysing the mythical tales that occupy others’ minds because 
he has not yet come to know himself (229c-230a).
Additionally, he has no interest in wandering in the 
countryside because he is a lover of learning. The trees and 
fields can teach him nothing, but the men of the town can 
(230d). They can teach him about the human mind.229
229Yet, this merely reinforces the mystery surrounding Socrates’ 
willingness to wander away from the city. Can he come to understand 
the human mind when surrounded by the sensual distractions o f the 
countryside? Phaedrus is walking beyond the walls because he is 
taking the advice of Acumenus, who has said that walking on the rural 
roads is less fatiguing, i.e., more healthy, than walking the city streets 
(227a). Phaedrus is promoting his health by treating his body well. 
Socrates, on the other hand, is after a different kind o f health, that of 
the soul. Usually, to promote the soul’s health, he violates the advice of 
his friend (and Phaedrus’ -- 227a), Acumenus, and remains in the city.
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In other words, the desire to achieve knowledge of one’s self is 
necessarily to achieve knowledge of one’s true self. As the 
correctly ordered human soul is one thing (i.e., all correctly 
ordered souls, those that are ruled by the reason within them,
are identical) we can say that the true self is the universal
human self. The cognitive attribute of that self is knowledge, 
so to satisfy the desire for self-knowledge is to become the 
only self of which knowledge is possible. Thus, to know oneself 
is to know the human soul and cross-examination of others is 
like a dialogue with your self.
The problem with textual exegesis, while contributing to the
problem of recovering intended meaning, relates to the dual 
problem of self-knowledge and self-revelation. Only in the 
absence of self-knowledge can a person employ the subterfuge 
of adopting a persona, a mask. All expressions of oneself, in 
the absence of self-knowledge, amount to a masquerade, with 
the important complication that the masked individual is 
unaware of his own disguise — precisely because he lacks 
knowledge. Hence, we see Phaedrus failing to see his own 
reflection in Socrates’ irony. Moreover, only through the desire 
for self-knowledge can friendship exist. Friendship resists all 
subterfuge and tolerates no false appearance. To befriend 
someone in these terms is to engage in a joint search for
The health of the body is made secondary, though Socrates knows what 
would be beneficial to it (227b). To ensure the health o f the soul, he 
follows those who may have something to teach him and this gives him 
sufficient reason for following Phaedrus.
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identity; it is the progressive stripping away of falsehood from 
the soul. This means that it is reciprocal. Friends are looking 
for the genuine self in each other. Moreover, friendship thus 
becomes limited to those who are engaged in this sort of 
search. It is achieved when both see their own reflection in the 
unclouded and unironic mirror of the other’s soul. Consider 
also Phaedrus’ playful threat that coaxes a speech out of 
Socrates. This is the antithesis of friendship. Phaedrus’ 
willingness to commit “violence” against Socrates to get what he  
wants foreshadows the kind of violence against the soul that 
Socrates will describe in his first speech. The themes of hidden 
identity and violent power will dominate Socrates’ first speech.
At 237a Socrates prepares himself to deliver the speech. He 
says that he will speak with his face covered so that he will not 
catch Phaedrus’ eye and feel ashamed for anything he says.
This is a symbolic representation of what I have been arguing. 
First, we can see this as somehow reflecting the separation 
between author and text. Socrates’ speech is no more than a 
disembodied voice, as the text is a disembodied collection of 
statements. Second, Socrates has very literally put on a mask, 
leading us to question to what extent the words are an 
expression of his true self. At 235c Socrates has already 
warned us that something seems to be possessing him and 
making him think that he could outdo Lysias’ speech. The 
mask he wears refers us back to the idea of possession as the 
replacement of true self with the identity of some other entity. 
The man possessed is not himself and is only in a technical 
sense responsible for his actions.
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Additionally, by hiding his face, Socrates is stepping out of the 
public space where he, the person who supposedly holds the 
beliefs contained in the speech, can be seen and judged both 
for his words and for his character. In covering his face he 
underscores the text’s deceptive efficacy. If even the 
Athenians based the worth of a man’s speech on the worth of 
the man, any disguise that gave the impression of virtue had 
practical advantages.230 So, identity can be hidden by an 
unbrigdeable gap between word and speaker/writer or by an 
impenetrable shield between speaker and audience. Both, as I 
have been claiming, reduce to a lack of self-knowledge.
Socrates’ First Speech (237h-241d)
At least one thing immediately distinguishes Socrates’ speech 
from Lysias’. Before speaking Socrates identifies what he takes 
to be the appropriate method for proceeding. One must begin 
by defining the topic under consideration. Lysias fails by 
constructing his speech backwards, beginning where he should
230Ober (1989), 126. That the mere guise o f virtue may have practical 
consequences underscores the remarks above about friendship. It also 
reminds us of certain themes raised in the Republic. As Adeimantus 
asserts in Book II, young men are taught that the appearance o f virtue 
is all that is desirable. In addition, as Socrates constructs his ideas on 
imitation and dramatic representation, it becomes clear that the 
appearance  is all that most men can judge, which is why he ensures 
that virtuous character is all that they are allowed to see. It is not 
merely that most men do not engage in the sort of self examination that 
characterises true friendship; most men cannot engage in such an 
exam in ation .
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have ended (264a). Interestingly, the speech even reads as if 
the speaker is continuing an on-going discussion. Lysias 
alludes to the young man’s awareness of how things stand 
between them (230e). The non-lover’s argument is the 
midpoint of a larger whole. Charles Griswold finds Socrates’ 
“second-level talk about talk” to be significant regarding the 
later discussion of techne .231 At the level of political context it 
does more than this. It also connects this second speech of the 
dialogue with the first. The background to Lysias’ speech is 
precisely the numerous technical manuals on rhetoric that 
provide him with a system of rules for proceeding. Socrates’ 
“little techne” is a nod in the direction of the would be theorists 
of rhetoric. Its emptiness as a guide mimics the worthlessness 
of those manuals.232
Socrates’ first speech immediately raises an interesting 
problem. After establishing that love is a kind of desiring, but 
a base kind that pursues only physical beauty, we are given 
the background to the speech (left unstated in Lysias’). The 
young man to whom it is addressed is now shown as being 
surrounded by a flock of suitors who say they love him. The
23C harles Griswold, Jr., Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus (New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 58. Griswold will go one to show 
that this “techne” is shallow and finally overthrown by the later 
d iscussion .
232Socrates’ insistence on definition reminds us of the familiar aporetic 
dialogues where definitions are sought, but never found. It is not 
unusual for him to claim that we cannot proceed without determining 
what we are talking about (cf. Meno 80d), but, as Griswold points out, 
Socrates is here too loose with his own terminology for us to take this as 
an example of Socratic technique. Griswold (1986), 59 ff.
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non-lover in this speech is a member of the flock, but 
persuades the young man that he is not actually in love with 
him. Here, the non-lover openly lies. He pretends to be 
something he is not in order to win the young man over to him 
and does this by trying to show that the character represented 
by his adopted persona has definite advantages. The non-lover 
sees himself as a lover. But his self-perception and his disguise 
to mask what he takes to be his true self reflect the 
philosophical tail-chasing behind the lack of self knowledge.
He oscillates between believing he is something that he is not 
and pretending to be something else that he is not. There is no 
mechanism within his deceptive scheme that will allow him to 
discover or ascend to his true identity. His lack of self- 
knowledge allows him to display a false identity. But the lack 
of knowledge prevents him from seeing what truly being 
himself means. While this will come out as the conception of 
love changes in the dialogue, at this stage we can read the 
opening lines of the speech as re-emphasising the idea of false 
iden tity .233
233The sort of concealment that Socrates visibly employs here is 
mirrored in other dialogues. For example, we see in the Hippias Major  
that Socrates puts his questions to Hippias through the imaginary 
persona of an unnamed friend (who we know is Socrates in this case). 
Again, we see a similar ploy used in the Protagoras, where Socrates 
adopts the guise of a person accusing Protagoras and Socrates o f making 
no sense. While these examples are similar, it is important to note that 
the concealment in each differs fundamentally from the case in the 
Phaedrus. In this case, Socrates attempts to disappear; his self is no 
longer present. In these examples, however, he adopts a hypothetical 
stance, asking how an interlocutor would answer if someone were to put 
this or that question.
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Lysias’ speech developed the inherent superiority of the non­
lover over the lover. The lover is shown to be a madman and 
the non-lover as perfectly rational. The lover causes a young 
man harm and the non-lover brings him genuine benefits. 
Socrates’ speech advances the description of the almost 
perverse irrationality of the man in love. The madness of love 
utterly distorts one’s judgement. Love paradoxically contains 
its own opposite, hate. A man who is in love hates the sight of 
equality or superiority in his beloved. He wants either to 
convince the beloved that he is inferior to his admirer or 
hinder the development of higher physical and mental 
qualities. This will lock the beloved into a position of 
inferiority (238e-239b). Lysias* lover could not judge what 
would harm or benefit the young man. He harmed him 
through a combination of neglect and over-zealousness.
Socrates’ lover has malicious intentions. His love has not so 
much made him mad as made him evil. Thus the harmful 
effects of associating with such a person are calculated to occur. 
The lover has not misjudged what will actually improve the 
youth; he tries to harm the youth. Socrates seems to be saying 
that Lysias was too gentle with the lover and should have 
shown that such a madman is also a scoundrel.
Two things should be stressed. First, the speaker is a false 
non-lover. He is, in fact, a lover and, thus, his words apply to 
himself. He is saying that his own nature as lover is to harm. 
Given the chance, according to his own words, he will commit 
violence against the young man’s soul. Second, the speaker
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does not believe his own words. How do we know? Let us say 
that he can be one of two kinds of lover: a Lysian lover or a 
Platonic lover (momentarily leaping forward in the dialogue). 
The Lysian lover is mad and this causes harm to the young 
man. But he has no intention to do so and actually believes 
that he does the young man some good (he gives him gifts and 
makes all sorts of promises; surely these things are “good” or 
the young man would never consider them desirable in the 
first place). So, the Lysian lover cannot believe what the 
speaker here is saying. At most he can acknowledge that he 
does not care whether or not he brings genuine benefits, since 
he is just out to satisfy his own desires with whatever means 
are required. He cannot admit to an intention to harm.
The Platonic lover very clearly cannot believe these words 
because Plato has constructed the scope of love to exclude even 
the possibility of harm. Indeed, we do not need to jump ahead 
in the dialogue. We already know that interpersonal harm is 
self-harm .234 Furthermore, we can look to the craft analogies 
to see why he could not, as a Platonic lover, believe his own 
words. As a “maker” the Platonic lover necessarily has an 
other-regarding concern for the beloved, which prevents him 
from making his “subject matter” worse than it already is. So, 
unless this lover is a different sort of lover not mentioned in
234See Apology 25c-d where Socrates makes the point that only a fool 
would make someone evil, since evil people do evil things to those 
around them. Socrates makes effectively the same point to 
Thrasymachus in Republic I.
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the dialogue we should conclude that he does not believe in his 
description of himself.
The critical point is that the characterisation of the lover 
between the Lysian and first Socratic speeches has undergone a 
gradual change. In the Lysian speech the lover is a mirror held 
up to the young man reflecting whatever is already there. The 
first Socratic lover, however, possesses the possibility of self­
reflection. He can say something about himself qua lover — 
something other than “I am mad.” If madness in the sense 
treated by Lysias and Socrates means that a man is not being 
his actual self, then the “I” in that statement is an ambiguous 
term .
More than the possibility of self-reflection, though, the first 
Socratic lover has a two-level motivation system. At one level 
he wants to win the young man — corresponding to his desire 
for physical beauty, as defined at the start of the speech. At 
the other level he wants to dominate the young man — and this 
corresponds to his desire for power, which the Lysian lover 
wholly lacks. The Lysian lover wants to keep his prize; the 
Socratic lover wants to enslave his.
Returning now to the two points I just made about self­
reference of the non-lover’s statements and his own incredulity 
towards them. Because the non-lover is really a lover, his 
words technically apply to himself. He is saying that the sort of 
person he is will inevitably cause harm. The “law-giver” he 
represents is the kind who promotes faction and strife by
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design. He commits violence against the soul of the young man 
and, as law-giver, commits violence against the citizens. But, as
he does not believe this we could say that it is not so, or that
we are actually no wiser about the lover’s nature because of 
this deception. However, this conclusion is invalid. His 
deception is itself an act of violence against the soul of the 
young man and potentially against the citizens. He is already 
committing the acts he warns us the lover will commit. If the 
truth of the speaker’s words, when taken into the soul, 
improves the audience, the false speaker’s words cause damage 
(cf. Section Two). The non-lover in this speech, while 
ostensibly revealing no information about the nature of lovers, 
has revealed all we need to know through his duplicitous 
actions as a concealed lover. He is engaged in an enterprise to
satisfy his own desire for power.
The purpose of the first Socratic speech might appear as 
somewhat of a mystery. As far as rhetoric goes it is a better 
example than Lysias’ speech.235 Perhaps Socrates is simply 
demonstrating the ease with which anyone can construct a 
pleasant-sounding, vacuous speech. Therefore, this middle 
speech of the dialogue may be a parody of the rhetoricians. It 
is just Socrates’ usual ironic stance. Alternatively, some have 
claimed the speech represents a subtle contribution to the
235Griswold, for example, says that it is an improvement over Lysias’ 
speech because of its beginning interest in definition and its overall 
organisation. Griswold (1986), 58.
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intellectual feud between Plato and Isocrates.236 This would 
make the significance of the speech lie outside the dialogue 
(unless we wanted to say that the dialogue itself sets out to 
make such an attack). This argument does have a certain 
appeal if for no other reason than that it gives some purchase 
on Plato’s intentions and on the contemporary controversy 
surrounding rhetoricians. Finally, the speech may be a 
necessary “half-way house” between the offensive Lysian 
speech and the redemptive final speech of the dialogue. It has 
no intrinsic function other than to bridge together the 
beginning and the end of the dialogue (with a modicum of 
comic mockery thrown in).237
The analysis I have tried to construct indicates that all of these 
interpretations miss the mark. While each may still be part of 
the picture, none is the central message I see unfolding in the 
dialogue. In Socrates first speech, the central speech of the 
dialogue, a pivotal transition is underway. The non-lover in 
Lysias’ speech casts himself in the role of self-knower and self- 
revealer. In this central speech the non-lover has been 
unmasked and shown to be the lover he denounces. Even as he 
tries to hide behind a disbelief in his own words, his actions
236Malcom Brown and James Coulter, “The Middle Speech in Plato’s 
Phaedrus”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971), 405-424. See 
their references for further arguments along similar lines.
237Hackforth implies such a view in his commentary, noting that 
several ideas are foreshadowed in the first Socratic speech and that the 
speaker “shows a real concern for the welfare, especially the moral 
welfare, of the boy.” Hackforth, 40. I have tried to show above that this 
is incorrect.
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show that his assessment is correct. There is an emotional 
state that calls itself love, but it is a counterintuitive love -- a 
love that hates. It is a grasping, greedy, power-hungry love 
that detests all rivals. This love is tyranny.
I said at the beginning of this section that it would be useful to 
assign political identities to the character types in the speeches. 
More than useful, I think the consideration of love and rhetoric 
in the dialogue is an invitation to do so. We cannot divorce 
rhetoric from public discourse; persuasive speech needs an 
audience. We have, then, a Lysian lover who has no political 
status because he only reflects the passions of the citizens 
without assessing them. The Lysian non-lover wants to be our 
law-giver because of his heightened self-awareness. But, I 
have tried to show that the self that he sees is only a persona. 
Finally, we have the dual-characterised Socratic lover/non­
lover. Where others are merely ignorant, this person is evil.
He has a cunning deceitfulness that tells us he is more than a 
typical individual lacking knowledge. He seems, somewhere 
along the line, to have become twisted and malicious. His 
words conceal him, but his actions betray him.238 As the 
dialogue proceeds we shall see how this situation is resolved.
238A couple of analogues to this character come to mind. First, we see 
the philosopher-rogue described at Republic 494b ff. Seduced by the 
promise of easy gain, this would-be philosopher ends up as the best 
criminal. Second, we see the expert craftsman who is best at doing 
wrong in the Hippias Minor. Socrates will ultimately claim in that 
dialogue, according to the argument he has been making, that the just 
man will be supremely capable of evil.
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The Second Interlude (241d-243c)
The second interlude is brief, as will be my comments. More 
than the first interlude, it appears to be a dramatic pause to 
allow us to observe the coming philosophical storm where 
Socrates will develop a new conception of love and rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, a number of points stand out. First, in referring 
to his just completed speech, Socrates says that there is no 
point in wasting words. Every point he has just made about 
the lover can be counterbalanced with an observation about 
the non-lover. “And that being so, my story can be left to the 
fate appropriate to it...,” he says (24le). It is interesting to note 
that Socrates has reversed the errors of Lysias’ speech. The 
former began in the middle with an assumed background of 
shared knowledge. Socrates’ ends in the middle with an 
assumption that the rest is derivative. In other words, 
speeches constructed according to the “rules”, the technai that 
form the background to Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ “little 
techne”, are purely mechanical. If rhetoric is like cookery (as 
described in the Gorgias) then the handbooks of style are 
simply cookery books. Furthermore, the fate to which Socrates 
leaves his speech resembles the author’s abandonment of the 
text. The words have been spoken and they are now simply 
part of the “environment,” a piece of material reality having no 
connection with the man who spoke them.
The reference to Stesichorus’ recantation (243a-b) has obvious 
parallels with the argument I have tried to develop about self- 
knowledge. Stesichorus the poet wrote that Helen had w illingly
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run away to Troy, causing the most famous war in Greek 
history. For this slander he was struck blind. Sensing that it 
was his offending verse that angered the gods, he immediately 
penned new lines stating the error of thinking Helen had even 
gone to Troy, let alone voluntarily. He immediately regained 
his sight.239 The second speech that Socrates will shortly 
deliver is more than a similar recantation. It points towards 
the rejection of falsehood and the subsequent achievement of 
one’s self-vision. When we try to say what is true, we begin to 
see ourselves.
This is reflected in Socrates’ removal of his face covering 
(243b) under which he delivered his first speech.
Commentators normally acknowledge the significance of this 
device Plato has Socrates employ, treating it as a reference to 
the embarrassment his first speech causes him.240 More than 
this, however, it is a symbolic stripping away of what hides the 
true self. It is not only the embarrassment that drives Socrates 
under cover. His entire motivational framework is distorted in 
the first speech. He speaks to “win high renown from men” 
(quotation from Ibycus at 242d), though he sins in the sight of 
God. The speech was an imitation of Lysian style, and also of 
the warped Lysian perspective on what is right and proper for 
a speaker to set out to achieve.
239A dramatic counterpart to Stesichorus’ blindness is Socrates’ 
covering his face. The latter effectively blinds himself in advance of 
his blasphemy. I discuss this dramatic device further in this section.
240Hackforth (1952), 34, n. 4.
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Socrates get Phaedrus to agree that Eros has been insulted and 
this sin must be atoned. Socrates offers some advice to the 
(absent) Lysias to the effect that he too should avoid insulting 
the god. Phaedrus says, “Rest assured that will be done. When 
you have delivered your encomium of the lover, I shall most 
certainly make Lysias compose a new speech to the same 
purport.” Socrates responds, “I’m sure of that, so long as you 
continue to be the man you are” 243d-e). Hackforth’s footnote 
to this passage says that Lysias will be unable to resist 
Phaedrus so long as the latter maintains his enthusiasm for 
rhetoric. This, it seems, misses the point. As long as Phaedrus 
remains unable to see the message through the medium, to 
hear the meaning not the words, Lysias the logographos and 
professional orator will have an audience. The existence of the 
unreflective and un-self-revealing “art” of rhetoric follows 
from the availability of an unreflective and un-self-knowing 
audience who praise form over content. Unless Phaedrus can 
begin to see his own reflection in the mirror held before him, 
he will forever be running back and forth between the rhetors 
looking for what he cannot recognise.
The theme of identity is reinforced in the closing lines of the 
second interlude. Before he begins, Socrates asks where is the 
young man to whom he had been speaking (i.e., the 
intermission is over and the audience should return to their 
seats). Phaedrus says, “He is here, quite close beside you, 
whenever you want him” (243e). Nussbaum says that this is 
“among the most haunting and splendid moments in
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philosophy.”241 Hackforth quotes Friedlander as noting that 
the second speech is unmistakably addressed to Phaedrus. 
Hackforth himself disagrees and feels that the exchange is 
simple playfulness.242 The reference is, I think, sufficiently 
multi-layered to allow for Nussbaum’s haunted feeling, 
Friedlander’s discovery of an erotic sub-theme, and Hackforth’s 
scepticism. We can also find in the passage an antidote to 
Phaedrus’ continuing to be the man he is, referred to at 243d-e. 
If Phaedrus is not doomed to a constant pursuit of the most 
beautiful or pleasing speech, if he can turn away from the 
pleasant and look to see his own true self, Socrates is here to 
help him.243 If Socrates’ second speech and the conversation 
that follows it are successful, Phaedrus will not return to the 
rhetors in search of a new speech on love (or any other topic 
presum ably).
Like the familiar aporetic dialogues, there is a sense in this 
dialogue that Socrates is concerned to change the outlook of the 
character immediately present. We find a similar statement at 
Gorgias 475e where Socrates says that he will be satisfied if he 
can only get Polus to change his views. It is, as I said at the 
beginning, part of that dialogue’s theme of redemption. The 
same theme is not foreign to the Phaedrus. Thus, Socrates will 
be doing more than developing his own art of rhetoric; he will 
develop a science of persuasiveness. His science addresses the
241Nussbaum (1986), 211.
242Hackforth (1952), 53, n. 1.
243It is not only in this dialogue that Phaedrus is addicted to speeches. 
He is the, admittedly indirect, instigator behind the discussion of love in 
the Symposium (177a-c)
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fundamental issue of how to get the message out of the speech 
and into the soul. We will see as the dialogue continues just 
how important the speaker’s own achievement of true identity 
(and his self-revelation through speech) is to that science.
Socrates’ Second Speech
The third and final “speech” of the dialogue is hard to compare 
to those that went before. We should note that Socrates 
attributes his first speech to the inspiration brought on by 
Phaedrus. His second speech he says is inspired by Stesichorus 
the repentant poet. The second speech contains some of Plato’s 
best mythical writing and, indeed, the myth of the soul’s ascent 
dominates the speech. Socrates begins by distinguishing the 
various types of madness. It was wrong, he says, to shy away 
from love because people call lovers mad. We must see how 
madness can be a good thing brought to us by a god. Love is 
the highest form of madness and brings the person possessed 
by it the greatest bliss. As he develops his argument, the lover 
will turn out to be a philosopher, who is called mad by those 
who cannot imagine the vision of Being that he observes.
After identifying the different ways in which one can be mad, 
Socrates begins his “proof* and he starts by showing that the 
soul is immortal. His proof of this rests on the related 
assumptions that the soul is self-moving and whatever is self- 
moving cannot die. If that which is self-moving were to die, 
i.e., cease moving, then everything else in the universe would 
slowly grind to a halt, since there must be an unmoved mover
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to get the entire causal process going. The soul is considered 
self-moving because we can identify no external source of its 
motion (perhaps an even more basic assumption at work is that 
the soul is in motion. At 245e Socrates implies that the very 
definition of soul is self-motion). Thus, since the soul is 
perpetually in motion — and all other human attributes derive 
their motion from this movement — we can say that to know 
the soul is to know all else that is human. All human 
characteristics that derive their motion from the soul are 
epiphenomenal for Socrates. To know these epiphenomena is 
to know nothing about what is essentially human. Human-ness 
is simply human soul.
Moreover, to know human soul is to know the essential 
character of every human soul. The myth will show that 
different souls achieve different cognitive heights, but the 
human soul, at its point of perfection, is essentially one thing. 
Thus, as I have said earlier, the process of discovering one’s 
own self is the process of discovering the human soul. Lying 
within this is the bond of friendship, which becomes the act of 
looking upon one’s own image in the soul of another. Implicit 
within this is the idea that to know the human soul at all is to 
know it at its point of perfection, and to know this is to become 
such a perfected soul.
Socrates compares the soul to a chariot with two winged horses, 
one good and the other bad. The good horse strives to ascend
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to glimpse a vision of true Being beyond the heavens.244 The 
bad horse impels the whole chariot downwards towards objects 
of earthly beauty. The horseman must reign in the bad horse 
and somehow get the two steeds to operate in unison. This is 
the structure of the human soul. The soul of a god is different, 
however. Having no bad horse to pull it down, the soul of a god 
ascends easily and breaks completely free of the phenomenal 
world. “And now there awaits the soul the extreme of her toil 
and struggling. For the souls that are called immortal [the souls 
of gods], so soon as they are at that summit come forth and 
stand upon the back of the world: and straightaway the 
revolving heaven carries them round, and they look upon the 
regions without” (247b-c).245 This is the privilege of the gods. 
Human souls basically get to stick their heads above water for 
a short while, see some of Being, and get pulled back under by 
the bad horse. The vast majority of souls (non-human souls) 
never even achieve that height; they remain below the surface, 
as it were. While each soul by its nature strives to behold the 
Truth, most find themselves incapable and are constantly 
trying to reign in the bad horse in order to ascend to whatever 
height they can. In the meantime, they are trampling upon one 
another and breaking off the horses’ wings (defeating the 
attempted ascent).
244In this cosmological sketch Socrates treats the phenomenal world as 
encased in some sort of permeable shell. Within the shell is all that can 
be sensed. Beyond the shell is the realm of true being.
24^Hackforth’s translation of this speech is a bit cumbersome and 
archaic, as he tries to capture the poetic flavour of the original Greek.
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To understand this we must understand that Plato treats all 
animate creatures as having a soul. We can see this in the 
hierarchy of fallen souls that he constructs beginning at 248d. 
“For only the soul that has beheld Truth may enter into this our 
human form...,” he says (249b). As in the Myth of Er at the end 
of the Republic there is an idea that every soul has seen what 
is eternal and unchanging. This vision, indeed, is what ensures 
that a soul will be re-embodied as a human agent rather than 
as a lower animal in the Phaedrus. As a result, what is missing 
from this myth of the returning soul is the remarkable 
conception of choice that is so intriguing in the Myth of Er.
Here, depending on the extent of one’s prenatal vision of Being, 
one will come to inhabit a particular sort of human and this 
does not appear to have any relation to what one may 
choose.246 The souls that beheld the most will come to earth as 
philosophers. They have the best recollection of the Forms 
(having seen the most and having constantly attended to 
recovering that vision). Socrates subtly brings this sort of 
person under the rubric of lover who is now considered to be 
the most fortunate “madman.” He is characterised by a love of 
beauty. When he sees earthly beauty he is reminded of the 
Form of Beauty and “his wings begin to grow” (249c). Other 
souls that cannot remember as well as the lover/philosopher
246In the Myth of Er, choice plays a double role. One chooses a new life, 
but also chooses how much to forget of what has been seen. The 
requirement to drink from the River of Forgetfulness is a requirement 
to drink a minimum amount, but some are overwhelmed by thirst and 
drink a greater quantity. It appears in that myth that Socrates wants to 
hold these imprudent people accountable. Such accountability is not 
plainly seen in the P h a ed ru s .
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never make the connection between earthly and heavenly 
beauty. These souls never turn away from the world of 
becoming and dwell upon the appearance of truth throughout 
their human lives.
The very presence of the myth of the soul underscores the 
issue of recovering or discovering the meaning hidden beneath 
the medium. There is always a risk with Platonic myths that 
the message will become lost in the ingenious imagery. While 
it is possible to decipher the symbolic meaning of each image, 
we should try to treat the myth as a whole and attempt to 
understand what overarching idea is being presented. It is 
well known that Plato’s theory of knowledge relies heavily on a 
belief that all understanding is recollection. And, as he writes 
in the Republic, education is a process of turning the pupil’s 
soul in the direction of Being and away from the mere images 
of the phenomenal world (518d ff.). The passages comprising 
the myths found both here and in other dialogues, then, are 
supposed to tell us something about the nature of the human 
mind. Because the language of “soul” and immortality strike us 
as unusual (not being part of our normal philosophical 
vocabulary) it will be useful to remind ourselves that Socrates 
is speaking about a common modern issue, namely the 
existence, source and function of our moral intuitions.247
The source of these intuitions for Plato is the vision of the 
Forms glimpsed by the disembodied soul, which becomes the
247The presumed existence of moral intuitions is not an issue for Plato 
or probably any Greek contemporary.
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foundation for the agent’s entire moral framework. Through 
the process of forgetting, whatever the particular mechanics of 
this within each myth Plato offers,248 this vision is relegated 
from conscious apprehension to intuitive perception. What 
matters most, though, is that the vision each disembodied soul 
has is of the same perfect and unchanging reality. Our 
intuitions, then, while based on different degrees of obscured 
vision, are fundamentally identical.
This helps us understand an interesting detail that seems to 
crop up in a number of dialogues, particularly if the main 
interlocutor is a sophist. Socrates seems to have an uncanny 
ability to inspire feelings of shame in this sort of person. In 
the debate with Thrasymachus, Socrates says that he sees him 
blush. Protagoras feels a degree of humiliation. Gorgias and 
Polus are ashamed to speak what they say they believe. 
Callicles has no shame, but is then made to experience what he 
denies (494e). The pervasiveness of shame indicates to us that 
moral intuition is not something created or developed from the 
fact of social existence for Plato. Our intuitions represent an a 
priori set of cognitive faculties. Because we have these 
intuitions we have the faculty for rational thought that lower 
animals lack. Intuitions ultimately become translated into the 
motivational factors behind rational action.
248A useful discussion can be found in Julia Annas, “Plato’s Myths of 
Judgement”, Phronesis 27 (1982), 119-43. She discusses such myths as 
found in the Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic .
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It returns us, then, to the notion that to know the soul is to 
know the essence of what a human is. Because the vision of 
Being is of the same thing for each soul, but to varying degrees 
of clarity, recollection becomes the central component in 
reaching into any given soul. The more one remembers of the 
vision of Being the more one remembers one’s self as the 
disembodied perceiver of that vision. The more one comes to 
know this the more one comes to know the essential similarity 
of every particular soul. Coming to know one’s self is coming to 
remember one’s self, qua soul, and coming to understand one’s 
self as simultaneously distinct and identical to others.
This has direct bearing on Socrates’ science of persuasiveness 
in the dialogue. I did not comment on this phrase when using 
it earlier, but it seems appropriate and necessary to do so now. 
The concept of an art of rhetoric is overburdened in this 
context with images of handbooks on rhetoric. Consequently, it 
is too easy to think that Socrates is doing something like 
producing the equivalent of a manual of rhetorical style, but 
with philosophical rigour. The concept of rhetoric itself, 
however, presents us with a special problem ~  forcing us to 
revise our view of Socrates’ actions. If rhetoric is persuasive 
speech, what does it mean to be persuasive? What makes 
something so? The question reveals what the myth of the 
chariot-soul points towards: a conception of human 
understanding, the nature of conviction, and the mental process 
of “seeing” the universal in the particular. An art of rhetoric 
only touches the surface of what Plato is trying to construct. 
Rhetoric is the great unexamined practice that can only be
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approached through Plato’s philosophy of mind. It is not 
simply that rhetorical techniques as conventionally understood 
have nothing to do with the truth (the almost knee-jerk 
characterisation of Socrates’ “true rhetoric”). Nor is it the 
companion assertion that rhetoricians do not speak from 
knowledge. These points are quite correct, but, like Lysias’ 
speech, “vulgar rhetoricians” begin from what needs to be 
explained, taking for granted the mechanics of persuasion. 
Somewhere between the speaker’s attempt to persuade and the 
auditor’s conviction there is an indeterminacy, a “something” 
that happens in order to produce the conviction. We need to 
examine what might reside in that gap between speech and 
conviction. As I have just said, this demands an exploration of 
Plato’s philosophy of mind.
We can think of the intuitions in Plato’s scheme as residing 
somewhere between a conscious and subconscious mental state 
(though this is anachronistic and somewhat misleading 
terminology, it will be useful for the moment). They are not 
something we could call fully conscious ideas or perceptions 
because, by definition, they are inarticulable (maybe 
undefinable as principles) sources of thought and action (I am 
abusing the concept of consciousness a bit). Nor are they fully 
sub-conscious because we are aware of having them and acting 
upon them. They are motivational. The myth is designed to 
give some insight into this ambiguous status. Persuasiveness, I 
want to claim, is a result of somehow reaching into the soul and 
“animating” a person’s intuitions. Persuasive speech gives the 
particular the flavour of the universal. It leads the mind from
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this momentary set of experiences up towards the motivating 
intuitive perceptions that, with varying degrees of awareness, 
we use to organise, understand, and explain our own 
actions.249
Returning to the myth, the characterisation of the 
lover/philosopher supports the view I am constructing. It is
not exactly correct to say that the lover is a philosopher. All
philosophers are lovers, but a lover is just a potential
philosopher. In the myth the souls that see most of Being are
travelling in the train of a god. Different gods, basically, give 
different journeys. Those who follow Zeus are predisposed to 
being lovers of wisdom and leaders of men. They seek and are
249Because of much modern work around intuitions the vocabulary I 
am using is hard to manage. I say intuitive “perceptions” because I 
want to distinguish intuitions from Platonic knowledge, since, insofar 
as intuitions are intuitive, they cannot be such a cognitive state yet.
Secondly, I want to avoid the modern sense of the term in which a
person can have intuitive “principles.” In the framework I am using
here, the idea of a principle gives intuitions too much determinacy for 
us to appreciate Plato’s argument. Some modern uses of “intuitions” 
might explain what I do not mean. R.M. Hare uses the idea of intuitive 
principles as part of a two-level scheme for establishing 
noncontradictory principles of justice (we have intuitive principles 
that we then reflect upon and choose between with “critical thinking”). 
See R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
To different, i.e., anti-utilitarian, ends John Rawls develops an idea of 
“reflective equilibrium.” If I understand this correctly, this is the 
outcome of a process in which intuitive principles are examined under 
the light of prevailing social values. Some sort of revision and 
reconceptualisation occurs resulting in a balance between the two. See
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
especially 48-51.
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drawn to similar souls. When this other soul is encountered, 
the embodied soul begins its journey away from the particulars 
and towards the universal. “And if they have not aforetime
trodden this path, they now set out upon, learning the way
from any source that may offer or finding it for themselves...” 
(252e). The distinguishing feature of this person is the speed 
with which he moves from perception of the particular to a 
desire to see the universal. This indicates a highly developed 
intuitive recollection of Being. He did not, as a disembodied 
soul, achieve the perfect vision that a god achieves, but he saw 
and remembers more than the typical human. We can add that 
he remembers because he struggled to recollect.
Like any human soul, his is attracted to eternal and unchanging 
Beauty. When the embodied soul encounters or perceives 
earthly beauty, it rapidly shifts its gaze from the particular 
instance before it and begins to recollect the prenatal vision of 
perfect Beauty.
[T]he fourth kind of madness...causes him to be regarded as mad, 
who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true 
beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an
upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and
neglects the things below” (249e).25 0
250i use Fowler’s translation here to avoid Hackforth’s unwieldy 
rendering of the passage. H.N. Fowler, Plato: Phaedrus (C am bridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914). Hackforth writes:
Such an one [the lover], as soon as he beholds the beauty o f this 
world, is reminded of true Beauty, and his wings begin to grow; 
then he is fain to lift his wings and fly upward; yet he has not the
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Beauty, Socrates will go on to say, is the part of Being that all 
human souls witnessed in all its brightness. Furthermore, the 
earthly images of beauty, unlike the images of “justice and 
temperance and all other prized possessions”, is most similar to 
the original -- and our visual perception of it is most like our 
prenatal vision (250b-d).
Thus, the lover/philosopher finds that his intuitive awareness 
of a higher reality is stimulated by the perception of physical 
beauty (cf. Phaedo). The particular thing or person that 
stimulates that perception becomes effectively marginalised 
because he recognises that his affection is actually for 
something outside the material world. All souls residing in 
human bodies have had some vision of Being (a point Socrates 
repeats at 249e), and the reclamation of their mind’s eyesight 
is difficult. Most give up the struggle. In other words, most 
are seduced into thinking that earthly beauty is the genuine 
article because they cannot easily move from the particular to 
the universal. Nevertheless, having had the appropriate soul- 
vision at some point, even these souls are impelled towards 
beautiful things. They simply find it impossible to make the 
connection between them in order to recognise their essential 
unity under perfect Beauty.
power, but inasmuch as he gazes upward like a bird, and cares 
nothing for the world beneath, men charge it upon him that he 
is demented.
2 9 1
The chief assumption still at work in the dialogue is that an 
older man will fall in love with a younger. Every lover,
Socrates says, wants his beloved to resemble the god who lead 
him round the heavens. The lover will try to mould the 
character of the beloved to resemble as closely as possible the 
divine image of that god.
[Lovers] go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature 
accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his 
affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and 
education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature o f the 
god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or 
meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means in 
their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they 
honour (253b-c).2^ 1
The impression is clearly of an older man, as in the preceding 
speeches, contributing to some sort of moral and intellectual 
redirection, perhaps regeneration, in a boy. Of course, in the 
two earlier speeches the lover produces harmful changes, 
utterly debasing whatever mental virtues the boy might have
25 iFowler, trans. Hackforth writes:
Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature like to
his own god; and when he has won him, he leads him on to walk
in the ways of their god, and after his likeness, patterning 
himself thereupon and giving counsel, and discipline to the boy.
There is no jealousy nor petty spitefulness in his dealings, but his 
every act is aimed at bringing the beloved to be every whit like 
unto himself and unto the god of their worship.
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(and physical virtues, as well, according to Socrates’ first 
speech).
This new approach to describing the lover is significant for my 
characterisation of the lover and non-lover as rival law-givers. 
In the two earlier speeches the non-lover presents himself as 
having an ability to make the young man better, an ability 
based on supposed self-knowledge. He says that the lover will 
corrupt, not improve, precisely for the opposite reason. Now 
Socrates is reversing this. The lover seems to have an intuitive 
sense of who he is — a follower of Zeus — and effectively falls 
in love with that same image in another person. Eventually, 
the beloved finds himself drawn towards the lover (the stream 
of beauty that pulled the lover towards the beloved is returned 
and the beloved finds himself drawn to the other), but is still 
unable to understand what he loves. He cannot account for his 
feelings and does not understand that his lover is like a mirror 
held up to the beloved’s soul (255d).
Earlier the point was made that Socrates had put on a 
“Phaedrus mask” to show the younger man the appearance he 
presented to others. We have here a different sort of mirror, 
one that reflects soul, not persona. The lover, by virtue of what 
it is that makes him such, is able to show his beloved the 
nature of the self. In turning from the young man whom he 
loves and seeing the eternal and unchanging Form of Beauty, 
the lover sees himself as soul. In turning back to the image of 
beauty in the young man, he reveals what his soul perceives in 
the heavens — and reveals it as the essential “matter” that
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attracts him to the beloved. The beloved is also intuitively 
drawn towards this, but cannot yet recognise what it is. The 
craftsmanship of the lover/philosopher, however, will ensure 
that the young man continues to progress towards a mature 
appreciation of the soul’s vision.
Thus, as Socrates concludes at 256e-257a:
He who is not a lover can offer a mere acquaintance flavoured 
with worldly wisdom, dispensing a niggardly measure o f worldly 
goods; in the soul to which he is attached he will engender an 
ignoble quality extolled by the multitude as virtue, and condemn 
it to float for nine thousand years hither and thither, around the 
earth and beneath it, bereft of understanding.2 5 2
He then goes on to say a prayer for the souls of Phaedrus and 
Lysias, especially that the latter be turned towards the love of 
wisdom.
This is the point in the dialogue where discontinuity seems 
most apparent. Socrates has finished his speech on the virtues 
of love, correctly understood, and now the discussion turns to 
other matters. I hope that by this point one can see that 
whatever follows will draw heavily on the discussion of love 
and self-knowledge that has gone before. Perceptions of 
discontinuity stem from a literal reading of the foregoing 
speeches, rather than seeing the speeches as part of a broader 
subject.
252Hackforth, trans.
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An End to Speeches - Dialectic, Rhetoric and Soul
The speeches are over. The lover has been vilified, the non­
lover praised, and the true lover hailed as the most fortunate, 
divinely mad creature. We have learned that all souls 
currently residing in human forms have seen some part of true 
Being. This is the source of our moral intuitions. Because Being 
is eternal and unchanging, each soul saw the same thing and, 
therefore, all moral intuitions are fundamentally the same. We 
each have an intuitive sense of justice, beauty, temperance, and 
so on. These intuitions are the motivating force behind human 
action. A decision to act in a particular way reflects a belief 
that the chosen course somehow actualises one’s intuitions. In 
other words, it appears to be the right course to follow. The 
memories that comprise our intuitions are, by their very 
nature, formal and, thus, not specifically related to how we act 
in the world. The point for Plato is the need to mentally 
recover the universal, to regenerate the knowledge of the 
universal from the particular. The regeneration of that 
knowledge becomes the activity of love and is a kind of self­
knowing. For the beloved, the true lover is the man who helps 
him regain the vision of Being. The true lover benefits the 
beloved by bringing this vision to the front of his mind, 
displaying it to him by displaying himself. Not all go through 
this process. While we all have intuitions of the same things, 
the residual vision of Being varies in degree between people. 
Some people are more likely to recover a clear vision of Being,
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corresponding to the small number of souls that managed to 
see the most a man can see when disembodied.
Taking this image back to the level of politics, we can find that 
there is room for an implied space occupied by the rhetorician. 
Inside every deliberative institution or framework is a small 
hollow where the person who is best at actualising intuitions 
takes a seat of honour. Any man can express an opinion 
reflecting his best judgement, but the rhetorician’s 
pronouncements are authoritative. In both his vulgar and 
Platonic form, this man says the things that just sound right -- 
he seems to give voice to a host of inchoate sensations. We are 
convinced that what he says is correct because it appeals to us 
as a cogent expression of something we always knew, but could 
never verbalise. We are persuaded because our imprecise 
intuitions are made concrete and displayed before our eyes. 
What was once a “perhaps” becomes an “of course”, closing the 
gap between intention to persuade and conviction. This, it 
must be stated, occurs in both the pseudo-rational appeals 
heard in Lysias’ speech and in Platonic rhetoric. What 
distinguishes them is the persuader’s desire to direct the 
auditors’ mental gaze toward the universal, to the extent 
possible. Analogous to the true lover, the true rhetorician 
seeks the improvement of others. Importantly, the true lover 
undertakes this with one who can, and eventually does, become 
like him. The true rhetorician cannot, because of the varying 
levels of cognitive capacity, bring all of his auditors to his own 
level. Nevertheless, without understanding the source and role
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of moral intuitions described in the dialogue Socrates* 
statements about rhetoric are all but incomprehensible.
In his first speech Socrates advocates the “little-techne” o f 
defining the subject under discussion at the start of the speech. 
It turns out this is necessary because people disagree about the 
meaning of certain words (263a). Now he wants to expand on
this. His first speech supposedly relied on a definition, but this
still lead him to the wrong conclusion. Something more is 
needed prior to definition: a dialectical method. This involves 
the twin procedures of collection and division that will reveal 
the constituents composing the subject. Socrates describes the 
processes thus:
The first [procedure] is that in which we bring a dispersed
plurality under a single form, seeing it all together.... [The
second procedure is] the reverse of the other, whereby we are 
enabled to divide into forms, following the objective articulation... 
(265d).
Before we can define anything, or say anything about it, we 
need to see it as a unitary thing that operates as a complete 
whole. We must then analyse its micro structure to observe 
the movements and relations between its parts. This 
movement is entirely contained within the structural facade of 
the whole and is not normally what we have in mind when 
referring to the subject. Thus, we see in Socrates’ second 
speech that madness is identified as a complex entity that 
could be divided “following the objective articulation” (Socrates
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does not give much guidance for identifying how natural 
dividing points are to be found). Once the complex is made 
simple, the subject of the speech can be more narrowly 
specified. It is no good saying that love is madness, thus, bad, 
unless we can be sure that madness is a unitary thing. Since it 
is not, and some kinds of madness are good, we must see if love 
is of the good sort or the bad. True love is divinely inspired 
madness (a subset of the complex we simply refer to as 
madness) and, therefore, is good for the lover and the beloved.
This is how one practices dialectic.253 It is a method of 
ensuring that the words and concepts we use are precise and 
not misunderstood. At this level, though, it is simply technique 
and we cannot take Socrates as having given us the full picture. 
Words are themselves only signifiers, not signified (and what 
they signify is transcendental). In fractionalising the concept 
of madness we are still contending with language and ignoring 
meaning. The methods of collection and division, when applied 
to words, do not address the central issue of understanding  
language. At this point, we could simply say that Socrates has 
refined the work of the sophist Prodicus, who concerned 
himself with the precise definitions of words. His careful
253The relationship between this dialectical method and that alluded to 
in the Republic is unclear. It may be the case that by the time he wrote 
the Phaedrus Plato had, or wished to present, a more coherent picture of 
dialectic. The discussion of dialectic in the Republic starts as a concern 
with achieving a vision of Being. Nevertheless, its power is as a type of 
reasoning that separates itself from the material world. Plato does not 
specify there with much clarity how one undertakes such reasoning, 
while the Phaedrus seems to offer a method.
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distinctions are parodied in the Protagoras. Surely Socrates 
intends more.
He has told us at the start that the pursuit of knowledge begins 
with knowledge of the self. In discovering the nature of our 
own souls we will discover what and how the soul understands. 
This discovery is the discovery of what is signified by language. 
Collection and division are methods for understanding who we 
are. Socrates says at the start of the dialogue that he spends no 
time analysing and explaining popular myths because he does 
not yet know himself. Further, he has not yet found out if he is 
a “complex creature and more puffed up with pride than 
Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being whom heaven has blessed 
with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature” (230a). In light of the 
analysis of soul in his second speech, we know that this is an 
ironic reference to the dialectical method and not literally what 
Socrates seeks to know about himself (though we could not 
have known this when first reading 230a). The soul is 
composed of a rational and irrational part, making it into a 
complex whole that needs to be assessed as such.
The chariot-soul myth shows clearly what he intends by 
collection and division. As a whole the chariot behaves as a 
unit; it can only do one thing at once (chase after an object of 
beauty, reel back in awe, etc.). Bound together into a composite 
structure, neither the horses nor the driver can plot a separate 
course. As individual parts, however, each contends against 
the others, struggling to assert their peculiar desires as the 
soul’s will (the external expression of which is the behaviour of
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the chariot as a whole). The outcome of this internal struggle is 
the soul’s behaviour, but it may represent a mixture of desires 
and, in cases, a forced compromise. The soul’s vision of Being is 
limited and brief because the evil horse is pulling downwards 
away from the heavens. The good horse is pulling up to see 
even more. The soul’s will inevitably reflects the inability of 
either horse to assert completely its desires to the exclusion of 
others. The good horse’s inability to triumph decisively is the 
tragedy of the human soul. Under the fa$ade of any human 
action is the hidden struggle between our highest and lowest 
desires. Is this reflected in our political actions?
Take the following as a convenient sketch of political 
deliberation. Political deliberation is about courses of action, 
each of which is within the realm of possibility for the 
deliberators. No one deliberates about what necessarily must 
be. We might add that no one chooses a course of action that 
he perceives as manifestly impossible. And what is contingent 
or possible is not open to scientific demonstration. So, given a 
finite set of possibilities, the choice of one alternative 
presupposes political argument, deliberation. The choice will 
reflect what, on the considered judgement of the deliberators, 
is plausibly considered to be the best course of action. Thus, 
political argument is concerned with establishing plausible 
accounts of what is best. The person who puts forth the most 
plausible account will persuade the rest (defining plausibility 
as persuasiveness). This is what Phaedrus and Socrates would 
recognise as political deliberation. It is not too far removed
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from the first and second speeches of the dialogue.254 This is 
what Phaedrus has heard, at least. The good rhetorician is 
successful because his arguments are plausible and plausibility 
has a high correlation with public acceptability. Investigations 
to answer questions of fact (did John assault James) follow this 
prescription. Questions of fact can be determined with a 
degree of certainty that deliberations over proposed future 
action cannot. Nevertheless, no one is likely to be convinced 
that some act actually occurred in the past that seems highly 
improbable, as Socrates mockingly notes when refering to the 
rhetorical techniques and teachings of Tisias (273b-c). A small 
man is unlikely to assault a large man. In this case, the facts 
should be suppressed because no one will find them 
convincing. It is implausible that it should have happened that 
way.
If the human soul has the basic make-up and operations 
Socrates describes it is not altogether obvious what this could 
have to do with political argument. Would knowing that the 
soul contains a rational and irrational component and that 
human action is a compromise between perfect rationality and 
the animal pursuit of physical gratification, in any way help a
254 It is also admirably demonstrated in the dialogues such as the 
Euthyphro and the Crito, where alternative courses o f action are 
available and the decision is seen to bear a relationship to what is 
objectively right. In the former dialogue, the investigation into piety 
relates to Euthyphro’s decision to prosecute his own father, an action he 
may or may not undertake, depending on how one construes piety. 
Euthyphro cites some of his own relatives as saying he is wrong to 
bring charges. In the latter, Socrates has a very specific choice to make 
and asserts that he will act in accordance with the best argument.
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rhetorician persuade his auditors? It seems that a careful 
study of human responses to various stimuli would give us 
sufficient, if not complete, knowledge to persuade. This is the 
view Socrates describes at Republic 493a-b when he says the 
sophist has simply discovered what will tame or enrage the 
wild beast, demos, and thinks this is adequate for setting up a 
school. This is presumably what he means by equating rhetoric 
with cookery and flattery in the Gorgias. We hear the same 
idea in the Phaedrus when Socrates asks if anyone who induces 
vomiting is qualified necessarily to teach medicine. Or, he 
contends, is the man who can write long or short passages that 
contain strong emotion capable necessarily of writing tragedy? 
By analogy, is the ability to bring forth in an audience one sort 
of emotion or another sufficient to be called a true rhetor?
To answer these questions, we must see persuasive speeches as 
comparisons between particulars and universals. Any 
rhetorician is trying to establish the plausibility of whatever he 
is recommending and this means showing its greater intuitive 
appeal. Intuitive appeal is an outcome of close correspondence 
between a particular and universal in the sense that the 
rhetorician must promote the idea that a particular alternative 
more closely corresponds to a broader concept, such as justice. 
The more convincing person will more readily make present to 
the auditors the inchoate intuitive sensations that normally 
guide their conduct. Two sorts of person will have this 
rhetorical success: the “observant” and the knowledgeable. The 
former, we can say, sees how to direct behaviour. The latter, 
on the other hand, sees the true ends sought through action
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and wants to do direct behaviour accordingly. The “observant” 
have a technique: a quick eye for recognising and measuring 
responses to their words. They have calculated what sorts of 
words, expressions, tones of voice, structures of speech will 
promote various emotions. Their speeches produce these 
emotions with considerable regularity. If the response 
inexplicably takes an unforeseen turn, they can quickly change 
direction themselves. Whatever response they do want, it goes 
without saying that they do not want to become objects of 
contempt or derision. Callicles shifts his ground to please the 
crowd (Gorgias 48Id). Socrates jokingly offers to dance naked
to gratify his audience, Menexenus (.Menexenus 236d). The 
activity of the “observant” is not foreign to some contemporary 
thinking on rhetoric. As one theorist has put it:
To make his discourse effective, a speaker must adapt to his 
audience. What constitutes this adaptation, which is a specific 
requisite for argumentation? It amounts essentially to this: the 
speaker can choose as his points of departure only the theses 
accepted by those he addresses. In fact, the aim of argumentation 
is not, like demonstration, to prove the truth of the conclusion 
from the premises, but to transfer to the conclusion the 
adherence accorded to the p r e m i s e s . 2 ^
In other words, success in political argument is about probable 
outcomes and probability is just another way of saying that, 
with luck, the unexpected will not occur. This sort of speaker is
255Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1982), 21.
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lucky because what he wants to happen usually does. He has 
no theory of why his technique works, just ample empirical 
evidence that it gets results. Over time he may even win a 
reputation as an able speaker and, indeed, will be called wise 
by those who are consistently persuaded by his arguments. His 
admirers will be of the "I-wish-I-had-said-that" variety and 
will imitate his style, thinking that there is something 
intrinsically significant about every detail of his speaking 
technique.
Assuming with Plato that this person does not have knowledge 
in the strict sense that he demands — and accepting that such a 
person rejects the need for such knowledge — we can say that 
he may unknowingly mislead his audience regarding the truth 
of the matter he proposes. He may say that the truth is 
unknowable (cf. Gorgias, On Not-Being), but this is not a 
rejection of the existence of an objectively true condition. He 
may even, as Protagoras implicitly does, accept the existence of 
an objective reality.256 Nevertheless, he is still possibly guilty 
of leading people away from truth. He may very well lead 
them towards truth, but this is as unintentional as its opposite.
Socrates’ argument that the true rhetorician must have genuine
knowledge, in the Platonic sense, hinges on a particular point
256Implicitly at Protagoras 351c when he rejects that pleasure is good, 
saying that pleasure in noble things is good. More to the point, in the
Theaetetus, his thesis that knowledge is perception assumes the
objective existence of that which is perceived. One may, for example, 
have a perception of the wind's temperature, but it is assumed that the 
wind is actually there.
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left unexamined in the dialogue. He says at 262a that "anyone 
who intends to mislead another, without being mislead himself, 
must discern precisely the degree of resemblance and 
dissimilarity between this and that."257 Central, but almost 
unobserved, is the idea of self-deception. An intentional 
deceiver, as we would normally understand him, knows or 
believes that what he is recommending is not the case. His 
deception would be accidental if this were not so. Why, then, is 
there a possibility of self-deception if one intends to deceive 
others? What is the intentional deceiver deceived about — the 
same thing about which he intends to deceive?
We need , first, to specify a little more carefully how 
intentionality fits into this. The quotation above follows a 
discussion of how the man with the "art" of rhetoric can make 
things appear just and unjust to the same audience at will 
(261c-d). Socrates then goes on to describe under what 
circumstances we are misled, namely when the difference 
between two things is narrow (26le). Quite without warning 
he begins to assume in the next lines that the person with the 
"art" of rhetoric sets out to mislead and does so by shifting his 
ground a little at a time. This is how deception can occur. Then 
in the lines quoted from 262a, he fully assumes that misleading 
the audience is intentional. The intention to deceive is 
meaningless, however, unless we understand why a person 
might set out to do so. Given the practice of rhetoric in Athens, 
it is reasonable that Socrates would imagine a misleading 
speech as one among a number of speeches and as something
257Italics mine.
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addressed to a large audience The rhetorical "space" is the
public arena — and arena may be an apt concept. The
emphasis in such settings is on competition. We can see that
this is what Socrates has in mind at 261d-e:
So contending with words is a practice found not only in lawsuits 
and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we find 
this single art, which enables people to make out everything to 
be like everything else, within the limits of possible comparison, 
and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who disguise 
what they are doing.
The purpose of deception — the motivation to deceive — arises 
from the competitive framework within which the speaking 
takes place. The intention is not to deceive as such, but to win 
the argument. The background intention to that desire is the 
desire to win praise or respect — the only prize legitimately on 
offer during deliberation (although we can easily imagine 
numerous illegitimate prizes). Given this, we can understand 
why Socrates constructs an intended deceiver as his main 
target.
He reveals something else that we should note. Insofar as 
rhetoric is practiced in all interpersonal communication, 
Socrates seems to be saying that all interpersonal 
communication is competitive. One is contending with words 
whenever one speaks. If this is so then it seems the desire for 
praise will always win out over a desire to persuade people of
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the truth. If competition breeds the intention to deceive, the 
intention to deceive will be very common, if not ubiquitous.
We can now return to see how this works out in the idea of 
self-deception. The intending deceiver cannot logically be 
misled over the same things about which he intends to mislead. 
It is nonsense to say that he intentionally misleads without 
supposing that he also knows what is the case. Thus, he 
proposes as true something he knows or believes to be false. 
Perhaps we could say that a person can intentionally mislead 
without his knowing the case at all. However, it would not be 
correct to say he is misled about the same things of which he 
tries to mislead others, which appears to be Socrates’ meaning 
at 262a. For example, if I tell you that the dog is outside, but I 
do not know where the dog is, and I know that I do not know, 
one might say I mislead intentionally without knowing the 
case. But I am not intending to mislead about the specific 
proposition "the dog is outside." I mislead about my knowledge 
of what is the case.
This reveals immediately the essential nature of the deception 
Socrates has in mind. The rhetorician who sets out to deceive 
is trying to persuade people that a) what he says is true and b) 
that he knows what is the case, at least with respect to this 
issue. He is like the unknowing dog-owner who simply wants 
us to think he has the right answer. An argument is persuasive 
because it makes present to us our moral intuitions. A 
persuasive speaker is considered persuasive because he is able 
to present such arguments. The more successful he becomes in
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persuading, the more he is considered to have knowledge of 
the matters that are discussed. By intentionally setting out to 
mislead about the specific proposals under consideration, he 
has unintentionally misled about his own cognitive state. He 
has created, without his being aware of it, a false persona of 
the wise man. Thus, his pronouncements become authoritative; 
he has established his authority as a knowledgeable expert.
This persona is reflected back to him via the acclaim and 
approval of those whom he set out to persuade. The image he 
has of himself, the only image he is ever shown is of a man 
who has knowledge and this becomes his self-image. His 
success in deceiving others has resulted in his own self- 
deception.
In this respect, the man who sets out to deceive must be 
deceived himself, unless he fails in his attempt to deceive. 
Ironically, in failing to deceive, the image reflected back to him 
is the image of the man who does not know what he is talking 
about — a man with no knowledge, as Socrates claims to be 
himself.
The man who does not want to be deceived himself — and we 
now know that this means being deceived about one’s own 
cognitive state — must begin from a position of knowledge.
The implication is that he is not simply knowledgeable about 
what is the case, but knows his own level of knowledge. He is 
self-knowing. Socrates tells us at 271a-b that, since rhetoric 
aims to plant conviction in the soul, the scientific rhetorician 
will have to specify precisely the nature of the soul. He will
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also have to describe what capacities it has and how it is acted 
upon. Finally, the scientific rhetorician must define the various 
types of discourse and the corresponding types of soul upon 
which they are affective. At 271d-272b he says that there is a 
determinate number of soul-types and an equal number of 
types of discourse. The artful speaker will never fail in 
"speaking or teaching or writing."
There may be a literal significance to what Socrates is saying 
about the types of soul. He may have in mind something like 
the tripartite division in the Republic or the apparent 
rational/irrational dichotomy in this dialogue.258 We can, I 
think rule these out as Socrates' meaning. The souls that 
interest us in persuading others are human souls. The required 
qualification for a soul inhabiting a human body, to follow the 
metaphor, is that it had some vision of Being when 
disembodied. In this respect, every human soul is identical, 
even though not all souls were equally successful in achieving 
that vision. Some saw less because of the dominance of the
258See Hackforth's comment on this: "Plato is simply thinking o f an 
unspecified number of types of mind to which an unspecified number 
of types of discourse will be respectively appropriate: unspecified, yet 
determinate." Hackforth (1952), 147, n. 1. This is uncertain, mainly 
because Plato does not give any clear indication. The relationship 
between the soul/chariot metaphor and descriptions o f the soul found 
elsewhere is equally unclear. The clean division between the rational 
and irrational parts of the soul appears to be characteristic of Plato’s 
earlier thinking on the subject. I think that, beginning with the 
tripartite division in the Republic, we begin to see a more complex 
analysis o f human motivation and that the soul/chariot reflects this 
complexity, with its emphasis on struggle, without plainly relating the 
structure o f the soul to anything Plato has argued in other dialogues.
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downward-pulling horse and, thus, face a more difficult 
struggle to recover any vision of Being. That vision of being is, 
nevertheless, what provided human moral intuitions, in which 
all men share. What is persuasive to a human agent is 
whatever "animates” or makes present those intuitions. In 
other words, as a category of discourse, the same type of 
speech is persuasive to all souls -- the kind that turns the soul 
away from the particular to the universal.259
This is where the possibility of differentiating discourse 
occurs. The behavioural aspect of moving from particulars to 
universal is primarily the speed with which it occurs (since it 
occurs to some extent in all humans). The secret to speaking 
persuasively is knowing, or anticipating, how quickly the 
audience will make the connection between particular and 
universal. In other words, the rhetorician will want to know 
how prone any given individual is to abstract thinking. And 
this is when the appetite, or the irrational part of soul becomes 
im portant.
Appetite is concerned, not only with the things of this world, 
but with particular things of this world. Appetite does not 
conceptualise a broad preference for a category of things 
(speeches, say). Appetite seeks gratification as such, and this is 
exhibited in a pursuit of numerous and randomly occurring
25 9As a category of discourse, this may be true. We may still assimilate 
this to the division of the soul into its rational and appetitive elements. 
Some speeches should, in these terms, be addressed to the appetites 
initially. Whether a speech must at some stage affect the rational 
faculty is unclear.
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particulars. Take, for example, Hippocrates in the Protagoras, 
the epitome of the appetitive man. He is completely 
unreflective about his desires, or as unreflective as a man can 
be. He is something like a wanton, as I said. We can place him 
at the bottom of human souls, having a very slow "particular- 
to-universal" response time. Socrates has to lead him through 
a very elementary series of questions simply in order to create 
some sort of framework from which he can proceed to 
interrogate Protagoras later. He basically says, "If X turns 
things into X ', what will you become by associating with X?" He 
then has X stand for several types of skilled craftsmen and 
leads Hippocrates to conclude that Protagoras will make him a 
sophist.
Compare him to someone like Phaedrus, who is also quite 
appetitive. Nevertheless, he is not in random pursuit of 
gratification. He has a very specific fancy for eloquent speech. 
Above the disorganised and unpredictable mass of desires he 
may have, he has established a somewhat general category of 
thing that he finds especially gratifying. This demonstrates a 
certain ability for abstract thought and we can perceive the 
difference in the more abstract speeches Socrates delivers to 
him. Also, the rather abstract content of the entire dialogue, 
considering the presence of only one other character, indicates 
that Phaedrus is somehow capable of grappling with all the 
material discussed.260
260if  we were looking for dramatic clues about Phaedrus' nature, we 
could note that he is leaving the city to practice Lysias' speech, i.e., 
removing himself from the world of particularity. We could also note
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The artful rhetorician, then, begins from a position of self- 
knowledge, which is a knowledge of himself as an embodied 
perceiver of Being. He knows that he has a moral sense.261 He 
knows what these intuitions refer to, since he himself has an 
ability to move quickly from particular to universal. He can 
speak in a way that reminds people that they too have moral 
intuitions that have definite points of reference. His persuasive 
speech seeks to pull people up to his own level of 
understanding. Speaking persuasively with self-knowledge is 
about turning the souls of the auditors inwards towards those 
very same souls he seeks to affect. He wants to promote self- 
knowledge and this becomes his personal act of self-revelation. 
In making others self-knowing he recreates himself qua self- 
knower within their souls.
Running alongside this, tangent to self-knowledge and self­
revelation, is Socrates' criticism of writing. As I have been 
arguing, the persuasive speaker is instrumental in bringing 
forward in our minds our moral intuitions. It is well-known 
that Plato saw all learning as recollection of the disembodied 
soul's vision of Being. We are now well-positioned to see how 
writing fits in with this. Socrates tells a story set in Egypt 
about the invention of writing. The god, Theuth presented to
how Socrates, like the true lover of his speech, is pulled towards the 
object of beauty, Phaedrus, and in being so pulled is himself carried 
beyond particularity.
261 This is reminiscent of the "moral sentiments" one finds in 
Eighteenth-Century thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Hume. Of 
course, their epistemologies are incompatible with Plato's.
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Thamus, the king, this novel art with the promise that it would 
aid the memory. Thamus rejects the art calling it a "recipe not 
for memory, but for reminder" (275a). He says that people will 
stop looking for memories within themselves, but will rely 
instead on what has been written. As their “knowledge” 
remains text-based, what is not written will, ultimately, be 
forgotten. They will cease to enquire into themselves.
Clearly, an aid to recollection would suit Socrates well, 
especially in this dialogue. We should note that he does not 
mention writing as an aid to interpersonal communication; 
writing here is an analogue to persuasive speech. It is 
something used to promote a keen awareness of our moral 
intuitions, which are the only genuine memories we have.262 It 
should be fairly clear why writing fails to accomplish what 
persuasive speech can do. The author's text represents one 
possible method of address that would be suitable for a 
particular sort of person. Its persuasive power, though, is 
contingent upon it reaching that audience and no other. The 
appropriate audience will be reminded of the vision of Being 
that is meant to be conjured up by the words. The 
inappropriate person will be baffled and will try to develop 
some interpretation that will make the text meaningful to him. 
If the writer wrote with self-knowledge, we know that his text 
is analogous to the sort of speech he would make, encouraging 
an upward gaze away from particularity. If he wrote without
262Genuine in the sense that they point towards Being and away from 
the experiences of the embodied soul.
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self-knowledge, there is no objectively appropriate audience 
because there is no correct audience for misleading words.
Speech becomes the tool of the science of persuasiveness.
Speech can be tailored to meet the needs of the particular soul. 
We can imagine Hippocrates’ puzzlement if he picked up and 
read the Phaedrus. We can imagine Phaedrus' annoyance if 
Socrates questioned him as he does Hippocrates. The text, by 
virtue of the spatio-temporal separation from the author, 
cannot be an act of self-revelation. The self-revelation occurs 
through the act of turning the auditors to examine their own 
souls. With some of the texts, "auditors" may be so turned, but 
others are baffled or thrown back upon their own intellectual 
resources to reconstruct the intended meaning.
Furthermore, we can see in the Egyptian myth, that the 
recollections which writing excels in producing tend to be about 
the world of particulars. It gives men the semblance of 
wisdom and will make them conceited about what they take to 
be their own wisdom (275a-b). In referring us to the 
semblance of wisdom, we can see Socrates making a point 
about the risk of embedding language in the world of 
particulars. Language treated as a particular is denied a role in 
leading the soul to a contemplation of universals. Written 
language tries to make concrete what is too ephemeral to be 
captured within human communication. The marks on the 
paper easily become confused with the words, which are 
already easily confused for the signified. If words are 
embedded in particularity, written words are the logical
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extreme of this condition. Language has become an artefact 
detached, in the minds of its users, from Being.263
263An interesting comparison can be made with the Cratylus. Socrates' 
etymologies which occupy a large middle section of the dialogue often 
rely on the sensation that a particular sound causes — a word may give 
the sense of motion or smoothness, and so on. This is the sort of thing 
that I think he is saying written language sacrifices. Conveying this 
sense allows language to act as a springboard to understanding.
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Conclusion
This section has covered a great deal of ground in trying to 
develop a coherent picture of the Phaedrus. I have tried to 
show that the dialogue centres on a conception of self- 
knowledge that entails self-revelation through speech. The 
purpose of this self-revelatory act is to promote self- 
knowledge in the auditors, that they may become better 
examples of an ideal of the human soul by living according to 
what is true and right, to the extent they are able. I have tried 
to show the link between being one's self and showing one's 
self and found that there is a tension in the dialogue between 
true identity and persona. Through dramatic details and 
arguments, we see Socrates trying to show Phaedrus his own 
reflection, the disconnectedness between false speech and 
identity, and the necessity of self-knowledge if one is to 
persuade others. Finally, I have tried to show the link between 
the madness of love and true self through an examination of 
the disembodied soul's vision of Being and the embodied soul's 
moral intuitions.
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C on clu s ion
In the four sections of this thesis I have attempted to show 
that in Plato’s political thought we can find a concern with the 
relationship between politics, language and order. This 
relationship arises both from Plato’s belief in an orderly 
universe, characterised by the Theory of the Forms, and from 
his desire for the creation of order in human affairs to the 
greatest extent possible.
We have to understand Plato’s concern with order in human 
affairs not as a personal bias, but as an intellectual 
commitment to improving human life through the 
rationalisation of the political association. Just as life in the 
polis is the natural life for man, order in the polis is the natural 
condition for that association. The universe is naturally well- 
ordered, thus, disorder in any aspect of the universe is an 
anomaly, something in need of correction. It is because man 
has a greater ability than any other creature to manipulate the 
character of his communal life that disorder can even emerge. 
Through his rational element, his psychic attribute that 
resembles the divine, man can create a way of life for himself. 
Through those aspects of character that are animal rather than 
divine, man’s creations can deviate from the harmonious 
pattern of the universe. Reason in man, unlike in god, must 
struggle for mastery of the creature in which it resides. Order 
in human society is a problem because the order appropriate to 
man can be subverted. Man, in effect, has the capacity to
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subvert his own destiny. Man’s condition is potentially tragic, 
therefore.
The four works I have examined in this thesis contribute to our 
understanding of order in Plato’s thought. I have chosen to 
examine four aspects of order to demonstrate its importance to 
Plato: the concept itself; the use of language and its relationship 
to order; language and political order specifically; psychic 
harmony and order in human society.
My examination of the Protagoras is designed to show that 
order is, indeed, a fundamental concern in Plato’s thought. The 
opening scene where Socrates encounters the over-anxious 
Hippocrates is intended as a graphic depiction of a life without 
order. The latter has a steady stream of desires which he is 
unable to evaluate in any terms other than the strength of 
each. In fact, it seems that he pursues his desires immediately 
upon the initial experience of a need. Hippocrates confesses 
that he has not considered the consequences of his desire to 
enrol with Protagoras. In bringing this confession out, Plato 
makes clear that disorder is not merely unnatural, but harmful. 
Hippocrates is putting himself at risk — the risk of making 
himself a worse human being.
In the second part of this section, I look at Protagoras* ‘Great 
Speech’ and try to show the problematic nature of order in 
human society. The myth of creation, which dominates the 
Great Speech, is the story of man’s need to construct order in 
the political association. Man has certain divine gifts,
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intellectual attributes and moral instincts, that allow him to 
glimpse at some level the orderly pattern of the universe.
These gifts are opportunities that must be seized; man has the 
capacity to order the political association, but must strive to 
grasp the nature of cosmic order to recreate it in his own life.
In the third part I try to show how difficult the creation of 
order can be. Socrates’ facetious analysis of Simonides poem is 
a game to show that something which looks like a coherent 
order can be invented. However, this appearance may not 
reflect reality. It becomes a clever speech to convince those 
who have not considered the nature of order and, therefore, 
cannot pronounce upon its manifestation in human life.
Hippias’ offer to give an equally worthy account of the poem 
confirms that imitations of order are not only possible, but a 
risk associated with man’s failure to understand order itself.
Section Two carries these themes further, developing them 
specifically in the direction of how language can be used in a 
political association. The emphasis in this section is language 
and power and I try to show that clever speech, intended to 
persuade the ignorant, can become a tool of the unscrupulous. 
In the first part of this section, I examine Gorgias and the 
statements he makes in defence of his own profession. I try to 
demonstrate that, while he recognises rhetoric as an 
instrument for gaining power, that power is never intended to 
become despotic. Gorgias always assumes that existing 
conventions which contribute to political order are both in 
place and desirable.
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On this point he differs from Polus and Callicles. The former, I 
claim, serves as a transition in the dialogue. He gives us a 
glimpse of language used to undermine the existing order, thus 
revealing how even an order based on principles other than 
those of Plato depends on the beliefs and values of the 
association's members. The content of language expresses the 
values of its users, but the beliefs of those users may be at 
variance with those values. In that case language is cynically 
manipulated to achieve what one (mistakenly) takes to be his 
own personal ends.
Callicles completes the view in the final part of this section.
Here I have tried to show that the extreme pursuit of power he 
represents fully expresses the threat to stability and order 
when the existing values of a community are not held by all of 
that community's members. In other words, some of the 
members see the values of the community as something to be 
used in order to control those who cannot grasp what those 
values require of them.
In Section Three I take a more precise look at the 
correspondence between individual and collective beliefs. I 
argue that order in the political association is fundamentally 
natural and try to show how this order can be subverted. In 
the first part I look at Polemarchus' playful threat of force in 
the opening scene. I find there a number of clues about bonds 
between men and how these bonds may act as merely a facade 
which covers fundamental conflicts.
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In the second part I examine Cephalus' use of poetry, myth and 
anecdotes to show that a language, or moral vocabulary, can 
contribute to order. However, the stability of this order, I 
claim, requires a grounding in objective moral principles — 
which is Plato's aim in the dialogue. Cephalus’ moral language 
cannot survive because it has become a dogma at a time when 
critical examination has become the dominant mode of 
argum ent.
Polemarchus has a vague awareness of this, as I try to show in 
the third part. He accepts the content of his father's beliefs, 
but goes about trying to defend them in a more sophisticated 
way. He recognises that the objective is to ground his father's 
beliefs. Nevertheless, he cannot conceive of a way to do this 
without arbitrarily invoking some authority for his views. He 
misses the crucial point Socrates is making that knowledge of 
moral principles is the only stable grounding.
The final part of this section is an examination of 
Thrasymachus’ views. The discussion between Socrates and 
Thrasymachus shows that knowledge is the issue 
fundamentally at stake. Unlike Polemarchus, Thrasymachus 
appears to understand this, a point especially revealed by his 
counter-deployment of the craft analogy. Thrasymachus also 
seems aware that language can be used as a tool by those 
seeking power. I look at his first statement about justice, 
which I accept as an important corollary to his more inclusive 
second statement. In it I find an awareness that language can
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be used to impose something like an orderly framework on the 
political association, but that, in Thrasymachus' view, this 
framework is designed to serve only the interests of the person 
who imposes it. Combining this with the problem of 
knowledge, we see that Thrasymachus has not furnished the 
means of stabilising such an order.
In the final section of the thesis I look at the Phaedrus and the 
connection between order in the polis and order in the psyche. 
As I have argued throughout the thesis, language can 
potentially be misused and in this section I try to show how 
Plato envisages that it should be used. Here we see a more 
complete Platonic statement of what it means for the human 
mind to grasp the basic order of the universe. In Socrates’ 
descriptions of love and beauty we see that the rational 
element must transcend its human casing and recreate within 
the entire soul a harmonisation of parts. We see finally, that 
the order of the universe must penetrate to the deepest level 
of human life, the individual psyche, if there is to be order in 
the political association.
•  •  •  •  •
If the foregoing analysis has any merit, it is to show us Plato’s 
sensitive conception of the human mind. The attributes of the 
psyche are described as problematically related to one another, 
leading us to see human actors as complexly motivated. It is 
this appreciation of complexity that we can use in examining 
other dialogues and this gives us some startling insights into
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what Plato may have believed about motivation and 
responsibility. The message running through the dialogues 
examined here is that those who (mistakenly) believe in their 
own knowledge persist in asking the wrong questions of 
themselves. The difficulty is not simply to establish what 
motivates a person to act, but to establish the motivational 
forces at work when individuals conceptualise the problems or 
circumstances to which their actions relate. Plato would appear 
to be arguing that asking oneself the wrong questions is not 
something for which one may be held responsible; the 
possibility of achieving true knowledge seems determined. 
However, in the dialogues I have chosen, we have some 
interesting evidence that this might not be the case. One may 
not be responsible for asking the wrong questions, but one may 
be so responsible if one persists in the face of offered 
alternatives. Protagoras, Callicles and Thrasymachus remove 
themselves from the investigation, by “playing along” with 
Socrates, which is a choice they make. The Socratic offer to 
redirect the conversation into more fundamental issues is 
effectively rebuked. These individuals will not ask questions 
different from their own — as opposed to being unable to do so. 
We do, though, see characters who seemingly lack the cognitive 
capacity to proceed as Socrates would wish. Here we can 
identify Gorgias, Polus, Cephalus and Polemarchus.
Hippocrates’ and Phaedrus’ positions in this framework are 
unclear. Like Glaucon, perhaps, they are willing and possesses 
the relevant capacity, yet this is undeveloped.
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The framework of unwilling vs. unable, however, may not be 
sustainable or may not be the only significant division. The 
great antithesis we see in these works is between those who 
will listen and participate and those who will not. Those who 
will not, relieve themselves of the burden through ridicule, 
obstinacy and indifference. Those who do, are shown to have 
begun a process of reflection upon fundamental philosophical 
questions and upon themselves. The success of their new 
investigations is marginalised, while their willingness to 
undertake them at all is moved to the centre. Thus, the simple 
inability to reason effectively, while crucially important for 
Plato, is not the entire story. Unwillingness to make the effort 
and, thereby, be improved, completes the idea of motivation 
and responsibility that he wants to convey. The question of 
how to live one’s life implies responsibility for the choices 
made. But am I even asking myself that question if I do not 
take a critical stance toward myself now? Polemarchus’ 
unwillingness to listen becomes more profound than it already 
appears to be in the context of the Republic.
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